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USING INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE AS A CONCEPTUAL TOOL: 
AN EXAMINATION OF COGNITION IN IMPROVISED MUSICAL PERFORMANCE 
TIMOTHY THOMAS SA YER 
Abstract 
Viewing musical improvisation in the light of psychology and cognitive science, this thesis will 
explicate the rationale behind the development of a software based audiovisual interface for use 
in improvised solo instrumental performance. The evolution of the performance environment is 
presented along with the theories and concepts that have shaped its progress. The opening 
chapter will review the terms of reference used throughout the work and will set a boundary 
around the area of examination. Chapter two will place musical improvisation within the context 
of human behaviour and in so doing will draw upon theoretical discourse from the fie lds of 
evolutionary psychology and cognitive science. This chapter will explore the nature of volition 
and its relationship with subconscious processing, drawing upon anecdotal evidence from 
improvising musicians as linkage between theory and practice. Chapter 3 augments the study of 
the inner world of the improvising musician by encompassing the communicative functions of 
this activity. The boundary of this study does not embrace musical interactions between 
musicians in a diaJogic sense, my remit here is to explore behavioural response to sensory 
information and the mechanism by which this may or may not manifest itself in conscious 
thought. Chapter 4 sees the development of a theoretical model with which to contextualise the 
practice of musical improvisation and to provide the foundation from which to evolve the 
architecture for an experimental performance envi ronment. This leads in Chapter 5 to a 
discussion around the function and nature of tools as problem solving devices. looking at 
conceptual and physical tools and the mapping of functionality. The discourse in this chapter is 
aimed at providing a rationale for the development of a software based tool to address some of 
the issues raised previously in the study. The concluding chapter will document the evolution of 
a software based audio-visual performance environment, mapping its various incarnations and its 
relationship to the theoretical model developed over the course of the pervious chapters. This 
chapter will refer to documentation and audio visual material on CD Rom and DVD found in 
Appendix l. 
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Introduction - A Personal Statement 
This work has been the culmination of a journey that has taken many years to complete. I 
ftrst began playing the trumpet at primary school and continued in secondary school, working 
my way through the grade system. On leaving secondary education, the vast majority of my 
peers from my inner-city comprehensive school moved seamlessly into apprenticeships at 
Portsmouth dockyard. Having a strong desire to pursue music as a career, the only option 
presented to me was to join the services. On my departure from the services I undertook 'A' 
levels and an interest in improvisation through modem jazz grew, hearing for the first time 
live performances by Dizzy Gillespie, Miles Davis, Keith Jarrett, John McLaughlin and the 
like. There is a sense that I was attracted to jazz not purely as a musical phenomenon. The 
stories, anecdotes and urban myths that have imbued the world of jazz convey a sense of 
excitement and nonconformity which I found attractive as an adolescent. IronicaJiy as the 
years have passed, it is the extra musical aspects of this genre that have caused me to question 
the validity of what I do when I perform jazz. That is not to say I don't gain significant 
satisfaction and enjoyment from performing this music, but I am acutely aware that this 
endeavour owes a significant debt to a musical and cultural lineage that is not my own. 
I attended Dartington College of Arts during the eighties and was lucky enough to fall under 
the wing of trombonist and composer, Jim Fulkerson. This encounter had a significant effect 
on my trumpet playing and musical aspirations. I was introduced to extended brass 
techniques, new approaches to improvisation and players such as Albert Mangelsdorf and 
Evan Parker. As a player, I began to feel empathy with the musical movement broadly 
termed 'free improvisation' and felt comfortable operating within that aesthetic and lineage. 
On leaving Dartington I undertook an MSc in computer science in Stafford and 
simultaneously found myself being engaged for commercial trumpet playing work in London. 
I lived and played in London for a number of years before returning to Devon to take up a 
lecturing position at the College of St Mark and St John where I currently teach digital media. 
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The reason I find it hard to pin point where the journey of this study began is because over 
many years of playing, a whole host of concerns, anxieties, annoyances and intrigues have 
influenced my desire to gain a greater understanding of improvised music making and to 
explore the various parameters that exist in this performance paradigm. I will recount three 
examples of the types of incidents that have fuelled my motivation. 
Playing From A Script -During the 1980's I was engaged to play at the WOMAD festival 
with a free jazz ensemble named 'Out To Breakfast', the members of which I knew only 
vaguely. When I arrived I was presented with a number of scripts which related to the 
sections of the performance. The scripts contained either specific instructions, some prose or 
a combination of the two. Each script was to be read prior to the section commencing and 
each performer was required to bring to mind the sentiment of the prose contained within the 
script. I was intrigued by the influence that the prose had on the performance, and was 
surprised at how such a subtle intervention could have such a profound effect on the 
behaviour of the musicians. It seemed to me that in many ways, the prose was a more 
effective tool than the instructions for eliciting a particular response from the musicians. 
Playing When Angry- There was once an occasion when I arrived at an engagement only to 
find I had been double booked with another player. Far from being apologetic, the organisers 
were very discourteous. I had no means of leaving the venue because I was reliant upon a lift 
from another musician, and so I had to wait in the dressing room for the duration. With 
nothing much to distract me, I became angrier and angrier as time went on. Towards the end 
of the performance, one of the band members came from the stage and asked me if I would be 
prepared to come and improvise in the last piece, to whjch I agreed. It was a truly cathartic 
experience in which my emotional state had a significant effect on my playing. It may seem 
obvious that an improvising musician' s emotional state will influence their playing, but what 
occurred to me, was the possibility that this emotional state could be malleable and could be 
harnessed in some way within a performance parameter space. 
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Playing When Distracted - Some years ago at Christmas time I was performing with a 
quartet at a seasonal meal for a large corporation. The meal was housed in a marquee 
positioned adjacent to a stately home. The temperature in the marquee was very cold and 
many of the guests complained. The management positioned electric heaters around the 
perimeter of the marquee and linked them together with electrical extension cables and then 
connected the whole lot to a single power point. When the switch was thrown to turn on the 
heaters, a fuse was blown and the whole place was plunged into darkness. The quartet 
continued to play, not through any sense of duty, but purely because our minds had been 
distracted from the music. I can quite vividly remember wondering if I was in any danger and 
thinking through the ramifications of an electrical overload such as this. I then became aware 
that there were many waiters clearing tables, with plates piled high on their arms which were 
beginning to fall off as they tripped and stumbled around in the darkness. When my mind 
returned to my playing, it took a moment for me to catch up with what I was doing and where 
I was going in my improvisation. We finished the piece in darkness and the audience cheered 
and applauded heartily for the first time in the whole evening. It seemed somewhat ironic that 
the darkness had brought their conscious attention to the music while simultaneously taking 
mine away. 
In undertaking this study it has occurred to me that it is an audience that makes music, not a 
musician. It is the choice of an audience member to interpret sound as music or not. I use the 
word choice not to denote a conscious choice but a human, primal choice, a choice based on 
an internal decision provided by the cognitive models which a person's sub-conscious uses to 
process and interpret sound. The condition for this decision is evaluated differently by 
different people because the resources used to make that evaluation are different for different 
people. In the case of a piece of composed music, the decisions made in the construction of 
the piece can be taken in the light of possible/probable interpretations constructed by an 
audience, as a result of their processing of the sound. An improvising musician is 
simultaneously both creator and consumer of the sound world which s/he shares with the 
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audience. This dual role puts the performer in conflict between, on the one hand, the desire 
to construct meaning by interpreting sound in the light of pre-existing cognitive models of 
what constitutes music, and on the other hand, augmenting the existing model to include 
within the interpretation, musical material which doesn' t exist within that model. As an 
improvising musician this seems to be at the heart of my dilemma, fuelling my motivation to 
construct new improvised music performance environments .. 
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Chapter 1 - Terms Of Reference 
This study is an examination of cognition in improvised musical performance and explores 
the potential of interactive software to provide conceptual tools to address some of the issues 
which arise from this examination. Part of this endeavour is to provide a practical and 
theoretical framework for the creation of improvised musical performance in which 
psychological techniques and technological intervention are used as tools to augment and 
challenge established notions of a performance paradigm. To that end the study will comprise 
explorations into a variety of theoretical arenas to underpin the conceptual basis for the model 
of the performance paradigm and the development of computer based performance systems. 
Project documentation for the evolution of the system and documentation of its use are also 
included. 
This chapter will define terms and techniques which will be utilised within this study. It will 
define a boundary around the area of study and justify the elements that have been included 
and excluded. It would be impossible to elucidate all the influences that have come to bear on 
the development of this work: the volume would be too great, many would have little 
relevance and perhaps most importantly many have not revealed themselves and perhaps 
never will. Many pragmatic issues, however, can be dealt with. Issues of process, 
methodology, language and interpretation can be discussed in terms of their usage and the 
manner of their expression. 
1 .1 Systems Theory 
Throughout the research I have undertaken to complete this study, systems theory has 
reoccurred as a theme numerous times in differing contexts. Although I have been aware of 
systems analysis methodologies within the field of computer science I became aware of the 
parallel development of systems theory within a range of other disciplines, disciplines that 
have come to bear significant influence on my examination of the improvised music 
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performance paradigm. The definition of systems theory offered by Heylighen and Joslyn is 
sympathetic to my own understanding of this term. 
Systems Theory: the transdisciplinary study of the abstract organization of phenomena, 
independent of their substance, type, or spatial or temporal scale of existence. 
(Heylighen and Joslyn 1992) 
I have constructed an initial premise from this philosophical perspective. The premise being 
that there is not a system in the material world that exists in isolation from all other systems 
be it physical, biological or conceptual, with musical improvisation being no exception. Not 
only is this activity non-autonomous but it continues to defy a consensual defmition amongst 
those who engage in it and those who study it. Like so many culturally defined super-ordinate 
terms ' improvisation' is used in reference to a range of human activities and even when 
applied to those that are classified as 'musical' it fails to provide a consistent term of 
reference. Viewing musical improvisation as a communication system comprising many 
subsystems will I hope clarify the areas of the process under examination in this study. 
Like natural language, music is a system that consists of a hierarchy of systems. Each 
system has its fundamental components: the 1/50,000111 -of-a-second micro-sound 
sample, the note or sound event, themes and phrases, and ultimately the structure of a 
complete work. Each system has its rules for describing its structures: for combining 
and sequencing elements. And each system can itself be seen as the base element of 
another system at a different level in the hierarchy. (Holtzman 1994) [156] 
From here on, I will use the term ' improvisation' to refer to musical improvisation. Within 
this human activity the domain in which I have particular interest comprises systems that 
support the preconception, conception and formalization of ideas. Although there is not a 
large body of work providing an examination of this domain, specifically in relation to the 
spontaneous creation of musical material , there does exist a wealth of material within the 
fields of evolutionary studies. cognitive and behavioral science and linguistics with which to 
construct a plausible model of improvisational behaviour in the field of music. 
Improvisation exists in a variety of physical locations and social contexts. It can be engaged 
in by differing numbers of participants and be subject to a variety of organisational and 
relational forms. This study is primarily concerned with exploring improvisation from a 
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performer-centric perspective not in terms of audience perception or to any great extent 
evaluating the musical output of the performance. This is an examination of improvised 
music making as human behaviour, investigating the experiences which relate to an individual 
engaged in that activity. No discrete evaluation of group dynamics, player/audience 
relationships or socio-political theory will be undertaken. To that end, performance 
environments developed as part of this study have involved solo performers interacting with 
technological systems. 
1.2 Spoken Language 
In certain contexts there exists a broad similarity between musical improvisation and spoken 
language, with the seemingly seamless formulation, encoding and transmission of sonic 
material. During this study reference is specifically made to spoken language, as opposed to 
written language and mark making, because of the area of commonality that many 
practitioners perceive it to have with improvised music. Some of the observations applied to 
language in this section may therefore not apply universally to all aspects of language but 
only to spoken language as it occurs spontaneously and naturally. This does not therefore 
include narration, recitation or any form of vocal commentary which is delivered via the use 
of a pre-written script. The aspect of language explored in relation to this study focuses on the 
mechanics and physicality of the spontaneous formulation, encoding and delivery of linguistic 
information via vocal transmission. That is to say, the analysis of linguistic content in terms 
of cultural and critical theory and semiotics will not play a significant role in this study. 
1.3 Cognitive Science and Neuroscience 
It is perhaps inevitable that the analysis of an aspect of human endeavour in terms of its 
behavioural characteristics will encroach on the area of psychology and neuroscience. I 
attempt to treat these themes discretely, dealing mainly with the implications for 
improvisation arising from the field of psychology and cognitive science. There seems to be 
a legitimacy in divorcing these two fields, a view held by Fodor who clearly believes that 
cognitive science and neurophysiology can and should be studied independently. 
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This cnttctsm is bolstered by Fodor' s endorsement of the strict separation of 
psychology from neuroscience. According to Fodor, the neurological properties of the 
brain are irrelevant to its cognitive properties. (Zawidzki) 
Within this particular area of examination it is necessary to highlight any potential mismatch 
in terminology. One such misinterpretation could occur when dealing with the concept of 
perception. When making reference to perceptual processes, in the light of Sperber's work, I 
should make clear that I am not alluding to conscious perception but to the low level 
processes responsible for receiving sensory data prior to that data being conceptualised and 
passed to consciousness for human perception. The distinction between perception as 
receptivity rather than consciousness is one made strongly by Debono in his examination of 
perception in plants and evolution of human consciousness. (Debono 2004) 
It is particularly necessary to distinguish between the various uses of the word perception, in 
chapter 4, when dealing with the notion of mapping. When examining a conceptually high 
level activity such as a musical performance a satisfactory definition of this term could be to 
make manifest a conscious response to sensory data based on the recognition and 
interpretation of that data. When examining human activity at a lower conceptual level, such 
as the inner workings of cognition, it is necessary to refine this definition to exclude 
consciousness from the process. The distinction between the term 'perception' in relation to 
low level perceptual processes and its general usage which tends to refer to 'conscious-
perception' is very important to establish, however is it essential that the latter is understood 
to be perception that is revealed to consciousness and not constructed by or controlled by 
consciousness. Throughout this study consciousness is regarded as the passive receptor of 
information, the passenger rather than the driver and so 'conscious-perception' refers to 
perception of which one is conscious as opposed to the lower level perceptual modules of 
which one is not conscious. In justifying this position I wi ll develop the notions of 'bio-
mechanical ' and 'cognate-mechanical' behaviour as a means of distinguishing these two types 
of perception. 
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1.4 Metaphor of Mind 
Throughout the ages, metaphors to describe brain processes have been borrowed from the 
technology of the day. This phenomenon has been traced by authors such as Frank Tallis 
(Tallis 2002). Phraseology such as ' letting off steam' and 'being under pressure ' originated in 
the hydraulic era of the 19th century. This was followed by the introduction of electricity in 
the 20th century and with it notions of being a 'bright spark', ' run down' or 'blowing a fuse '. 
Some believe that the relationship between psychological metaphor and the technology of the 
day will expire as knowledge about the mind becomes based more on hard science than 
conjecture, and as the field develops its own vernacular. 
Thankfully, the study of the human brain itself has advanced tremendously over the 
past decade. We now have a direct understanding of how the brain itself works which 
is unparalleled in history. It is to be hoped that metaphorical reference to current 
technologies may no longer be necessary in future years. (Tyrrell 2003) 
Although this may become apparent in the future, at the moment the metaphorical language of 
computer technology has a significant influence on the language used to describe matters of 
the mind. Crude parallels between working, short and long term memory in humans are 
regularly drawn with memory in computers. Cognitive processes in humans are perhaps 
equated to data processing in computers, with operating systems that utilise interrupt levels 
mapping onto the notion of cognitive goal states. 
From time to time during the course of this study I have adopted this metaphorical approach 
in order to abstract a particular meaning. I have done so for two main reasons. Firstly, it 
serves my purpose to draw analogies with computer technology since there is a re lationship 
between my interpretation of human cognition and the development of a software based 
performance tool. The second reason is that it is a common analogy used in the literature and 
hence it is used in work I have referenced, to elucidate concepts that are apposite to my 
theme. I am mindful of the fact that the mind - computer analogy is an anathema to many 
academics but I would suggest that in the context of this work its use as metaphor is quite 
benign. It is not my intention to present the technological component of this thesis as having 
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a mimetic relationship with human cognitive processing but to embrace the notion of the 
computer as offering a form of prosthetic mental functioning or as Fredrick Brooks would 
have it 'Intelligence Amplification'. (Reingold 1991) David Cope draws on the vision of 
Jacob Bronowsky in his examination of the relationship between composer and computer and 
it is this sentiment that I have tried to embody in the relationship this study sets up between 
improvising performer and computer. His notion of the continuous relationship between 
humans and machines resonates strongly with the ideas surrounding tools and prosthetics 
discussed in chapter 4. 
we are now coming to realize that humans and the machines they create are 
continuous and that the same conceptual schemes that help explain the workings of 
the brain also explain the workings of a "thinking machine." Human pride and its 
attendant refusal or hesitation to acknowledge this continuity form a substratum upon 
which much of the distrust of technology and an industrialized society has been reared. 
Ultimately this distrust rests on the refusal by humans to understand and accept their 
nature- as beings continuous with the tools and machines they construct. (Bronowsky 
1993) [4] 
1.5 Anecdotal Evidence 
In collecting evidence for this study I have deliberately limited the field of enquiry to material 
which explicates the behaviour of an improvising musician and explores possibilities for 
technological intervention. A main tenet of this investigation is therefore the performer 
experience and as such anecdotal evidence has been an important source of information. I do 
not regard an anecdote, in any sense, to represent a truism, but it can be used as an indication 
of perception. That is to say, its accuracy may be called into question but, unless the subject 
is deliberately lying, it can be regarded as a reasonable reflection of what was perceived. ln 
that sense anecdotes are valuable but it needs to be appreciated that they are expressions of 
closest fit mappings that may or may not accurately correlate the performer's internal and 
external worlds. Anecdotes, personal as they are, cannot escape the crudity of language as a 
tool to represent a domain, such as music, that could be considered in some sense meta-
lingual. 
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Anecdotes are also interesting because they can often reveal a mismatch between perceived 
reality and the actual reality. They present an opportunity for an observer to reconcile the 
improviser's duality in their performance, that of producer and consumer. For the musician it 
is a chance to offer justification in situations for which it may not be possible to offer an 
objective, logically causal explanation; things that just happen. They are useful devices for 
performers in attempting to rationalise the irrational. 
1.6 The Scope of the Prototype 
It is important to acknowledge the substantial amount of research that is currently being 
undertaken in the field of computer music interface design. A reasonable overview is 
presented by Di Scipio and others. (Di Scipio 2003) It must be understood that the remit of 
this project does not extend to the advancement of fields such as generative and algorithmic 
music, pitch or beat tracking, autonomous agent technology, artificial life, advanced DSP or 
any other topical area of computer music systems development. Sound processing and 
production algorithms developed for this study exist only to provide a range of mappings onto 
the performance parameter space. This mapping attempts to interface with an improvising 
performer's cognitive and psychological state. The visual and sonic output from the 
computer is responsive to the performer's musical output by using a range of stochastic 
processes governing the behaviour of the various software components. A working prototype 
has been developed for this study to explore these ideas which interfaces routines for 
producing a visual response to the performer and routines for producing a sonic response. 
Because of the component based architecture that has been adopted for the development of 
this prototype the audio visual routines that have been submitted could be substituted for 
patches produced by other developers. Although during the period of research a number of 
stand-alone performance systems have been produced it was always the intention to 
ultimately produce a flexible tool rather than a fixed artifact and as such the majority of the 
development effort has been applied to the framework rather than the patches with which it 
interfaces. 
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1.7 Tools and Toolmakers 
As with traditional tools, computer based tools can be viewed as existing sometimes 
discreetly and sometimes layered between, and interfacing with, other tools. Just as a work 
bench can interface with a vice or a pillar drill and the drill can interface with a range of bits, 
so it is with software. The main difference between the traditional and the digital is that for 
software tools it is generally only the layer that interfaces with the user that is visible. The 
layers on which the top layer depends are buried like Russian dolls beneath a stack of 
software components that are ultimately supported by the machine's native language. The 
sub-layers provide the necessary servicing up and down the hierarchy in order that the human 
computer interface can provide its promised functionality but without revealing themselves to 
the user. It is interesting how the traditional view of the tool clearly attributes notions of 
invention and creativity entire ly with the tool 's user with minimal credit given to the tool 's 
c reator. In the world of software the situation is rarely clear cut. It is not uncommon for 
someone working in a computer based environment to be simultaneously utilising half a 
dozen or more software components simultaneously, from the graphical user interface, the 
database engine, the audio plug-ins, the display drivers, the operating system and the bios. 
The ISO interconnecting network model is a prime example. This model is a seven layer 
standard defined by the International Standards Committee which defines, for each layer, 
services to the network layer above and below while maintaining a protocol compatibility 
with the equivalent layer on the system with which it is communicating. It is important to be 
aware of the notion of a system or tool being comprised of layered components in order to 
appreciate at what conceptual leve l the creation of a new piece of software has been 
undertaken. The lower level or more ' native' the software is to the machine on which it is 
being executed, the less reliant it is on building blocks provided from other sources. There is 
of course a trade off between working at the highest and lowest level. The amount of time 
and effort needed to complete a task rises exponentia lly the lower the level of the 
development environment, where as the higher the leve l of the development the less 
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expressive the environment becomes. Imagine writing a book using only language suitable 
for five years olds at one extreme and creating a new language from scratch with which to 
write a book at the other extreme: complete freedom to create the book and the language in 
which it is written, on the one hand and being restricted to a sub set of the language on the 
other. The production of software tools can be positioned in one of two broad camps. It may 
be helpful to position software produced for this project in relation to the development 
process and its eventual usage. Broadly speaking a software tool can be used by a software 
developer to create other pieces of software, a software 'hammer and saw' if you like, or it 
can be a tool for an end user, a software 'chair and table' . 
In the creation of the various interfaces to explore the ideas and concepts in this project it was 
necessary to frrst construct the former in order to create the latter. I will refer to the former as 
the prototype development tool and the latter as the application or performance system. The 
prototype development tool in its present form has been constructed using a high level 
development environment and comprises a versatile software component that is parameterised 
and configurable. It is designed for use within the development environment by novice 
programmers to construct performance systems. 
1.8 The Conceptual Tool 
The term 'conceptual tool' requires clarification in the context of this study. In some sense it 
is true that I have produced an artifact which can be used to make performances, and in that 
sense it could be regarded as a physical tool. From my perspective I view the artifact I have 
created as being a realisation of a conceptual tool and that the idea of making an instance of 
the conceptual tool need not be confined to a software application. 
In essence the conceptual tool I have created comprises two maps, one interfacing the 
performer's sensory perception to their behaviour and the other interfacing their behaviour to 
a responsive environment. The first map is realised using a hypnotic script, delivered prior to 
the performer consciously engaging in the performance. This script is designed to circumvent 
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the performer's normal response mechanisms in a performance situation. What I am 
describing when I use the term 'normal' are musical responses that the performer recognises 
as being automatic or mechanical. It is important to reiterate that this does not take an 
audience's perspective into account. There is always someone in the audience for which the 
whole performance is likely to be new. The mapping procedure for the first map, expounded 
in chapter 4, is executed in three stages, the third stage being the performance. The mapping 
procedure for the second map is undertaken largely by the performance designer, which may 
or may not be the same person as the performer. The function of the performance designer is 
to make decisions about the nature of the performance, such as duration, number of sections 
etc. and to configure the sonic input to the audio/visual response. This mapping can be 
completed entirely prior to the performance or can be manipulated in real time during the 
performance. Obviously if one person is both performer and performance designer, real time 
manipulation during performance would be problematic. In the construction of the first map, 
the hypnotic techniques I have employed owe much to the Milton Erickson school of 
hypnosis which make significant use of metaphor in its hypnotherapeutic interventions. In 
this regard I have not adopted what might be regarded as 'hard-core' post hypnotic suggestion 
in the scripts I have developed. My reasoning in this has been guided by my belief that the 
function of my research is to emancipate a performer's musical behaviour from the 
constraints of their conscious mind rather than to impose upon them constraints which I have 
constructed. 
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Chapter 2 - Improvisation and Human Behaviour 
2.1 Evolution of the Brain- Spontaneity Versus Learnt Behaviour 
In recent years the development of evolutionary psychology has pointed the way to a new 
interpretation of human behaviour. The suggestion being that, along with physical 
adaptations that have taken place over the course of history, human beings' behaviour has 
experienced a similar evolution. It is clear that the majority of human cognitive processing is 
undertaken subconsciously and that those processes that seem straightforward and innate to us 
are in fact far too complex for most people to understand on a conscious level. Playing chess 
is a relatively simple process compared to the mechanics of actually seeing the chess pieces, 
yet we perceive playing chess as quite challenging but 'seeing' very easy. We learn to play 
chess but we 'see' instinctively, this relationship between the 'innate' and the 'learned' is 
interesting when examined in relation to musical improvisation. Cosmides and Tooby 
suggest that the modern human skull houses a stone age mind in which the 'innate' and the 
'learned' are not opposites, with the desire and ability to learn being itself instinctive. 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1997) Even if this were the case, it still does not deny the possibility of 
an evolving relationship between the two. In fact, there seems to be a strong case to suggest 
that the evolution of this relationship is supported by humans' biological evolution. As 
Gurney suggests, the development of the thalamus and neocortex has led to greater control 
over behaviour thus reducing automatic or reflex type responses in favour of learned 
responses . 
. . . reasoning points to the separation of the new planning and reasoning areas of the 
brain from the older 'emotional' centres. It is conjecture that herein lies the reason for 
man' s 'objectivity' . He is less subject to the immediate demands of his emotions. The 
separation of the reasoning and emotional centres would have provided the 
opportunity for man to cope rationally with most situations, since it is known that 
strong emotions tend to disrupt organized behaviour, including learning. (Gurney 
1973) [42] 
The consequences of a cognitive pull such as this could have significant ramifications within 
the field of musical improvisation. Many of the frustrations expressed by improvising 
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musicians centre around the continuous battle to generate original material; to evolve the 
music beyond that which has been played before. In this endeavour it may seem that the 
improvising musician is swimming against the evolutionary tide. 
one of the themes of man's emergence was the loosening of instinctive reflex actions 
in favour of the learned control of voluntary behaviour. (Gurney 1973) [40] 
Gavin Bryars, once working as a bass player in the field of improvisation, moved away from 
this practice to create music through composition. The demise of his belief in improvisation 
as a valid art form came as a result of experiencing performances which in some sense 
seemed to be fraudulent. Although he identifies instances where he believes performers are 
knowingly deceiving in their performance, his issue with improvisation seems also to exist on 
a general level. In his discourse with. Derek Bailey he extends his objection beyond that of 
deliberate deception in his assessment of the relationship between improvising musicians and 
the music they create. 
One of the main reasons I am against improvisation now is that in any improvising 
position the person creating the music is identified with the music. The two things are 
seen to be synonymous. (Bailey 1992) [ 115] 
Bryars seems to be intimating that it is impossible for an improvising musician to remain 
objective during a performance, and that this psychological state compromises the autonomy 
of the art work. It is not only within the field of improvisation that this psychological state has 
been identified. The Russian philosopher Peter Ouspensky in his paper 'The psychology of 
man 's possible evolution' identified four general states of consciousness; 1 - sleep, 2- waking 
sleep or relative consciousness, 3 - self-consciousness and 4 - objective consciousness. 
Ouspensky places these states on a continuum from subjecti ve to objective with state number 
one, sleep, being purely subjective. Ouspensky suggests that people tend to spend the vast 
majority of their waking life in state number 2, in which their subjectivity is extended to 
include the perception of 'I' and 'not I'. Within this state he defines a number of 
characteristics and traits that people exhibit, one of which lends weight to Bryars' 
observations. 
- 18 -
' Identifying' or ' identification' is a curious state in which man passes more than half 
of his life. He 'identifies' with everything: with what he says, what he feels, what he 
believes, what he does not believe, what he wishes, what he does not wish, what 
attracts him and what repels him. Everything absorbs him, and he cannot separate 
himself from the idea, the feeling, of the object that absorbed him. This means that in 
the state of identification man is incapable of looking impartially on the object of his 
identification. It is difficult to find the smallest thing with which man is unable to 
"identify' . At the same time, in a state of identification, man has even less control 
over his mechanical reactions than at any other time. (Ouspensky 1940) [42] 
If this state is so ubiquitous, then the premise that, when two or more sentient beings 
communicate they are performing a conscious objective act, must perhaps re-evaluated. This 
argument has been employed by Karl Rosengren and others to distinguish the way human 
beings communicate from other animals and plants. 
when human beings communicate, we know that we do so. Each one of two 
communicating participants is aware of the (sometimes potential) presence of the 
other, and of the fact that communication is occurring (or may occur). (Rosengren 
2000) [6] 
An additional flaw in this premise, that supports Ouspensky's theory, is that much of our 
communication exists on channels that are not generally subject to intellectual filtering, body 
language and vocal intonation being two obvious examples. This situation exists in an 
improvised music setting as much as anywhere else. Facial expression, speed of movement, 
body gesture, physical positioning etc. are all able to communicate information in which the 
performer' s perceived intent plays no part. Cook's analysis of multimedia communication 
suggests that gesture and body movements of musicians, whether conscious or not, form part 
of the communication medium. He cites the performances of Jimi Hendrix as an example 
where the interaction of sound and body movements becomes a source of meaning. (Cook 
1998) [263] 
Rosengren 's typology extends the model of communication to include what he terms 
unintentional and subconscious transmission. 
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Individual is conscious of action/behaviour 
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= .:2 ..... No 3 bodily behaviour such as 4 unconscious bodily behaviour such 
-<.J blushing, stuttering, sweating, as small facial changes < 
trembling 
(Rosengren 1984) [7] 
Figure 2.1 A communicative-orientated typology of action and behaviour 
While the inclusion of these aspects offers us insight, by way of exemplars of the types of 
behaviour that are generally regarded as involuntary, the overa ll model, which suggests the 
conscious and subconscious to be a binary state, remains problematic. Ouspensky's notion of 
consciousness as a continuum on which a human activity can be placed in accordance with a 
persons' overall psychological state seems more plausible. 
In connection with this I must say at once that I do not mean what is called in modem 
psychology ' the subconscious' or ' the subconscious mind ' . These are simply wrong 
expressions. wrong terms, which mean nothing and do not refer to any real facts. 
There is nothing permanently subconscious in us because there is nothing 
permanently conscious; and there is no 'subconscious mind ' for the very simple 
reason that there is no 'conscious mind '. (Ouspensky 1940) [29) 
The suggestion by Ouspensky seems to be that cerebral activity is in constant flux, never 
achieving an absolute state and that the conscious and subconscious domains are influential in 
all psychological phenomena. 
2.2 Models of Memory 
In his examination of improvisation and cognition Pressing makes a distinction between long 
and short term memory in a musical context in which he suggests that long term memory 
tends to hold information relating to the stylistic context in which the performance exists. 
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This could include the musical tradition, standard repertoire and instrumental technique. 
Pressing's notion of short term memory is rather akjn to the more popular term 'workjng 
memory' which relates to temporary storage during engagement in a mental process. He sees 
short term memory as retaining information localised to the current delivery moment in a 
performance. This suggests that the performer circumvents Miller's limitation of the 
conscious mind by chunking together pieces of primary data into higher conceptual constructs 
(Miller 1956). Just as a reader assimilates words rather than letters, a jazz musician utilises 
chord sequences rather than individual notes. While these two memory modes are useful 
reference points in examining the information processing that takes place during a musical 
performance, it provides only a continuum on which to place an information retrieval activity. 
This is because there is no definable boundary between short and long term memory. If the 
moment-by-moment choices that a musician is makjng are beholden to a higher conceptual 
order utilised by the chunkjng activity, then this conceptual order must reside in long term 
memory. Chunkjng is not a discreet activity; it relies on the primary source of data and the 
conceptual system from which the chunks are created. 
The traditional distinction into short- and long-term stores is adequate for many 
purposes. Long-term memory critically shapes the kind of sound ideas the performer 
will produce, and the way in which they will be developed. This memory ranges over 
musical theory and composition concepts, 'auditory images', specific pieces and 
motives, and memorized muscular sequences (action units), corresponding roughly to 
the traditional music labels of theory, musicianship, repertoire and technique. Each of 
these areas allows the cognitive organization of many events under smaller umbre lla 
concepts like scale, modulation, interval of a major sixth, mordant, 'swing' time, etc. 
(Pressing 1984) l360] 
Pressing has presented the extremes of the long term. short term continuum without 
convincingly addressing the murky area where they touch. ln some ways even the notion of a 
continuum is too clean a concept and there is perhaps room for an interpretation of long and 
short term memory in which the two modes overlap. The human brain is so efficient at 
processing and interpreting data that it is sometimes hard to distinguish between that which is 
currently being processed and that which is offered from memory as an interpretation. Take 
the following example: 
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Aoccdmig to rscheearch at an El.ingsh uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer in waht oredr the 
ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht frist and lsat ltteer is at the rghit 
pclae. The rset can be a toatl mses and you can sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is 
bcuseae we do not raed ervey lteter by it slef but the wrod as a wlohe. 
This is an example of what might be termed meta-chunking. If we look at the words m 
isolation then this cognitive trick doesn' t work. If the chunking process fails to offer an 
acceptable interpretation (i.e. one that creates a match in long term memory) then the 
chunking process moves to the next level of abstraction. Instead of looking at the letter in 
context it looks at the word in context. This is undoubtedly an extremely helpful facility, a 
pre-processor that parses incoming data and presents it in an acceptable form for semantic 
interpretation. This is helpful indeed, unless it is unwanted, in which case there is a huge 
cognitive overhead required to suppress the facility. Reading the previous paragraph as is, 
without making the automatic corrections, is hard work. 
The discussion on memory so far has focused largely around information retrieval. There are 
however, issues surrounding the encoding and storage of information in memory which are 
relevant to the improvising musician. In defending an umbrella notion of memory rather than 
a number of discrete types of memory, Copelman suggests that although we can use a number 
of different concepts to understand the way information is encoded, stored and retrieved, they 
rarely, if ever, operate in isolation. (Copelman 2003) Long term memory contains short term 
memories that have been filtered in accordance with personal goal states. These goal states, 
according to Conway, are largely responsible for decisions about what is filtered in, what is 
filtered out and what type of structure the information is he ld in. (Conway 2003) It is 
interesting that by drawing from the world of computing, metaphors such as data types, data 
structures and symbol tables, we are able to conceptualise this process in a similar vein to 
Miller in 1956. 
Our memories are limited by the number of units or symbols we must master, and not 
by the amount of information that these symbols represent. Thus it is helpful to 
organise material inte lligently before we try to memorize it. (Miller 1956) 
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Although Miller's observation is undoubtedly correct, there is no way, as yet, to concur that 
the external organisation of information that is committed to memory has a correlation to its 
internal representation. Similarly, the logical representation of data on a computer screen, as 
perceived by an operator, is likely to be organised very differently to the internal data model. 
In terms of locating and retrieving information, human logic is not necessarily efficient. 
Copelman also suggests that, contrary to what we might like to believe, we have very little 
conscious control over the management of our memory. He suggests that even though we 
might make a conscious effort to remember things, whether they stick or not is beyond 
conscious control. The vast majority of information we retrieve from memory has been 
encoded and stored without our being aware. 
Another way of conceptualising memory, orthogonal to the long/short term model, is with a 
semantic/episodic framework. This concept relates to the nature of the information being 
encoded and stored rather than the time frame, with the term semantic memory representing 
facts and concepts and with episodic or autobiographical memory representing events. For a 
performer the chord sequence for a particular jazz standard would use semantic memory, 
while a particular performance would use episodic memory. The performer may remember 
exactly the chord sequence but is unlikely to be able to recall the event of it being learnt. On 
the other hand remembering a performance is likely to bring back lots of contextual 
information but without the precision of every aspect of the event. In this instance it seems 
reasonable to concur with Copelman that the operation of these modes is interrelated in some 
way. For example, if a particular performance introduced a new chord substitution it is 
possible that over a period of time that substitution would become assimilated and eventually 
become the norm, thus moving from episodic memory to semantic memory. 
2.3 Motor Control and Skill Acquisition 
It is particularly important to distinguish between the higher order semantic/episodic and 
long/short modes of memory operation and that associated with motor skill acquisition and 
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performance. It is not necessary to explore the technicalities of how these systems operate but 
suffice to say that there is reasonable evidence to suggest that motor skill acquisition and 
performance operate in a completely different location in the brain and have a discrete 
physical operation to that of higher order memory. Copelman recalls a patient who, after 
suffering brain damage, experienced severe amnesia. He couldn' t remember the fact that he 
had learnt the piano or that he was an accomplished performer but amazingly he could still 
play very well. Motor ski ll execution is of particular importance to instrumenta l performers 
but there is a consistency across all physical motor skills in the manner of acquisition. The 
process seems to begin with the repetition of small units of activity, which may be undertaken 
and evaluated using multiple senses. In terms of a musical instrumentalist this obviously 
utilises audible feedback but probably uses a visual mode of feedback too, such as observing 
finger movement on a fret board. The process continues by constructing larger units from the 
primitive units of activity and so placing them in a range of contexts. At this stage the 
parameters and variants in the activities and their triggers can be developed. The repetitive act 
is in effect embedding a neural program into semantic memory which can then be triggered 
and passed a range of parameters. The effect of this is to significantly lighten the cognitive 
load, as once the activity has been triggered the detail in the activity can be undertaken with 
minimal conscious control, responding only to changes in its parameter space. A pianist could 
practice a scale in this way and when the motor units had been fully committed to memory the 
activity could be executed without conscious control over each of the component parts. The 
motor program may have a speed parameter that the pianist can control but is perhaps 
unlikely to have a parameter to change the interva ls between the notes. In this way a whole 
catalogue of functional units can be triggered and left to run, leaving enough cognitive 
capacity to be able to undertake other tasks. 
There is of course a distinction that needs to be made between the acquisi tion and retrieval of 
the activity units and the mode and manner in which they are assembled into larger 
conceptual units. Pressing makes this distinction by describing 'object memory' and ' process 
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memory' as the place where the two exist. Crudely speaking 'object memory' for an 
instrumental musician would hold the activity units associated with playing the instrument, 
often identified by the blanket term 'technique' . The information required to make use of the 
instrumental technique resides in ' process memory'. Tbis is where the techniques for what 
Pressing describes as 'compositional problem-solving' are held. Methods of sequencing and 
systems for manipulating the parameter space of an activity unit are stored in 'process 
memory' and retrieved in accordance with the particular mode of performance. It is perhaps 
worth returning to the notion of cognitive capacity in the light of the processing that 'process 
memory' feeds. Motor activities such as tying up a shoelace or having a shave are reasonably 
cheap on processing power, because the pathway through the activity units is comparatively 
static and can be easily predicted. However, the processing overhead will increase with 
human activities that require a higher level of monitoring and real-time manipulation. In the 
former case it's possible for a person to experience a sensation of 'switching off , rather like a 
screen saver appearing on a computer screen. However, in the case of creative activities, 
routines executed from 'process memory' holds are likely to be more dynamic, requiring 
monitoring and parameter adjustment thus making greater cognitive demands. In this case the 
brain has a complex resource management problem to address in order for the activity to be 
undertaken effectively. Activities such as game playing and musical improvisation fall into 
this category but, as with all activities they exist on a continuum somewhere between the 
extremes of static and dynamic. Their position on the continuum on a moment-by-moment 
basis is determined by the resource management of the brain but over a period of time can be 
influenced by the level of pre-programming, or practice that is undertaken. The instinct to 
efficiently resource cognitive activity can be a double-edged sword when engaging in a 
creative process such as improvisation. After years of encoding object and process memory it 
becomes possible for the whole 'creative' process to be undertaken by traversing chains of 
previously stored information. Pressing summarises opinion on this matter. 
Fitts (1965) labelled this the ' autonomic phase', whi le Schmidt (1968) referred to it as 
'automatization'. The result for the performer is a sensation of automaticity, an 
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uncanny feeling of being a spectator to one's own actions, since increasing amounts of 
cognitive processing and muscular subroutines are no longer consciously monitored 
(Welford, 1976) (Pressing 1984) 
The systems that govern the use of 'process memory' will be dealt with in significant detail at 
a later stage but it is important to establish here one essential facility that has a significant 
influence on its use, namely the notion of feedback. This term requires discrete examination 
because of the various interpretations that it has attracted in relation to its use in cognitive 
science. In particular, for the purpose of this study, it is worth exploring the role of feedback 
as an open or closed loop system. 
In this context, a close loop system describes the self-referential nature of activity units drawn 
from 'object memory' and subsequent evaluation for the purpose of error correction. Pressing 
describes one such feedback model, known as 'closed-loop negative feedback ' (CLNF) 
(Bernstien 1967), in which an evaluation of intended and actual output is fed back to an 
earlier stage in the control chain. It is perhaps this process of evaluation that problematises the 
existence of closed and open loop feedback systems in improvisation. The submission by 
Pressing (Pressing 1988) that a consensus exists which suggests that both systems coexist 
seems reasonable if one acknowledges that materia l drawn from process memory is also 
subjected to an evaluatory process, the result of which bears influence on the subsequent use 
of ac tivity units. In this scenario, evaluation is undertaken at two levels simultaneously, but 
the nature of the evaluation is necessarily very different. It seems appropriate to apply the 
principles of closed loop theory to the evaluation of the primitive motor units, which suggest 
that a ' perceptual trace' of an activity unit is built up from its previous executions to form a 
template against which to gauge the success of its current execution. This theory (Adams 
1976), has particular appeal for motor actions undertaken by improvising musicians because 
of the autonomou manner of their execution but is not sufficiently flexible to cope with this 
situation at the 'process memory' level. Pressing recognises why this should be the case when 
he asserts that in an improvising musician " the ability to construct new, meaningful pathways 
in an abstract cognitive space must be cultivated. Each such improvised pathway between 
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action units will sometimes follow existing hierarchical connections, and at other times break 
off in search of new connections" (Pressing 1984). He pursues this idea in his later work 
(Pressing 1988), by exploring various template matching theories, augmented to render them 
suitable for an open loop feedback system (e.g. motor schemata (Schmidt 1983), action plan 
(Miller, Galanter et al. 1960)). The attempt in these theories to increase the level of flexibility 
in the evaluation process is driven by the need to model the novelty or invention of 
improvised music. The addition of flexibility does not however resolve the dilemma posed by 
employing a template based model in the evaluation of a process which is in many instances 
striving to be template free. Where as it seems wholly reasonable to model the activity at 
micro level in these terms, it seems more plausible that any template based evaluation process 
is better suited to activities where the probability of template adjustment would be minimal. 
Another problematic area for both closed and open loop feedback is the fact that a mismatch 
between expected and actual output, which is regarded as constituting an error, is in some 
instances regarded, retrospectively, as desirable. In his book "Effortless Mastery", Kenny 
Werner takes an extreme view on this, entitling one of the chapters ' 'There Are No Wrong 
Notes". 
It was said of Monk that he could make a concert grand sound like an out-of-tune 
upright. There were certainly better pianists around in his day. So why was 
Thelonious Monk so revered? The answer is that he had the depth of sound, the 
arrogance to play what he wanted to play. He was uninhibited by mind and fortified 
by spirit. Behind every note was the belief that "this is the truth." He didn' t believe in 
wrong notes. He believed that they were right notes because he played them. (Werner 
1996) [89] 
It is hard to think of another activity with such a high reliance on motor skill activity that 
promotes such a positive attitude to the production of errors. Anecdotal evidence seems to 
support the notion that far from detracting from the activity. the errors are often regarded as 
enhancements. 
One renowned pianist remembered the relief he felt during a performance when he 
missed the specific keys he intended to hit and Charlie Parke r exclaimed, 'hear you,' 
having interpreted the erroneous pitches within the pieces ' framework as an 
interesting chord voicing. (Berliner 1994) [33] 
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2.4 The Limitations of Consciousness 
Improvisation like all other human activities has to exist within the confines of available 
human resources. The previous section has referred to some of the demands made on an 
improviser's cognitive resource, in terms of various types of memory encoding, storage and 
retrieval. It is perhaps important to emphasize, at this stage, that information that is being 
processed consciously at any one time is only a small subset of the overall cognitive workload 
that is being carried out. It should be remembered that consciousness is a system that is fed 
information on which it acts and that it sits beside and competes with a multitude of other 
cognitive systems for resources. That is not to say that if all other competing systems relented, 
consciousness's performance could be enhanced ad infinitum. Consciousness is subject to the 
boundary of its own limitations. Miller, in 1965, coined perhaps the best known phrase for 
expressing a limitation on consciousness, the magic number 7 +/- 2" (Miller 1956). This 
'magic number' represented the amount of information threads or 'chunks' that could be 
retained in working memory at any one tjme. Another limitation which profoundly affects the 
performance of consciousness relates to its speed of execution. 
There is a long tradition of trying to quantify the performance of human consciousness in 
terms of speed of performance. In the nineteenth century one of the pioneers of experimental 
psychology, the German Wilhelm Wundt, developed a range of mechanical devices to 
measure reaction times. Probably the most well known was a device that became known as 
'Wundt's complexity clock' . The principle of this device was to rotate a spot in front of the 
subject and to measure the time e lapsed between the subject being stimulated and the subject 
reacting. The rotation was at high speed allowing for greater accuracy in the results recorded. 
By the early part of the twentieth century an Austrian named Hans Berger had started to use 
electrodes placed on the outside of the skull to record brain activity. The technique was too 
imprecise to record anything other than very general brain states but by 1965 German 
neurophysiologists Kornhuber and Deecke used large amounts of repetition to compound the 
results from the technique and provide reliable data on brain activity around reaction timings. 
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In doing so they discovered a phenomenon they called 'readiness potential ' which suggested 
that the brain became active anything up to 1.5 seconds before an act was undertaken, in 
preparation (readiness) for the act to be performed. 
In the 1970s Benjamin Libet, professor of neurophysiology at the University of California 
Medical Center in San Francisco, took this research a stage further. Libet raised the question: 
if this time tag exists between preparation and the act when are we conscious of the act? It 
seemed obvious to rum that there wasn' t a 'one second gap' between deciding to do 
something and actually doing it. In 1979 he set up an experiment using Wilhelm Wundt's 
complexity clock to measure the time between the onset of brain activity, conscious initiation 
of an act and the actual act. The clock consisted of a television screen with a spot revolving at 
a speed of 2.56 seconds per revolution. The observer could then report where the spot was 
when they initiated an act. Libet discovered that readiness potential started 0.55 seconds 
before the act, while the subject became conscious 0.02 seconds before the act. Libet 
concluded that "cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous voluntary act of the kind studied 
here can and usually does begin unconsciously" (Libet 1985). From Libet' s findings it 
became evident that the brain can process a response to an externa lly initiated act more 
efficiently than one that is internally initiated. Our reactions are therefore quicker than our 
actions. As Norretranders observes, a burnt finger will be removed from a hot surface before 
we think "Ouch!". (Norretranders 1998) [221]. This discovery has fuelled the debate on 
determinism, free-will and volition which has fundamental implications for our understanding 
of human activities predicated on the notion of spontaneous creation, such as improvisation. 
Authors such as George Simmel have, since the early part of the century, been alluding to a 
psychology of consciousness whose function is to maintain an illusion of control and of the 
logical execution of volitional acts. 
Our actual psychological processes are governed by logic in a much slighter degree 
than their expressions make us believe. If we look closely at our conceptions as they 
pass our consciousness in a continuous temporal sequence, we find that there is a very 
great distance between any regulation by rational norms and the characteristics of 
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these conceptions: namely, their flaring up, their zigzag motions, the chaotic whirling 
of images and ideas which objectively are entirely unrelated to one another, and their 
logicaJly unjustifiable, only so-to-speak probative, connections. But we are only rarely 
conscious of this, because the accents of our interests lie merely on the "usable" 
portion of our imaginative life. Usually we quickly pass over, or "overhear," its leaps, 
its non-rationality, its chaos, in spite of their psychological factualness, in favour of 
what is logical or otherwise useful , at least to some extent. (Simmel 1917) [311) 
If volition is pre-empted by subconscious cerebral activity and consciousness manages the 
illusion of rationality, there seems to be a plausible model emerging of free-will as broker 
between the probabilistic generation of a viable act, based on sensory and retained data, and 
the take up of that act. As Claxton suggests, what appear to be ' intentions' could be viewed as 
'predictions', a suggestion of that which is about to happen but which appears to be an act of 
volition. It is possible to observe the malfunctioning of these processes in patients who have 
experienced brain damage. Con way recalls a patient whose sense of free-will was so distorted 
that they felt in total control of their immediate environment, believing that they were actively 
setting the sun and moving cars along the street. Other patients have experienced permanent 
deja vu, believing they have a prior recollection of all experiences. (Conway 2003). 
Claxton's notion of the human as bio-computer is useful here, using the analogy of top-down 
software architecture as a metaphor for cognitive processes and sub-processes. In this model 
of software development a task might be decomposed into functional units. If the functions 
are sequenced correctly then the software's objective can be achieved. As with Conway's 
patients, if the control flow is disrupted, unpredictable behavioural results will be yielded but 
if correctly sequenced the various sub-routines will allow the illusion of personal control and 
volition to be maintained. 
By turning predictions into commands, self-as-instigator is really a simple subroutine, 
added to the bio-computer, which does not affect the latter's modus operandi at all, 
but which simply takes the glimmerings of a naturally-arising prediction, and instantly 
generates a 'command' to bring about what was probably going to happen anyway. 
(Claxton 1999) [ 111) 
In the section entitled "Anticipation, preselection, and feedforward" (Pressing 1988), Pressing 
acknowledges the need for a predictive element within his model of improvisation but fai ls to 
engage with the full extent of its existence. He suggests that the notion of 'preparation' in 
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real-time cognitive processing is employed when the cognitive load is nearing its limit. He 
therefore sees the function of 'prediction' as being to minimise error rather than the modus 
operandi for a spontaneous creative act. This view, in some ways, represents the opposite 
control flow from that of Claxton, wi th Pressing suggesting that the predictive sub-routine is 
called to ease the cognitive work load rather than the sub-conscious calJing consciousness as a 
sub-routine to accept the prediction and interpret it as an act of volition. Dennet offers an 
expanded view on this interface between prediction and volition. He contests that it is 
impossible to follow the trace of an act backwards from its manifestation in consciousness 
because of the amalgamation that is undertaken from the primary sensorial data and 
memorised referenced data. For this reason he suggests "we see the dramatic effects leaving; 
we don't see the causes entering" (Dennett 1984). Simmel describes the process as "an ex-
post-facto intellectual transformation of the immediately given reality" and suggests that there 
is a seamless transformation of data from one cognitive process to another. He suggests that 
"because of constant habit, we achieve this almost automatically. We almost think it is no 
transformation at aiJ, but something given in the natural order of things" (Simmel 1917). 
2.5 Voluntary and Mechanical Behavior 
Ouspensky's writing of the 1930' s is surprisingly topical in the current academic climate 
particularly within the realm of volition and free will. 
In the English language there are no impersonal verbal forms which can be used in 
re lation to human actions. So we must continue to say that man thinks, reads, writes, 
loves, hates, starts wars, fights, and so on. Actually, all this happens. (Ouspensky 
1940) ( 13] 
Think about the question "are you growing your hair?". A natural response could be "yes" 
but an equally valid response could be "no, it just happens". It seems that the linguistic 
mechanism doesn't exist to logically expres the notion that "I am not improvising, but 
improvising is happening". A less contentious way to formulate an expression of this type is 
to introduce the possibility of a negative intervention. The question. "are you allowing your 
hair to grow?" is perhaps less problematic although doesn' t entire ly express the correct 
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sentiment, because it still implies personal control or intervention which simply doesn't exist. 
It's curious that on these terms, buying into the notion that one is 'growing one's hair' isn't 
too far removed from Conway's patient who 'sets the sun' and 'moves the traffic'. In both 
cases there is a fundamental denial that consciousness sits in the passenger seat and not the 
driving seat; observing everything but exerting no control. As Ouspensky would have us 
believe: 
Man cannot move, think, or speak of his own accord. He is a marionette pulled here 
and there by invisible strings (Ouspensky 1940) [13] 
Further proof that volitional control is relinquished by human beings, particularly when 
undertaking processes at speed, is provided by the work of Cabrera and Milton. From 
analysing the movements of a hand balancing a stick they concluded that the compensating 
hand movements were so fast that conscious intervention in the process was not possible. 
They estabHshed that 98% of the hand movements required to keep a stick balancing were 
faster than the 100 milliseconds it takes for a human to respond to a visual stimulus. The 
compensating movement of the hand comprises a number of small random movements which 
keep the stick in a constant state of instability.(Cabrera and Milton 2003) 
In piecing together the various perspectives on the evolution of a human action a model 
emerges that perhaps supports the idea of a diversity of mechanical behaviour. This diversity 
can perhaps be viewed in two schools which I will refer to as 'bio-mechanical' behaviour and 
'cognate-mechanical' behaviour. Bio-mechanical behaviour can be regarded as being a 
collection of processes which exist on a continuum. At one extreme, physically embedded 
systems such as those that handle digestion and blood supply, while at the other extreme those 
that are more susceptible to external environmental influence such as motor control. What 
characterises processes on this continuum is that their execution falls outside of the conscious 
gaze even though their initiation may not. Cognate-mechanical behaviour on the other hand 
is presented to consciousness for monitoring and feedback, and as such has a greater impact 
on cognitive load. See Figure 2.1. 
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Viewing the human activity of 
riding a bike in this mechanistic way 
would reveal bio-mechanical ._! _...Jl.___.!L--___.,1 __ 11.____.L--___., _ _._ _ _. 
processes taking oxygen to the 
lungs, exerting force on the pedals 
and controlling balance, while the 
cognate-mechanical processes 
determine which route is followed 
and how fast to proceed. It seems 
likely, given that the human 
cognitive capacity is a finite 
resource, that there is an efficiency 
incentive for cognate-mechanical 
processes to migrate to the bio-
mechanical domain once they no 
Cognate-Mechanical 
Behaviour 
' I 
Bio-M echanica I 
Behaviour 
• • • • • • • • • 
Figure 2.1 
longer require monitoring and feedback, thus freeing resources. The imperative for this to 
happen becomes more acute as the number of cognate-mechanical processes happening 
simultaneously increases. This raises the issue of concurrency and inevitably the school of 
thought that asserts the impossibility of such an occurrence. 
Is it possible to attend to two things at once? Many researchers have answered 'no' 
(Broadbent, 1959; James, 1890; Welford, 1976), preferring to believe that (a) one task 
is ' automated' whi le attention tracks the other tack; or (b) attention alternates rapidly 
between the tasks (time-sharing); or (c) the two tasks are time-integrated (often by 
training) and reconceptualized as one task. (Pressing 1984) [356] 
Whether or not true concurrency is possible is perhaps less important to the fact that multiple 
streams can be 'handled' in some way. The situation is somewhat akin to the majority of 
computer operating systems which give the appearance of concurrent multi-tasking but in fact 
c leverly switch processing power to each process in turn, creating the illusion of simultaneity. 
Pressing identifies that in accordance with the resource allocation model of cognitive 
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processing the migration of a process from cognate-mechanical to bio-mechanical can be 
initiated. 
Two tasks can interfere if their total processing demands exceed existing capacity. 
The result of task rehearsal is thus to convert processing routines requiring conscious 
attention into automatic routines requiring only unconscious attention. As James said 
in 1890, ' habit diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed' 
(p. 114). (Pressing 1984) [357] 
There are a number of practical reasons in improvised instrumental music why this 
transference needs to take place. Pressing identified the speed at which acts are executed as 
having significant implications for which type of mechanical behaviour they are governed by. 
Consider that a semi-quaver played at a moderate speed of 120 beats per minute only takes 
around 100 milliseconds to execute. It seems that, according to Welford, the minimum time 
Jag needed to process a cognate-mechanical act would be in the region of 400 milliseconds. 
FinaJly it should be noted that unexpected sensory changes requmng significant 
voluntary compensations require a minimum time of about 400-500 ms (Welford 
1976). This is therefore the time scale over which improvising players in ensembles 
can react to each others ' introduced novelties (about twice a second). Nuances in 
continuous improvised performance based on self-monitoring are probably limited by 
error correction times of about 100 ms (Welford 1976), so that speeds of 
approximate ly 10 actions per second and higher involve virtually exclusively pre-
programmed actions (Pressing 1984a). An informal analysis of jazz solos over a 
variety of tempos supports this ball-park estimate of the time limits for 
improvisational novelty. (Pressing 1988) [ 138] 
Within the realm of improvisation this facility is of course a double edged sword. There is a 
trade-off that exists which has a significant effect on the improvisers ability to undertake 
improvisation. Transferring acts from the cognate-mechanical to the bio-mechanical sphere 
will undoubtedly increase processing speeds and in turn motor facility. What it also does, 
however, is render each act a fixed entry into a library of pre-constructed components held in 
object memory. 
Yet at the same time that the development and training of memory is liberating it is 
restricting. For the improviser yie lds the deta iled control of fast events to previous 
(non-spontaneous) decisions, and introduces an element of composition. Thus ... fast 
time-scale decisions cannot be very piece-specific; they are training-specific. 
(Pressing 1984) [360] 
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It is interesting that this dichotomy hardly exists outside of the realm of improvised music, 
except perhaps for speech. It is much easier to circumvent mechanical tendencies in fields 
such as improvised theatre because the speed imperative doesn ' t seem to exist to the same 
degree. Pressing points to the speed of the biological processes that underpin improvised 
music maldng as evidence of the fact that the field of music and the act of improvisation are 
natural allies. 
Processing speed seems to be greatest for audition and touch/kinaesthesia, of all the 
possible sensory systems. These are precisely the elements involved in musical 
improvisation and provide a vivid psychological interpretation for the historical fact 
that music, of all art and sport forms, has developed improvisation to by far the 
greatest degree. (Pressing 1988) [137] 
On a pragmatic level the need to reduce the cognitive burden of conscious monitoring at high 
speeds is clear, but it is still nevertheless a problematic notion for many improvising 
musicians. To some extent the core of the problem lies in the developmental stages of an 
improviser's practice. Learning to improvise has traditionally involved encoding in object 
memory a repertoire of musical motifs or patterns. The function of this process was not only 
to give the improviser a pallet of learnt material but also to develop instrumental facility. 
Pressing reviews a number of pedagogical approaches to the teaching and learning of 
improvisation and identifies one in particular that supports the notion of encoding in object 
memory a pallet of primitives from which can be constructed larger blocks of material 
appropriate to a particular idiom. 
A second approach, which historically took over as the first one waned, sets out 
patterns, models, and procedures specific to the improvisational situation, which, if 
followed by those possessing a solid enough level of musicianship, will produce 
stylistically appropriate music. In this category fall the many figured bass and 
melodic embellishment texts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (for example 
Mersenne 1635; Quantz 1752/1966; Bach 1778/1949; Amold 1965), as well as the riff 
compendia and how-to-do-it books in the field of jazz (such as Coyer, et al. 1970; 
Slonimsky 1975; Nelson 1966). (Pressing 1988) [142] 
There seems however, to be a certain amount of resentment by improvisers of this material 
when it appears during improvisation. That isn ' t to say that some improvisers don ' t exploit 
this fac ility and construct improvisations in a heavily stylised and idiomatic fashion. It is 
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probably fair to say that for some musicians there is almost an ethical principle at stake in 
calling a musical activity improvisation that overtly draws on ' learnt' material. 
One is reminded of the opinion of master trumpeter Miles Davis that his sidemen only 
really got loose in the last set of the night, after they had used up all their well-learned 
tricks (Carr 1982). (Pressing 1988) [ 140] 
The saxophonist Steve Lacy also falls into this category. In conversation with Derek Bailey 
he expresses his frustration accordingly. 
Why should I want to learn all those trite patterns? You know, when Bud Powell 
made them, fifteen years earlier, they weren ' t patterns. But when somebody analysed 
them and put them into a system it became a school and many players joined it. But 
by the time I came to it, I saw through it - the thrill was gone. Jazz got so that it 
wasn ' t improvised any more. (Bailey 1992) [54] 
What is interesting about Lacy' s observations is the assertion that the pioneers of Jazz didn't 
play patterns and begs the question, what constitutes a pattern? Lacy seems to be suggesting 
that the formulation of patterns is the mechanism by which acts, that he regards as 
spontaneous, can be replicated. They are perhaps the product of an analytical process for 
which the primary motive is ' learning' and 'copying' . What this opinion fails to address is 
the possibility that the ' learnt' has to exist on some level in all musical improvisation, 
particularly improvisation at speed. There are issues about learning or borrowing from others 
or from an idiom and the ethical questions that this throws up. but it seems impossible to 
contemplate the notion that an improviser can develop their practice in a vacuum, without 
musical influence. Perhaps subscribers to this school of thought believe that true 
improvisation is characterised by a streaming of material from the performer' s psyche without 
influence or contamination, an activity not unlike the Surrealists ' process of automatic writing 
pioneered by Breton, the premise of which is now generally accepted to be neurologicaJly 
impossible. (Leider 2002) 
An important principle in many modem cognitive therapies is not to try to achieve a 
behavioural response in someone by using a negative suggestion. Telling someone not to feel 
frightened is ukely to invoke the sensation of fear, as opposed to telling them to feel safe and 
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secure. Trying to not think about something just doesn' t work. There is still a misconception 
amongst improvisation educators who adopt the above pedagogical approach that a simple 
instruction "practice your scales and patterns diligently and when you need to improvise, 
forget them" will somehow liberate the performer from mechanistically drawing on learnt 
material. Even if under the influence of a psychotropic drug a performer managed to avoid 
normal mechanistic behaviour, the question of what would drive and inform their response 
mechanisms would still exist. In Pressing's review of improvisation pedagogy he briefly 
discusses the notion of an ' interrupt' technique, in relation to the pioneering work of Jaques-
Dalcroze in the 1920s who developed an innovative approach to teaching piano 
improvisation. 
These include composition-like problems in rhythm, melody, expressive nuance and 
harmony; muscular exercises; imitation of a teacher; exercises in hand independence; 
the notation of improvisation just after performing it; and what may be termed an 
' interrupt' technique. In this last technique the word 'hopp' is recited by the teacher, 
as a cue for the student to perform pre-set operations such as transposition or change 
of tempo during the performance. 
Pressing carries on to relate this to a suggestion by Curtis Roads that the whole activity of 
musical improvisation could be regarded as interrupt driven. This suggestion by Roads forms 
only a small part of a more general paper about musical grammars but offers an embryonic 
idea that warrants further development. Roads places the concept of an interruption in the 
context of a multi-player performance "in which a phrase may be interrupted and a new 
phrase may begin". (Roads 1979) Although applying the concept at this macro level would 
possibly illuminate an examination of group dynamics and social relationships in 
collaborati ve performance situations, it does little to further the exploration of an improviser's 
internal mode of operation. That 's not to say the concept is redundant at this level but rather 
that it needs reframing in terms of the streams that are being interrupted and by what. A 
musical interruption of the kind described by Roads is only one of a myriad of possible types 
of interruption that may bear influence on an improviser's behaviour. It also has to be 
acknowledged that such an event, however overtly initiated, may have no influence at all or 
may have an influence that never receives conscious attention i.e. the performer responds to a 
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musical interruption but is not aware of the response. Interrupt handling cannot guarantee to 
produce a cognate-mechanical response. In fact if an interrupt is received when the cognitive 
load is prohibitively high it is probably fair to say there is no guarantee of a response at all. In 
addition to response adjustments made in relation to cognitive load there is also the question 
of scheduling and prioritising interventions. If an interruption is defined as the recognition 
that a monitored stream of data requires some form of response, then mechanisms obviously 
need to be in place to handle the possibility of a number of such events occurring 
simultaneously. In exploring the parallel and dynamic hierarchies that exist in musical 
phenomena in relation to his own interactive performance system Jonathan Impett describes 
the nature of this complexity. 
An action at a given moment in time is thus in effect the product of the modulation of 
many dynamical systems, all changing and interacting with their own internal 
dynamics. (lmpett 1999) [3] 
One model could relate interrupt scheduling to the notion of goal states identified by Conway 
(Conway 2003). If we consider the possibility that instead of existing as discrete entities, goal 
states are nested in accordance with a hierarchy of significance, it' s then possible to conceive 
of a situation where one interrupt event can override another. 
Consider a driver listening to a play on the radio during a long motorway journey. There are 
aspects of this activity which could almost be regarded as bio-mechanical, steering for 
instance, which requiring very little conscious attention during motorway driving. Then there 
is the play on the radio. For long periods of the journey the cognitive processes involved in 
the act of driving the car can be successfully interrupted by the detail of the narrative as it 
unfolds on the radio The cognitive goal at this stage being the following the narrative of the 
play. As the driver passes a sign post, the ' radio play -perception' process is interrupted by 
the need to devote attention to the road sign as the goal of the 'journey process' has priority 
over the goal of 'play process' . If another car suddenly brakes then the goal of the 'survival 
process' will take precedence over the 'journey process' causing an action compliant with that 
goal state. There is scope for a much larger study than can be undertaken here into the nature 
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and formulation of these hierarchical networks of goal states, particularly in relation to 
improvising musicians. The particularly fascinating aspect of such a study would be 
distinguishing between those goal states that are cognisant and those that are not, and also 
those that are extra-musical and those that are not. Analysing behavioural traits of an 
improvising musician and placing their goal states on a matrix comprised of these two axioms 
would be a fascinating undertaking. What we are concerned with in this study however, is 
exploring the possibility of modes of intervention that could bear influence on the goal state 
hierarchy that exists when improvising musicians are practicing their art. 
2.6 Subconscious Processing 
Phobias are an interesting way to begin unpicking the workings of the subconscious. 
Psychologists such as Martin Seligman have suggested that there are three categories of 
stimuli which are likely to elic it a phobic response from a normally functioning human being. 
Broadly these are, those associated with disease, venomous or predatory animals and 
unfriendly conspecifics. It is curious that in the modem world, with its proliferation of 
potentially dangerous situations, that the human instinct provides a far stronger reaction to 
stimuli from our ancestral environment than our current one. This bears out Cosmides and 
Tooby's notion of a modem skull housing a stone age mind. Cars are now a significant threat 
to our well being, yet the thought of a scorpion is likely to engender more fear than that of a 
car. It is clear that phobic responses are not conscious responses, they occur far too quickly, 
and so must be processed subconsciously. The neural pathway whjch produces any 
behavioural response starts with the registration of a stimulus, which could involve any or all 
of our sense receptors. In the case of a primarily visual stimulus the thalamus wi ll construct a 
neural representation of an aspect of the situation in the visual cortex, for instance, the 
appearance of a wild animal. At this point, if the interpretation of the stimulus is deemed lj fe 
threatening, it is transmitted directly to the amygdala without conscious intervention. The 
limbic system, whjch is responsible for a variety of emotional responses, initiates pre-
programmed units of behaviour which it draws from its repertoire, in accordance with the 
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situation. It is interesting that there is not an exact or fixed relationship between the 
interpretation of the situation and the behavioural response. In fact, the brain exhibits a type 
of fuzzy logic that has become known as 'sloppy pattern matching' . This allows the 
subconscious to respond to situations with a degree of flexibility. If a life threatening situation 
is encountered and survived, the brain will have subconsciously processed a vast amount of 
contextual information which it will store in episodic memory. This will include data from all 
the senses. 'Sloppy pattern matching' allows an individual to exhibit a ' fight or flight' 
response when a situation shares a number of characteristics with one that was potentially 
fataL The disadvantage to this facility is that sometimes contextual informatjon that is 
irrelevant to the severity of the situation can be encoded by association and so produce 
inappropriate 'fight or flight' responses in the future. Someone who almost gets killed by a 
car while standing next to a doughnut stand may encode an association between the smell of 
doughnuts and extreme danger and consequently experience paruc attacks whenever they 
smell doughnuts. 
Because consciousness is only loosely tethered to the underlying apparatus that 
generates fear, the intellect cannot be brought to bear on the problem. The 
unconscious simply won't listen, preferring instead to abide by the time-honoured 
adage 'better safe than sorry' . Individuals suffering from phobias may have inherited 
a first-class alarm system, but it is one that has now become somethjng of a handicap 
in the controlled, protected environment afforded by civilization. (Tal lis 2002) [136] 
For good evolutionary reasons in normal waking life the control flow between conscious and 
subconscious processing is unidirectional. In a sense it seems as though consciousness cannot 
be trusted to affect processing which is deemed to be influential in achjeving our 'survival ' 
goal state. Our blood supply, digestive system, sleep patterns are all controlled 
subconsciously but so are many processes that allow us to interact with the world around us. 
Phobic responses are just one example, more common involuntary behaviours rrught include 
blushjng, crying and sweating. ln these cases internal psychological states are evoked in 
response to particular external si tuations. The mapping of internal state to external state has a 
probabilistic component to account for variations in the external state. 
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The library of external states is held as a collection of constituent parts which relate to 
sensory information. A mapping then occurs between these constituent parts and sensory data 
that is received. When incoming data constitutes a reliable enough 'sloppy' match with a 
range of components of a held state then the corresponding response can be triggered. 
Although many people may be aware that an external state has an inappropriate mapping 
there is very little that can be done to subvert it. Even though we know meeting a particular 
person may make us blush, when the situation arises there is nothing that we can do to 
prevent it. It is of course not always the case that the triggered responses are unwelcome. 
There are many instances where they are integrated searnlessly into our conversations, sexual 
encounters, arguments and even musical improvisations. Although it is true that intervening 
in the mapping process is impossible for most people in real time, i.e. preventing a blush, 
there are fields of endeavour that do allow 'off-line' access to this facility. 
ln clinical circles hypnosis is perhaps the most established method of cognitive intervention. 
This method utilises the subconscious's receptiveness to suggestive language patterns, 
particularly when a person is in a state of deep relaxation or ' trance' . It is commonly accepted 
that most people experience a range of trance states on a daily basis. The consensus seems to 
be that a trance equates to any state of concentration in which the subject is oblivious to other 
stimuli, even momentarily. That is not to say that full consciousness cannot be regained at any 
time. During an hypnotic induction the subject remains conscious at all times but achieves a 
much deeper level of trance by focussing conscious attention on their inner psychological 
stale. The trance induction is aided by the use of a spoken script which is delivered slowly 
and in a low, soft tone. The script contains a range of language patterns to which the 
subconscious is particularly receptive. Once a trance state has been achieved various 
techniques can be employed to alter the mapping of psychological states to external stimuli 
and so affect behavioural change. 
ln therapeutic situations it has been possible to influence both bio-mechanical and cognate-
mechanical processes that have become in some way dysfunctional. It is clear from a 
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mountain of anecdotal evidence that improvising musicians can sometimes enter a 
psychological state that strongly resembles that of trance. Stephane Grappelli offers a classic 
description of a trance state in relation to his own practice. 
When I improvise and I'm in good form, I'm like somebody half sleeping. I even 
forget there are people in front of me. Great improvisers are like priests; they are 
thinking only of their god. (Balliet 1976) 
The complete absorption in the act of improvising expressed by Grappelli has a strong 
parallel with Roger Elliot's description of hypnosis. 
Hypnosis is simply the deliberate use of the imagination, paralleled with strong focus 
and relaxation. Done well, it can work in the same way as when you are dreaming. 
(Elliot 2003) 
In a therapeutic context hypnosis can be viewed as a two phase activity, the first being the 
induction of a hypnotic trance and the second the delivery of hypnotic suggestion. There is no 
indication in any of the evidence that I have viewed to suggest that anything other than the 
first phase is experienced in improvised music. The indication is also that the instances of this 
occurrence are not volitional and are infrequent. Sloboda implies, in his observation of Jazz 
improvisation, a duality of conscious state which gives the performer the facility to create 
acceptable and functional material in between periods of more intense creativity. 
The jazz improviser can enjoy his improvisation because he knows that there will 
always be something he can play. Within this competence he, like all improvisers, 
knows that for much of the time he will produce quite ordinary improvisations; but 
from time to time, according to circumstance of mood and choice, something 
superlative will come up. (Sloboda 1985) [148] 
There is no clear evidence to indicate what circumstances trigger this change in cognitive 
state or if this is a type of induction. There is however an interesting correlation between the 
sense of disorientation experienced by improvising musicians when they find themselves 
playing outside of their normal terms of reference, and the use of deliberate disorientation as 
an established technique during hypnotic induction. The fo llowing accounts seem to describe 
such a situation from both perspectives. 
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When using hypnosis, we primarily want people to stop thinking so much (conscious 
mind) and go with the flow a little more. Some people find this difficult and so it can 
be useful to use slightly confusing language to 'trip up' the conscious. (Elliot 2003) 
A lot of improvisers find improvisation worthwhile. I think, because of the 
possibilities. Things that can happen but perhaps rarely do. One of those things is that 
you are 'taken out of yourself. Something happens which so disorientates you that for 
a time, which might only last for a second or two, your reactions and responses are not 
what they normally would be. You can do something you didn' t realise you were 
capable of. Or you don't appear to be fully responsible for what you are doing. 
(Bailey 1992) [115] 
It can make a useful change to be dropped into a slightly shocking situation that 
you've never been in before. It can produce a different kind of response, a different 
kind of reaction. (Bailey 1992) [128] 
Bailey here quotes Evan Parker describing as ' slightly shocking' the feeling of relinquishing 
conscious control as a performance moves into territory in which his 'sloppy pattern' 
matching processes cannot retrieve an appropriate response quickly enough to deliver it to his 
consciousness. In Rouget's examination of music and trance from 1967, he cites the 
observations of Alain Danielou describing mystic dances from Southern India which has 
remarkable similarity to the situations described by Bailey and Elliot. 
The dancers are first of all drawn into an easy rhythm with which they identify 
completely and thus sink into a sort of hypnotic half-sleep. The musicians then create 
a shock by means of several violent drum strokes and embark on a new, much more 
complex rhythm. After hesitating an instant, the dancers are taken over by this new 
rhythm without even consciously willing it. In some of them, this provokes a trance 
state and a complete loss of self control, as though the rhythm were a kind of spirit 
that had possessed them. This trance state is characterized by insensitivity to pain, 
complete loss of modesty, and visionary perceptions. (Rouget 1985) [8ll 
The significant difference in this situation being that the musicians evoke the trance state in 
the dancers and do not enter the trance state themselves. This point is generalised by Rouget 
in terms of his analysis of worldwide ritualistic trance music by regarding the musician as 
having a functional relationship to the activity of trance induction. His view of their 'job' as 
to be "constantly available and at the service of the ritual". (Rouget l985) [104], deviates 
from the view of the musician in this study but none the less provides insight into the use of 
hypnotic techniques within a musical context. 
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Steven Nachmanovitch describes, from a musician's perspective, experiencing a sensation 
when musical behavioural response is no longer revealed to him consciously. The situation he 
describes parallels the Miles Davis observation cited earlier in this paper (page33) describing 
what happened to the players in his band when all their ' licks' were used up. 
Time after time my best music comes when I feel that the material is played out; I am 
at the end of my resources, and the piece had better end before I make a fool of myself. 
So I grope toward a closing phrase, and finish-but somehow, despite my intent, the 
bow refuses to stop! The cadence or whatever ending I contrive modulates into 
something else, and out of nowhere comes a totally new melody. I fee l in my blood, 
my bones, my muscles, brain, a wholly new and unexpected surge of energy. This is 
the second wind. Time doubles and triples over on itself; I disappear and the music 
really starts to cook. My feeling is invariably one of wonderment: "how in hell did 
that happen? I didn ' t know I had that in me!" Suddenly we, the players and the 
listeners, find ourselves elsewhere; the music has moved us. (Nachmanovitch 1990) 
It is almost definitely not the case that Nachmanovitch or Davis's band have managed to 
circumvent the brain ' s automatic response processes but what they are experiencing is their 
responses changing from cognate-mechanical to bio-mechanical. It is hard to determine 
exactly what causes this change but it is perhaps significant that they and others seem to 
describe this phenomenon in the later stages of a performance. We know that cognitive 
resource limits can affect those responses that are made conscious and those that are not, so it 
can perhaps be surmised that the pressure not to repeat material and fatigue could tip the 
balance towards the end of a performance. As Calvin identifies, it is clear that at a primitive 
level the musical material that will be produced, after consciousness has been ci rcumvented, 
is unlike ly in itself be new. 
Innovative behaviors are usually not new units; instead, they are composed of a novel 
combination of old elements: a different stimulus evokes a standard behavior, or some 
new combination of movements is used in response. How is sensory/movement 
innovation re lated to inte lligence? The sheer quantity rebuilding-block types could be 
important. (Calvinl996) [1 9] 
If then, as has been suggested, conscious decisions are controlled and initiated by the 
subconscious, the question has to be asked; does this trance type state make any difference 
whatsoever to the performance? It certainly seems to have a signi ficant effect on the 
perception of the performers but there is nothing to suggest that this is a re liable indication of 
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a successful performance. Indulging in chemical 'enhancers' can produce a sense of euphoria 
in a performer while having a negative effect on the performance of which the performer is 
oblivious. Composer and improviser Pauline Oliveros questions the premise that improvisers 
are operating at the limits of cognition. Her concept of quantum improvisation defines a 
vision of musical improvisation as means of realising the latent potential of the brain. 
Such a quantum leap could mean the utilization of more of the neo cortex the seat of 
creativity and problem solving. The newest part of the brain that is waiting to evolve 
in association with the limbic system - the amygdala - old brain and seat of the 
emotions. Quantum Improvisation could find new ways to express and understand the 
relationships between mind and matter. (Oliveros 1999) 
In fact her vision blurs the distinction between conscious and subconscious within the realm 
of improvisation. Describing, in her terms, improvisation as a fluid endeavour that ebbs and 
flows between bio-mechanical and cognate mechanical behaviour. Her scores and scripts 
exemplify her notion of a strategy, implying and embracing the idea that consciousness is not 
the driving force. 
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Chapter 3 - Improvisation and Communication 
3.1 Language and Spontaneous Thought 
To cast light on the probability or possibility of a human being possessing the facility to 
spontaneously and consciously manufacture novel thoughts in a musical context, it is useful 
to consider the domain in which those thoughts may become manifest. In doing so it is worth 
examining certain aspects of spoken natural language as this is perhaps a domain with a 
significant amount of commonality with musical improvisation. We use spoken language to 
express ideas and in that sense it is a vehicle for the internal to become external. There is no 
question that a representation of natural language can exist internally before it is expressed, a 
manifestation of which can be witnessed in the mutterings and mouthings that people 
undertake to themselves. We cannot conclude from this however, that ideas are formulated 
using the symbols and nomenclature of spoken language, just that they end up in that form in 
order for the idea to be externalised. There are at least two reasons to suggest why thoughts 
are not formulated using natural language. Firstly, thinking in animals other than humans is 
now an excepted phenomena which has no causal link to a spoken language; 
Animals recognize different agents and their interactions and the causal links between 
ongoing processes connecting them. We have now plenty of examples of mental 
representation possibility and of generalization, categorization and causal 
reasoning ... There is now strong indication that chimps even succeed in forming 
mental representations of the knowledge present in the mind of another subject. 
(Vaneechoutte and Skoyles 1998) [6] 
As previously discussed in chapter 1, this reasoning would also deny the existence of the 
abi lity to think in pre-linguistic children. ln formu lating his conclusions on the studies 
undertaken into ape language Vygotsky emphatically concludes that speech and thought in 
human beings is likely to emanate from separate origins. and that speech almost certainly 
originated as an emotional rather than an intellectual expression. 
[n the phylogeny of thought and speech, a prelinguistic phase in the development of 
thought and a preintellectual phase in the development of speech are clearly 
discernible. (Vygotsky 1962) [41] 
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The second, pragmatic reason is that the human brain does not have the capacity to formulate 
language in real time at the rate that it spawns original ideas. The overhead of constructing 
completely original utterances would be far too great, as Pinker alluded to when he identified 
the 6.4 trillion possible choices in constructing a five word sentence (Pinker 1999) [6]. This 
leads to the conclusion that natural language is used to provide a best fit expression of the 
idea rather than the primary mechanism for formulating it. This expression offers a very 
quickly constructed equivalence built from pre-used chunks of language. The analogy of 
language production as the packing plant for expression is perhaps appropriate. It receives 
items for expression which are placed into the most appropriately sized and constructed 
containers. If the number of containers is increased in an effort to provide a more direct 
mapping to each item, there becomes a point when diminishing returns will impact on the 
efficiency of the packing process. The range of choices become burdensome and the 
overhead of parsing the range of choices outweigh the benefits of producing a tighter match. 
Pinker refers to Miller' s conservative estimate of the potential number of choices available in 
the construction of a standard English sentence. 
If speakers keep a sentence perfectly grammatical and sensible as they choose their 
words, their menu at each point offers an average of about ten choices (at some points 
there are many more than ten choices; at others, only one or two). That works out to 
one hundred thousand five-word sentences, one million six-word sentences, ten 
million seven-word sentences, and so on. (Pinker 1999) [7] 
Pressing presents a view of the 'packing' process but from the perspective of improvised 
music. Interestingly he introduces a substratum of the packing process which simplifies the 
range of possible choices by employing a schema which in this example is diatonic harmony. 
He is describing chunking as an aide memoire rather than an aid to the expression mapping 
but nonetheless demonstrates the need to employ such techniques to lighten the cognitive 
load. 
Few, if any, performers can take all of a sequence of, say, 15 newly-presented notes 
not arranged in any standard sequence and improvise successfull y with them. There 
are just too many independent variables. Of course, if these notes can be conceptually 
'chunked' into larger groupings, this statement is no longer true. For example, if each 
adjacent group of 3 notes be longs to a different major chord, played in a consistent 
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order, then only 5 objects must be memorized and the experienced improviser would 
have no difficulty in manipulating the material. Without knowledge about theory, 
musicianship, repertoire and technique the limits of short-term memory would make 
sophisticated musical development and impressive technical displays impossible. 
(Pressing 1984) [360] 
By implication then, in the spontaneous creation of spoken language, the conscious choice 
humans make is not 'what to say' but ' how to say'. Derrida's observations are particularly 
revealing and could find equivalence in a whole range of contexts. 
Conversation is, then, a communication between two absolute origins that, if one may 
venture the formula, auto-affect reciprocally, repeating as immediate echo the auto-
affection produced by the other. Immediacy is here the myth of consciousness. Speech 
and the consciousness of speech - that is to say consciousness simply as self-presence 
- are the phenomenon of an auto-affection lived as suppression of differance. That 
phenomenon, that presumed suppression of deferance, that lived reduction of the 
opacity of the signifier, are the origin of what is called presence. That which is not 
subjected to the process of differance is present. The present is that from which we 
believe we are able to think time, effacing the inverse necessity: to think the present 
from time as differance. (Derrida 1967) [ 166] 
The notion of 'auto-affection ' could equally be applied to an orator speaking to a single 
person, a crowd or indeed to themselves. It is the absorption in the act of 'expression 
mapping' that leads to what Derrida describes here as the consciousness of self-presence, the 
illusory standpoint from which to view time. It is however, the 'auto-affection ' that remains 
outside the bounds of conscious control but nonetheless seeds the process of spoken language 
production. The 'auto' aspect of this phenomenon could undoubtedly be unpacked into a 
variety of subconscious and subliminal influences each with their own sophisticated 
parameter space making them resistant to accurate prediction and so masking the ' auto' 
aspect of their 'affect' . Predictable or not, there is no rational justification to support the 
notion that they are initiated or controlled consciously. Lechte comments on this relationship 
in reference to Lacan's work. 
By implication, then, the unconscious cannot be assimilated by the consciousness 
system, but rather poses a problem for consciousness because it cannot be represented: 
it speaks. Or in Lacan's words: ' there is no metalanguage'. There is no discourse over 
and above discourses of the consciousness system (such as the scientific) which can 
represent the unconscious. On the contrary: it appears. (Lechte 1990)[35] 
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The assertion presented by Lechte that the facility doesn' t exist in human beings to 
consciously form a direct representation of the unconscious, seems to support the notion of 
the 'expression mapping' function of spoken language which has been developed. It does 
however appear to conflict with current theories in cognitive science which concur with the 
notion that communication between the two areas is always uni-directional, from 
subconscious to conscious. Although there are very good biological reasons why this is the 
case for the vast majority of the time, it is also the case that this communication flow can be 
reversed in certain situations. Hypnosis and cognitive behavioural therapy are two disciplines 
that have direct relevance in this area. As the model we are examining here is one where 
spoken language is being used in a natural and unaffected manner, it is perhaps not that 
he lpful to examine in detaiL the capacity of traditional hypnosis to facilitate 
conscious/subconscious communication. The reason for this omission being, that traditional 
hypnosis is undertaken while one person engaged in the discourse has been induced into a 
trance state by the other. However, the work of Milton Erickson in this field is worth 
considering as his therapeutic practice blurred the edges between ordinary therapeutic 
discourse and hypnotic discourse. 
In many instances Erickson used standard, client centred hypnosis in his therapeutic practice. 
There are however many accounts of Erickson's work which refer to his ability to treat 
patients hypnotically but without visibly inducing in them a trance state. He used this 
technique in a variety of situations including those involving patients resistant to hypnosis. 
This practice usually involved the use of metaphorical stories, for which Erickson became 
famous. 
Milton Erickson is a master in the field of metaphor. In the way he listens to and 
observes a subject, as well as in the way he responds, he deals with the multiple 
metaphoric messages that are constantly communicated between people in their 
interchange. He functions as easily in metaphor as most people function with 
conscious, logica l communication. His directives to patients are not often simple and 
straight forward but include a variety of analogies that apply to the patient's problem. 
The metaphoric approach he uses when not formally using hypnosis is clearly related 
to his years of experimenting with metaphoric suggestions outside the awareness of 
the subject. (Haley 1973) [27] 
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Viewing this practice in the context of Derrida' s conversation between "two absolute origins" 
that "auto-affect reciprocally" (Derrida 1967), one can see the potential in Erickson's 
technique to intervene in the dialogic flow. What Erickson' s intervention allows is the 
possibility to remotely affect a person's auto-affect response. Although this is initiated via 
spoken language, the auto-affect is not confined to a linguistic response; Erickson 
successfully affected a range of behavioural traits. One key aspect of Erickson's work that 
sets him apart from many of his contemporaries is that, as far as possible, he confines his 
discourse to the metaphorical domain and purposefully offers no interpretation of the 
metaphor to the client. Erickson was so skilled in this type of communication that he was 
able to interpret his client's responses metaphorically, even if the responses were non 
linguistic. 
Although Erickson communicates with patients in metaphor what most sharply 
distinguishes him from other therapists is his unwillingness to "interpret" to people 
what their metaphors mean. He does not translate "unconscious" communication into 
conscious form. Whatever the patient says in metaphoric form, Erickson responds in 
kind. By parables, by interpersonal action, and by directives, he works within the 
metaphor to bring about change. He seems to feel that the depth and swiftness of 
change can be prevented if the person suffers a translation of the communication. The 
avoidance of interpretation applies not only to the verbal statements of patients but to 
their body movements. Erickson is famous for his acute observation of nonverbal 
behaviours but the information he receives remains nonverbal. (Haley 1973) [28] 
Using this technique, he could deliver a complete course of therapy without making the 
patient consciously aware of the therapeutic change that had taken place. There are accounts 
of patients being unaware that behavioural change had taken place because of the 
subconscious manner of its execution and returning to Erickson' s practice to complain about 
the ineffectiveness of the treatment. Erickson represents a departure from the traditional 
therapeutic premise that behavioural change requires in the patient an understanding of the 
causes of their behaviour. 
In the last decades the conditioning therapists have proposed an alternative theory of 
change. Reciprocal inhibition procedures and the modification of behaviour by 
designed re inforcements are not based upon the idea that becoming aware of why one 
behaved as one does is causal to change. It is assumed that changing the 
re inforcements of behaviour will change that behaviour. Therefore it has become 
more respectable to suggest that therapeutic change occurs without the person' s 
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understanding the meaning or function of his behaviour. The change also appears to 
persist longer than it does when people are helped to understand why they believe as 
they do. (Haley 1973) [38] 
This departure falls in line with the notion that conscious awareness or consideration is 
probably the least efficient mode in which to interact with the world around us. It certainly 
exemplifies the 'expression mapping' dilemma identified by Lechte in regard to the 
unconscious in that "it cannot be represented: it speaks". 
There is a curious connection between Erickson's ability to provoke behavioural change in a 
patient who is oblivious to the reasons underlying their original behaviour and the modes of 
thought described here by Claxton. In particular, a parallel can be drawn between the 
metaphorical or hypnotic delivery of a suggestion or instruction and the self initiated recourse 
to a mode of thinking which is purposefully non-conscious, named by Claxton ' tortoise 
mind' . 
Recent scientific evidence shows convincingly that the more patient, less deliberate 
modes of mind are particularly suited to making sense of situations that are intricate, 
shadowy or ill defined. Deliberate thinking, d mode, works well when the problem it 
is facing is easily conceptualised. When we are trying to decide where to spend our 
holidays, it may well be perfectly obvious what the parameters are: how much we can 
afford, when we can get away, what kinds of things we enjoy doings and so on. But 
when we are not sure what needs to be taken into account, or even which questions to 
pose - or when the issue is too subtle to be captured by the familiar categories of 
conscious thought - we need recourse to the tortoise mind ... This third type of 
intelligence is associated with what we call creativity, or even 'wisdom' . (Claxton 
1998) [31 
What Claxton describes is the conscious initiation of a cognitive process which once 
commenced is cut free from conscious control and left to run its course, from which it will 
return to consciousness once the process has been completed. Claxton is suggesting that non 
mechanical tasks are best suited to this mode of thinking because once the overhead of 
consciousness has been removed, greater cognitive capacity is available for the process in 
hand. The reasoning behind why the processing of information from 'i ll defined ' or 
'shadowy' situations should be more burdensome could be explained in relation to the 
'expression mapping' concept previously developed. Any translation process will be more 
arduous if the correlation between the various elements in the process is vague. Mappings 
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and re-mappings need to take place before an appropriate best fit is achieved. In theory 
expressing a preference between one's parents should be no more difficult than expressing a 
preference between tea or coffee, a simple binary choice. In reality the likelihood is that the 
latter choice will be undertaken in a deliberate manner as the sentiment that is presented for 
expression will be clearly and unambiguously mapped onto appropriate expression elements. 
The former, if attempted consciously, would be likely to require a much greater cognitive 
undertaking to find an expression mapping that would not be vetoed by the subconscious. 
This transition from unexpressed to expressed is perhaps related to the duality of signifier and 
the signified associated with the Saussure tradition. 
Its system requires that it be heard and immediately by whoever emits it. It produces a 
signifier which seems not to fall into the world, outside the ideality of the signified, 
but to remain sheltered - even at the moment that it attains the audiophonic system of 
the other-within the pure interiority of auto-affection. It does not fall into the 
exteriority of space, into what one calls the world, which is nothing but the outside of 
speech. Within so-called "living" speech, the spatial exteriority of the signifier seems 
absolutely reduced. It is in the context of this possibility that one must pose the 
problem of the cry - of that which one has always excluded, pushing it into the area of 
animality or of madness, like the myth of the inarticulate cry - and the problem of 
speech (voice) within the history of life. (Derrida 1967) [ 166] 
Derrida describes here the moment of expression without reducing it to a process of 
correlation, but what is interesting is the relationship he evokes between the sanification 
process and the process of auto-affection. He seems to be relating this to the interior -
exterior threshold of expression, and in so doing presenting an additional mode of expression 
that comprises the signifier and signified that has only an internal manifestation. This 
suggests the possibility of a ' signifier' existing and being expressed in the absence of a 
' signified' and that this could relate to a primal expression, such as a cry. 
3.2 Primal Utterances 
It is, at this point, perhaps worth viewing the distinction between verbal and vocal expression 
in the light of Derrida's observation. One could extrapolate from a cry a whole range of 
vocalisations for which, at expression time, there is no symbolic aspect to their manifestation. 
Laughing, groaning, coughing are vocalisation examples which have signifiers which relate to 
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that which is signified only as an objectified act. The various aspects of a person's laugh can 
be discussed, and in such a situation the objectified laugh becomes subject to the 
signifier/signified mechanism. A spontaneous laugh on the other hand is not a symbolic 
expression, it is an expression of something, and as such relates to a signifier but has not been 
encoded in a symbolic form. I am careful to describe the laugh as 'spontaneous' because of 
the distortions to this notion that 'forced ' or 'affected' laughter would cause. It is possible for 
a laugh to be executed in a manner that is more verbal than primal, for the expression of irony 
for example, and in that sense it becomes a signified utterance. 
In returning to the idea of language as the 'packing plant' for expression, it becomes apparent 
that for expressions of a primal nature, excursions into the ' packing plant' are not undertaken. 
There are obviously good evolutionary reasons for this phenomenon, in a life threatening 
situation encoding a scream into language is a luxury that cannot be afforded. Expressions of 
this nature are not confined to vocalisations, physical gestures such as smiling and flinching 
also operate in a similar fashion. Although it is clear that these primal expressions predate 
symbolic languages, it could be surmised that it is perhaps the non-spontaneous fabrication of 
these gestures that became the precursor to symbolic language and that their legacy exists to 
this day in non-symbolic modes of expression. 
Other forms of non-verbal communication include dance and music .. . All of these 
arts seem to be about as old as man. Actually, their elementary forms must be even 
older, since the imitative, representing function of gesture and mimics must have been 
used for tens of millennia before human symbolic language with highly specific 
articulation developed. Indeed, the most ancient musical instrument (a flute) to be 
discovered to date is estimated to be between 40,000 and 70,000 years old, which is 
older than the estimated age of human speech. (Rosengren 2000) [ 40] 
As Rosengren has identified, there is a possibility that instrumental music predates human 
linguist ic ability and if this is the case then there must surely be a compelling argument to 
suggest that vocal or physical music of some sort existed even prior to this. It is perhaps 
ironic that anecdotally practitioners use language as an analogy with which to describe and 
understand the processes at work within the context of improvised music. John Zorn' s 
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description reduces the process to accessing a library of symbols which embody consensual 
understanding amongst the participants. 
The analogy with language, often used by improvising musicians in discussing their 
work, has a certain usefulness in illustrating the development of a common stock of 
material - a vocabulary - which takes place when a group of musicians improvise 
together regularly. (Bailey 1992) [106] 
Berliner on the other hand sees the grammatical aspect of languages as a connection point 
with improvised music. 
Perlman and Greenblatt (1981, 169) have also been intrigued by this notion and state 
that the improviser's "specific harmonic and melodic constraints ... are in many ways 
analogous to the syntactic and semantic constraints of natural language and that 
playing an improvised solo is very much like speaking sentences?" (Berliner 1994) 
[794] 
The irony of these observations lies in the assumption that improvised music can be 
understood in terms of language rather than language being understood in terms of 
improvised music. It is perhaps an indication of how much language has been assimilated 
into other modes of expression, thus preventing an engagement with those modes without 
recourse to symbolic representation. The old adage ' talking about music is like dancing about 
architecture' is supposed to represent the absence of a correlation in nomenclature, but 
actually illustrates the dichotomy of describing something using a vernacular when the 
vernacular is derived from that which is being described. 
Not all practitioners describe the relationship between language and improvised music in this 
way. It is almost inconceivable to express in spoken and written language notions of 
expressiOn that are exterior to language, and for that reason anecdotal evidence from 
practitioners tends to recourse to the hierarchy of representing musical improvisation in terms 
of spoken languages. This hierarchy seems to be maintained even when, as with Max Roach, 
the interior dialogue evokes a climate where Derrida ' s "spatial exteriority of the signifier 
seems absolutely reduced". 
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It's like language: you're talking, you're speaking, you're responding to yourself. 
When I play, it's like having a conversation with myself. Max Roach (Berliner 1994) 
[192] 
Berliner cites another metaphorical representation of improvisation as spoken languages and 
in particular describes a form of internal dialogue. 
For Lonnie Hillyer, as for Max Roach, improvising "is really like a guy having a 
conversation with himself." HiUyer sometimes thinks of himself as "making 
statements and answering them" when he performs. (Berliner 1994) [192] 
These anecdotes pose an interesting question about natural languages ' ability as a tool with 
which to encode notions of this type. Superficially both of these accounts convey meaning 
related to the practitioner's perception of what they do but simultaneously they are 
nonsensical; referring to "a conversation with myself' is a negation of the act of conversing. 
In a sense, the act of trying to force notions into metaphors that don't fit, render that 
expression vacuous. Inevitably its only value resides with itself and not in that which it is 
intended to represent. What we witness in anecdotes such as these is in fact nothing more 
than a struggle, an attempt at expression doomed to failure and although the product of this 
struggle is material of interest on many other levels, it fails to fulfil its primary purpose. 
Kenneth Gregen's notion of the ' relational sublime' can perhaps offer another interpretation 
of how a relationship between spoken language and musical improvisation could exist. 
Gregen points to deeper structures that exist below the encoded transmissions of spoken 
natural language, structures open to more primal interpretation. 
Yet, although this realm of the sublime cannot be captured in language, we can 
appreciate its dimension. How are sounds and markings converted to what we take to 
be language? For how does language acquire its intelligibility? Here we must envision 
primordial processes of relationship - the pulsing coordination of movement and 
sound - that slowly turn the amorphous into the meaningful. (Grodin and Lindlof 
1996) [138] 
A paralle l can perhaps be drawn between that which is 'primordial ' in Gregen's ' relational 
sublime' and the 'deep structures' of Chomsky's ' transformational grammar'. The innate 
capability of the mind to formulate grammars which Chomsky saw as a substratum of human 
communication seems to relate to Gregen's belief in the relationship as the bonding layer 
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below natural language, in so much as they exist universally and are innate. The suggestion is 
therefore that we come into this world pre-loaded with the facility to interface onto any 
cultural language that we happen to be born into, as Fodor acknowledges, when we are born 
our minds are not a clean sheet. 
My view is that you can't learn a language unless you already know one. It isn' t that 
you can't learn a language unless you've already learned one. (Fodor 1978) [65] 
Fodor's metaphor of the internal state of the human mind resembling that of a computer 
allows us to draw the analogy between machine code and the human internal language, both 
of which require a compilation process in order to interpret external communication. In the 
case of the human, the external language is of course learnt and is translated at run time rather 
like an interpreted language. 
When you find a device using a language it was not built to use (e.g. a language that 
has been learned), assume that the way it does it is by translating the formulae of that 
language into formulae which corresponds directly to its computationally relevant 
physical states. This would apply, in particular, to the formulae of the natural 
languages that speakers/hearers learn, and the correlative assumption would be that 
the truth rules for predicates in the natural language function as part of the translation 
procedure. (Fodor 1978) [67] 
What is suggested then is that human communication comprises two levels of interpretation, 
one external and one internal. The external level dealing with a culturally defined natural 
language and the internal dealing with biologically defined ' language of thought', as Fodor 
describes it. Fodor argues that the notion of human beings thinking in natural language is 
impossible for the reasons described at the beginning of this chapter. 
One way of describing my views is that organisms (or, in any event, organisms that 
behave) have not only such natural languages as they may happen to have, but also a 
private language in which they carry out the computations that underlie their 
behaviour. (Fodor 1978) [68] 
If Chomsky' s ' transformational grammar' concept could be applied to improvisation, the 
process is like ly to be fraught with difficulties. It is perhaps easier to conceptualise a situation 
in spoken language where the truth rules for predicates in the surface structures have a 
correlation with internal states in the deep structure . It is impossible to conceptualise and 
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express such a situation in improvised music without retorting to a symbolic representation 
using natural language. In the study of the 'internal language' Fodor suggests that perhaps it 
is not necessary to try to determine exactly what the correlation is between inner and outer 
language, but that it suffices for that correlation to be consistently undertaken. This relieves 
the improvising musician of the onus to define what might be called the 'deep structures' of 
his performance in any other terms than those in which they are originally manifest. 
Notice that the use of a language for computation does not require that one should be 
able to determine that its terms are consistently employed; it requires only that they 
should in fact be consistently employed. (Fodor 1978) [70] 
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Chapter 4 - A Model of Improvisation as Human Behaviour 
In Fodor's later work he proposes a theory in which the mind consists of informationally 
encapsulated, 'low-level' perceptual modules which feed information to 'higher-level' non-
modular cognitive processes. (Zawidzki) Sperber develops this concept, (Sperber 1996), by 
introducing the idea that cognitive processes may also be modular and suggests also that they 
could become inputs to other cognitive/conceptual modules, breaking with Fodor's proposal 
that perceptual modules were the only feed to conceptual modules. Sperber seems to suggest 
that the evolving nature of conceptual modules required their reuse in the development of new 
modules. In a situation akin to computer software development, it would be highly inefficient 
to construct a new module from scratch if the output from an existing module could be 
utilised in its development. Sperber suggests that one such development could provide an 
insight into early human vocalisations. 
The possibility that springs to mind is human vocal communicative sounds. It need 
not be the sounds of Homosapient speech, though. One may imagine a human 
ancestor with much poorer articulatory abilities, relying more than modem humans do 
on rhythm and pitch for the production of vocal signals. In such conditions, a 
specialized cognitive module might wel l have evolved. (Sperber 1996) [141] 
He suggests further that even after the development of human speech, the primary cognitive 
modules remained intact providing the basis for human musical sensibi lity. Furthermore, he 
proposes that in its original use this module would have been optimised to accept as its input, 
a very low quality and hard to discern sonic input from man's early vocal facilities, but is now 
being "stimulated to a degree that makes the whole experience utterly addictive". (Sperber 
1996) [142] 
Although the human evolutionary dynamic, moving from the reflex response to the learned. 
seems to favour the development of natural language rather than that of improvisation, it 
seems safe to assume that early humans were musical before they where linguistic. Although 
the internal operation of the brain then was significantly different than from now, the possible 
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existence of this pre-linguistic cognitive module could explain why the ability to sonically 
create spontaneous non linguistic expressions seems to have been retained. 
The evolutionary change did not exclude emotion but tempered it. Man did not 
abandon the pleasures of satisfying his needs. Instead he learned to postpone them in 
the interest of long-term objectives. (Gurney 1973) [ 42] 
Improvising musicians can therefore be indulged in their internal dilemma between the 
learned and the invented, because they are it seems caught between the need to satisfy a pre-
linguist urge for sonic self-expression and the brain's modem day urge to suppress reflex 
response. 
4.1 Processing Referents 
Sperber's division of cognitive 
processes into the perceptual and 
conceptual, in the context of an 
improvising musician, leads to an 
interesting perspective on the 
range and causal affect of 
influences, both internal and 
external that come to bear on this 
practice. 
Abstractly and roughly at least, 
the distinction between 
perceptual and conceptual 
processes is c lear. Perceptual 
processes have, as input, 
information provided by 
sensory receptors and, as 
output, a conceptual 
representation categorizing the 
object perceived. (Sperber 
1996) [120] 
Figure 3.1 shows how this mode l can 
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be applied to an improvising musician sited in a performance situation. 
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The notion that perceptual processes have as their input the continuous data stream of sensory 
information and that the product or outputs from these processes become inputs to conceptual 
processes, can be used to formulate a model of human behaviour. A model where the 
parameter (sensorial) space in which the behaviour exists is split between the internal and the 
external. The parameters influencing the outputs of conceptual processes, those that manifest 
themselves as human behaviour, exist either as a result of another conceptual process or as a 
result of a pre-processed external data stream. Berliner alludes to one small aspect of the 
external parameter space when he describes a performer's response to the physicality of 
sound. 
The body plays an even more active role when, through its motor sensory apparatus, it 
interprets and responds to sounds as physical impressions, subtly informing or 
reshaping mental concepts. (Berliner 1994) [190] 
In non-scientific terms Berliner's description has an uncanny parallel with Sperber's model of 
perceptual processes feeding conceptual processes. The interface between these processes 
seems to provide the domain in which Pressing's notion of the 'referent' exists. Pressing 
acknowledges the role of external influences in shaping a performer' s improvisational 
behaviour although he includes a 'speed' caveat which proposes the diminishing influence of 
the ' referent' as speed of execution increases. 
Central to improvisation is the notion of the ' referent' . The referent is an underlying 
formal scheme or guiding image specific to a given piece, used by the improviser to 
facilitate the generation and editing of improvised behaviour on an intermediate time 
scale. The generation of behaviour on a fast time scale is primarily determined by 
previous training and is not very piece-specific. (Pressing 1984) [346] 
There seems implicit in this interpretation of the effects of speed on a performer' s behaviour, 
a fundamental flaw if one is to subscribe to the notion that the performers external monitoring 
system is in some way subservient to the retrieval of stored information. What this 
interpretation fails to acknowledge is the distinction between conscious and subconscious 
processes, the manifestation of which we have referred to in this study as 'bio-mechanical' 
and 'cognate-mechanical' behaviour. The animalistic facility humans possess to engage in 
background sensory monitoring must surely suggest that ' referent' parsing can take place 
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outside of conscious awareness in such instances when cognate-mechanical processing is 
taking place. Just because a performer becomes too preoccupied with an aspect of the 
performance to be aware of the external influences coming to bear, it doesn 't render them any 
less influential. Although the notion of a 'referent' is not incongruous with Sperber's model 
of perceptual and conceptual modules, the narrow interpretation offered by Pressing of what 
can constitute a 'referent' probably is. 
The relationship between improvised behaviour and referent is variable. It may be 
imitative, metaphoric, allegorical , antagonistic, canonic, contrapuntal, variational or 
independent, just to mention a few possibilities; and the time scale for behavioural 
response may vary from very short to long. In strict improvisation contexts 
compatibility between referent and behaviour is continuous, in freer contexts the 
expressive continuity of the improvised material may cause temporary abandonment 
of the referent. (Pressing 1984) [348] 
If we use the theory of 'goal states' previously examined in this study as a means of 
determining what might constitute a 'referent', the notion may become more useful in the 
analysis and mapping of a performance parameter space. Of course the examples that 
Pressing cites are valid as would be many more of this type but they are all specifically music 
referents and all exist within the conscious awareness of the performer. 
The previous chapter touched on Conway's concept of goal states in the encoding of 
memories. There is perhaps an overlap between this use of the goal state concept and the way 
it may be applied to the processing of referent information. The idea of nested goal states is 
as appropriate here as the 'driving' example used in the last chapter. It is true that in one 
particular performance context the most immediate goal state, after the tonal quality of the 
sound, might be to conform to a consensual form or protocol that exists between a group of 
performers. There may also simultaneously coexist goal states requiring the monitoring of 
'referent' information of which the performer is not cognisant but which may accordingly 
influence the performance. 
It is quite possible that many of the goal states that comprise an improviser's practice are in 
fact non musical. After all, improvising performers do not cease to be mothers, brothers, 
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priests or drug addicts for the duration of their performance. It is also perhaps too simplistic 
to create a duality of 'referent' information, that which is perceived and acted upon and that 
which is acted upon and not perceived. There seems also the possibility of a conscious act 
resulting from 'referent' information but without consciously understanding why the act 
should occur. In the production and consumption of music generally, human behaviour is 
perhaps governed by what we know rather than by what we understand. It is a cliche to 
describe consumers of art products in these terms but rarely is this notion applied to art 
producers. 
Within the context of musical improvisation and particularly within the genre of jazz, many 
great performances have taken place by performers who know what it takes to move an 
audience. Many academics and observers have deconstructed and analysed performances in 
order to understand what was produced by the performer and have succeeded in representing 
the material in accordance with particular analytical methods, but this does not address why a 
performance has the effect it does. A performer can often deduce what has an effect but not 
why, a behavioural influence which Alain Danielou, cited by Derek Bailey, identifies as 
sometimes being detrimental to a performance. 
Alain Danielou, writing about the difficulties for Asian musicians working within the 
Occidental entertainment system describes exactly the problem which has also 
affected Western performance musics such as flamenco, jazz and, increasingly, ' free' 
music. 'When the musicians note a positive reaction from the public, they are tempted 
to reproduce the effect which provoked this reaction and consequently one can 
understand how a rapid deterioration of the music performed could occur. The 
musician becomes little more than an actor who repeats his tricks when he notices that 
the public reacts favourably. (Bailey 1992) [44] 
Therefore, ' referent' data is processed by perceptual modules, passed as parameters to 
conceptual modules which may then result in either bio-mechanical or cognate-mechanical 
behaviour. In the latter case, the performer may be aware of the response that has been 
provoked but may not understand why it has been provoked, even if a causal path is evident. 
The conceptual modules that are evoked in this process almost certainly do not rely entirely 
on perceptual modules for their inputs. It is acknowledged by Forder and Sperber that inputs 
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to conceptual modules can be output from other conceptual modules, thus realising efficiency 
gains and increasing cognitive capacity. I would therefore suggest also that this model would 
stand the possibility of 'referent' data being derived not only from sensory monitoring but 
also from the retrieval of stored data. 
Moreover, within the artist's personal store of knowledge, these differing elements 
can each carry associations that influence the performance of subsequent ideas: 
harmonic qualities suggesting lineages with particular harmonic synonyms, rhythmic 
elements evoking other patterns with similar configurations, and yet other features 
invoking figures with comparable contours, phrase lengths, compatible moods, or 
finger patterns. (Berliner 1994) [195] 
Pressing asserts that it is not possible for an improvising performer to construct a performance 
out of material that has not been previously learnt. Indeed it is hard to imagine a context in 
which either internal or external 'referents' didn' t ex.ist in a performer, if they have the 
capacity to learn and the capacity to sense. 
There is a continuum of possibilities between the extreme hypothetical limits of ' pure' 
improvisation and 'pure' composition. These limits are never obtained in live 
performance because no improviser (even in 'free' improvisation) can avoid the use of 
previously learned material, and no recreative performer can avoid small variations 
specific to each occasion. (Pressing 1984) [346] 
Let us not forget that learning need not always be reconstituted by the conscious mind, 
muscles and tendons are equally adept at utilising this resource. The output of a conceptual 
module may not manifest itself as a consciously initiated action, it may occur directly as a 
muscle response. The mind body relationship as explored by Sudnow bares witness to trus 
(Sudnow 1978). It is possible for the sensation of playing to be driving the action. Berliner 
sites many examples of an improviser' s material being generated as a direct result of the 
physical relationship with an instrument. 
When leading, the body pursues physical courses shaped not only by the musical 
language of jazz, but by idiomatic patterns of movement associated with the playing 
techniques of an instrument. These, in turn, reflect the instrument' s particular 
acoustical properties, physical layout, and performance demands. Ultimately all of 
these factors define the body's world of imagination, inviting it to explore their 
re lationships. (Berliner 1994) [190] 
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This relationship, of course, falls within the realm of a perceptual module, where the 
sensation of interacting with an instrument provides data for conceptual modules but 
interestingly can provoke a reactive response from the performer who feels they are 
witnessing or experiencing the body' s behaviour, rather than controlling it. 
Within each instrument's general constraints, tbe pleasure that individuals derive from 
particular motions can also influence performances. "I like to play swing?' a drummer 
once explained while demonstrating a swing pattern for snare drum and brushes with 
wide, circular arm motions. "I like the way my body feels when I'm moving like this. 
But there are other ways I like to move too, other ways my body likes to feel. 
(Berliner 1994) [191] 
As conceptual modules produce behaviour, which in this context becomes physically 
manifest, we are faced with the recursion of sensory data feeding modules that produce 
physical responses that in turn create sensory data. The process ruptured only by 
unpredictable external ' referents' and the intervention of the internal ' referents' of learnt 
material, motor skills, values, be liefs etc. The loop seems closed, with little room for the 
spark of originality or the divine inspiration that Pressing refers to as the ' seed' idea. 
The generation of seeds is an associative process. That is, each new seed generated 
will almost always be the result of combining previously learned gestures, movement 
patterns or concepts in a novel relationship or context. The conservatism of this 
process derives largely from the limited resources of cognitive processing available 
for real-time composition. But all or nearly all improvisation traditions also proclaim 
the notion that complete ly new and unprecedented seed ideas sometimes 
spontaneously occur. The origin of such material is often ascribed to God, mysterious 
higher forces, or unde fined transpersonal powers. (Pressing 1984) [35 11 
This sense of the improvisatory process not being an explainable, mechanistic activity is an 
important part of the belief system of many musicians. The striving for emancipation from its 
predicable grip and the tapping into a mode of expression which in some way transcends the 
monotony of the learnt and the conditioned, for some, is the imperative of the practice. 
4.2 Internal Dilemmas 
The questions and dilemmas faced by improvising musicians are many and some find parallel 
with the objections held by some artists to the validity of improvisation as an art form. 
During the period of the 1950's and 60's when John Cage was engaged with indeterminacy he 
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expressed quite an aversion to the idea of improvisation. His development of a style of 
composition using techniques to subvert the will or ego of the composer and/or performer was 
an anathema to a mode of musical endeavor that relied on an internal, totaJly subjective store 
of learnt data to stimulate it's execution. 
Improvisation ... is something that I want to avoid. Most people who improvise slip 
back into their likes and dislikes and their memory, and ... they don't arrive at any 
revelation that they are unaware of. (Turner 1990) cited in (Feisst 2002) 
His objections are of course based on a sound theoretical footing. There are good reasons 
why it is far more difficult to circumvent this tendency in the real-time formulation and 
production of music than in the process of composition. We know that consciously 
preventing a cognitive act is impossible except by displacing one act with another but even 
then the initial act has to exist before it can be displaced. Berliner identifies this struggle in 
much of the anecdotal evidence he presents. These two examples by Bobby Rogovin and 
Lonnie Hillyer portray the sense of frustration experienced when the conceptual module's 
ability to make a novel use of stored material begins to wane. 
If at some moments soloists must respond artistically to unexpected phrases arising 
from their vocabulary store or from their improvisations' associations, at other 
moments they must contend with the occasional repetitive or hackneyed use of 
vocabulary. "Sometimes, when you get ready to play, you say to yourself, ' I don ' t 
want to play the same stuff I always play, so you deliberately try not to play it, but 
you end up playing the same old stuff anyway," Bobby Rogovin says ruefully. 
(Berliner 1994) [206] 
Lonnie Hillyer's experience is much the same. "Just trying to make phrases come out 
differently is hard at times, very hard ' he says, "because we're programmed. It's 
almost like working against the grain at times because you want things to come out 
differently, and they just don't?" Improvisers may push themselves off one well-
known melodic course as soon as they realize that they have started down it, only to 
find themselves proceeding along another familiar path. (Berliner 1994) [206] 
These accounts demonstrate the inherent difficulty in consciously eliminating cognate-
mechanical processes once they have gained residence in the mind. It is possible that 
succumbing to this pressure has a load lightening function similar to buffering in computing, 
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which allows a fleeting diversion of processing power to another goal state, which might be 
the formulation of the next piece of material. Berliner suggests that this type of device is used 
consciously by performers to 'gather their thoughts' as it were, so if it can take place within 
the conscious gaze there is no logical reason for it not to also take place unconsciously. 
As soloists immerse themselves in their internal dialogue, the most obvious way for 
them to advance their conversation-responding to their "own notes" - is by pausing 
briefly after an initial statement, then repeating it, perhaps with minor changes such as 
rhythmic rephrasing. This also aUows time for the player to conceive options for the 
subsequent phrase's formulation. (Berliner 1994) [193] 
In fact, Berliner describes a situation which could be interpreted as an ebb and flow between 
consciously and unconsciously using this device. He suggests that the performer is 'waiting' 
for an event of interest but I would suggest that a more plausible explanation is that this 
activity represents the processing and buffering of data from the conceptual modules in 
preparation for its execution. 
Within a performance's normal stream of events, improvisers typically allow their 
adequate inventions to pass by without necessarily treating their elements motivically. 
Rather, they await the appearance of figures that especially interest them, then explore 
their implications. The identification of such patterns and the treatment of their 
features vary with the soloists' changing sensitivities. They may hear different 
possibilities in, and derive new value from, the same vocabulary pattern as they 
perform it on different occasions. (Berliner 1994) [195] 
This is a curious condition indeed, not least of all because of the performer's perceived role in 
this process. It seems to have little influence on the pattern of behaviour whether the 
performer is compliant in this operation or not, or even if they are aware of its existence. As 
can been seen from these last examples, there is no consensus on whether the involuntary 
reuse of learnt material is felt by the performer to have a wholly positive or negative impact 
on the performance. 
Ironically, Berliner also offers a negative perspective on conceptual modules that appear to 
avoid regurgitation of old stock, which for some is a burden in itself. This leaves the 
performer to contend with the possible mismatch that might occur when the conscious mind 
and the motor control systems are presented outputs from conceptual modules that have no 
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correlation. The mind is told one thing and the fingers another. For many performers this 
may appear to be the 'spontaneous' act that they strive for, when in reality both sides of the 
mismatch are constructed from the same mix of internal and external referents that supply 
data to all the perceptual and conceptual modules, even the ones that are perceived to produce 
habitual behaviour. The performer perceives an unstable, unpredictable situation which is 
actually bought about by the removal of their 'feed forward ' facility and the evaporation of 
the illusion of volition. 
Under the pressures of thinking in motion and amid the rapid-fire interplay and 
continually shifting frames of their conceptions, improvisers routinely contend with a 
variety of challenging, potentially daunting, experiences. One concerns the 
unpredictable relationship between the musical materia ls they have mastered for their 
large store and the actual ideas that occur to them during solos. Things are always 
happening "spontaneously," according to Harold Ousley. He "practices certain 
phrases" but finds at times that "none of those phrases will come out in my solos, and 
I'm playing something altogether different." Or, to his surprise, patterns "come out 
that I've only practiced a few times and didn ' t think I knew well enough to play. 
(Berliner 1994) [205] 
Perhaps this would be regarded by some as a breakdown in the fluid process of improvisation 
but for others this could represent a crack in the control mechanisms brought about by the 
pressure or real-time processing and delivery of material within the confines of a limited 
cognitive resource. 
In the 1970s, in reviewing his opinion of improvisation, Cage adopted a pragmatic approach 
to breaking down established processes in the creation of improvised music. He attempted to 
construct an improvisational context in which the performer had no internal resource with 
which to make reference. John Cage, in conversation with Maureen Furman, describes his 
approach. 
I'm finding ways to free the act of improvisation from taste and memory and likes and 
dislikes. If I can do that, then I wi ll be very pleased. In the case of the plant materials, 
you don' t know them; you' re discovering them. So the instrument is unfami liar. If 
you become very familiar with a piece of cactus, it very shortly disintegrates, and you 
have to replace it with another one that you don' t know. So the whole thing remains 
fascinating, and free of your memory as a matter of course. (Kostelanetz 1989) [91] 
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Although the intention may be laudable, this is actually a very crude attempt at circumventing 
a cognitive process that has been evolving for thousands if not millions of years. It is the 
adaptive nature of processes such as these that the species has relied upon for its very 
survival, and it is therefore unlikely that they will be undermined by swapping a musical 
instrument for a cactus. 
Exactly how adept these cognitive processes are at adapting to new circumstances can be seen 
in more of the anecdotal evidence Berliner has collected. By forging new relationships 
between data items and passing modules new types of parameters, it is possible for the 
cognitive processes that improvisation is built upon to become adaptive in the extreme. 
Art Davis recalls the dramatic incident that occurred on a tour with the Max Roach 
quintet in which fellow band member Booker Little accidentally closed a car door on 
Davis's hand. During the quintet's subsequent performances. Davis's broken finger 
forced him to explore alternative techniques involving multiple fingers resulted in 
ways new to him of moving around the bass. He has continued to develop this 
approach over the years, evolving a technique that involves four left-hand fingers as 
well as those of the right hand to achieve maximum speed and agility in bass playing. 
(Berliner 1994) [ 191] 
Given that such a finely tuned and resilient cognitive system is in use when an improviser 
performs it seems reasonable to assume that Cage's method fails to offer a practical method 
of liberating the performer from mechanical and habitual behaviour. His approach, however, 
does point the way forward for composers and improvisers who want to explore the cognitive 
infrastructure on which their practice is based rather than tampering with the fabric of the 
material that is produced. Sloboda suggests the fundamental difference between the artistic 
practice of composition and improvisation. 
The composer rejects possible solutions until he finds one which seems to be the best 
for his purposes. The improviser must accept the first solution that comes to hand. In 
both cases the originator must have a repertoire of patterns and things to do with them 
that he can call up at will; but in the case of improvisation the crucial factor is the 
speed at which the stream of invention can be sustained, and the availability of things 
to do which do not overtax the available resources. In composition, fluency becomes 
less important; but it is much more important to keep long-term structural goals in 
sight, and to unify present material with what has gone before. (Sloboda 1985) [149] 
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If Cage's goal, to "free the act of improvisation from taste and memory and likes and 
dislikes", is to be achieved then tools that liberate auto-affective behaviour are likely to be 
conceptual rather than physical. I would question Sloboda's assertion that an improviser must 
accept any material that springs to mind and pay little heed to long term structure, but I would 
agree wi th the implication that improvisation can utilise tools that function concurrently with 
the performance providing they are not cognitively over burdensome. 
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Chapter 5 - Tools For Improvisation 
5.1 Interacting with Tools 
a toolmaker succeeds as, and only as, the users of his tool succeed with his aid. 
However shining the blade, however jeweled the hilt, however perfect the heft, a 
sword is tested only by cutting. That swordsmith is successful whose clients die of old 
age. (Reingold 1991) [36] 
The traditional notion of a tool tends to refer to a physical artefact, used to undertake a task. 
This definition has been augmented in modern usage to include not only physical devices but 
also devices of a conceptual nature. Computers are regarded as tools but then so are the 
programs that run on them and the languages and components that are used to construct the 
programs. As our notion of tools and tool makers expands to include devices other than 
physical artefacts, so does the range of possible domains in which these devices might be 
used. An athlete may use a self hypnosis tape or a Neuro-Linguistic programming (NLP) 
technique to enhance their performance just as a sculptor may employ a piece of precision 
equipment to make fine adjustments to a piece of material. 
Tools then, can be seen to exist in an ever expanding variety of domains but they can also be 
seen to exist in relation to the hierarchy of their use and of their construction. This hierarchy 
may be more clearly understood if we firstly consider that a tool ' s use may signify the end 
point in a task or process. If the task is to play a jazz standard, then a piano will allow you to 
undertake that task. If, on the other hand, the task is to create a rhythmic accompaniment to 
the Jazz standard then a drum may be considered an appropriate tool. It is of course possible 
to perform this task adequately with just a drum, but it may be more effectively undertaken by 
employing the use of a secondary tool , a beater. This would constitute what we might call a 
' hierarchy of use ' and raises interesting issues in regard to interface design. We have 
established that a drum can be operated quite successfully using a human hand but that the 
potential of the drum could be exploited further by the use of a beater. The interjection of 
another tool between the hand and the drum requires a compliant interface at each side. The 
physical limitations of a hand would be accommodated by a pick-axe but the pick-axe would 
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not interface successfully with the drum because of its weight and sharpness. On the other 
side, a cactus may produce an effective rhythmic accompaniment when struck against the 
drum but because of the needles, could not interface with the hand. Interestingly in this 
situation the ' hierarchy of use' could be expanded to include a glove to interface between the 
cactus and the hand. 
The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of the interface between physical tools is likely to be 
more obvious than for conceptual tools, consider a foam hammer or a plug with four-pins. In 
the case of a physical tool the variables at play in its interface design are largely determined 
by physical considerations, whereas with conceptual tools, the components of the interface 
are likely to comprise pure data elements. 
If we consider computer software under the banner 'conceptual tool' and hardware as 
' physical tool ' the component based architecture of computer hardware exemplifies a 
reasonably standardised approach to interface design. Manufacturers are free to innovate 
within the components they develop as long as they adopt a standardised interface. Software 
operates on this basis in certain domains, the development of plug-ins and virtual instruments 
are good examples. Computer networking has one of the most established standards, but as 
the component layers increase so the interfaces become less standardised and more 
idiosyncratic. 
At each leve l, if the functionality of a software tool is to be fully utilised it is essential that the 
user of the tool, be it a human or another software component. is aware of how that 
functionality is mapped onto its interface. Once this is established the natural extension, of 
course, is for the interface to be pushed up to and beyond its limits. This endeavour is 
associated with human-machine rather than machine-machine interfaces and is prevalent in 
the use of tools of artistic expression. The way a1tists interact with their tools is often in a 
manner far removed from the modes of interaction envisaged by those that deve loped them. 
Regardless of this bastardisation or perversion of a tool 's use, the mapping of its implicit 
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functionality to the external control of that functionality needs to be appropriately expressed 
in terms of the 'user' domain. This fact is reflected in the computer world by the popular 
saying 'for the user, the interface is the system'. 
The reciprocal interface with the tool is, of course, the feedback mechanism. With physical 
tools, including traditional acoustic instruments, feedback is reasonably direct giving the user 
real time monitoring of the consequences of their action. In the case of conceptual tools, 
mediated by technology, there is the possibility of intervention in that process. This 
intervention could produce feedback based on the interpretation of the user' s use of the tool, 
opening up the possibility of time Jag, fi ltering, illusion and misinformation. 
There's a fundamental difference between what we traditionally call a tool, which 
requires feedback to be conducted to and from the human user for operations to take 
place, and a device that contains its own feedback paths, that can conduct its own 
investigations and modify its own behaviour on the basis of what it's able to feed back 
to itself from the results of what it has done. (Holtzman 1994) [218] 
As devices become more functionally rich the need for effective mapping between the 
controlling human domain and the machine's functional domain is very important if the 
perception of a causal relationship between the human and machine behaviour is to be 
experienced by the machine' s operator. In a musical performance setting, this importance is 
elevated significantly as the resultant machine behaviour is fed back with causal effect on the 
performer. A consistent mismatch between intent and result in relation to the performer's 
behaviour will cause a significant psychological overhead for the performer. Flautist 
Elizabeth McNutt extols the virtue of a performer's collaboration with technology in which 
the terms of engagements are clearly understood by the performer. 
When the terms of a piece are clearly understood by the performer, there is a 
corresponding increase in interpretive engagement and refinement. With live 
processing, for example, it is useful for a performer to understand the results of her 
actions on the processed sound output, so she can navigate these elements as part of 
her larger job of interpreting the music. (McNutt 2003) [298] 
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5.2 Mapping a Tools Functionality 
In their work on the use of metaphor in interface design, Fels, Gadd et al assert that there are 
pragmatic reasons why the mapping of sound production onto physical behaviour using 
acoustic instruments is largely a causal and mechanical process. In many instances 
instrumentalists are the initiators of physical sound, they actually excite the molecules of air 
and their physical behaviour exerts direct influence over the production of that sound. 
In the case of traditionaJ acoustic musical instruments, physics drives the mapping 
between control and sound. Traditional instruments are typicaJiy implemented with 
mechanical systems. As such, the mapping usually is easily understood by the player. 
Further, the physical form factor makes learning to play the instrument possible on a 
reasonable human time scale. These two factors make the mapping between 
instrument control and sound production psychophysiologically transparent for the 
player. (Fels, Gadd et al. 2002) [ 110] 
With instruments that mediate between the physical action and the production of sound, such 
as a piano or bag-pipe, there remains a tightly coupled relationship between the performer's 
action and the production of sound, because of the mechanistic nature of the instrument. 
despite the performers indirect control over the sound production. 
In early e lectronic instruments such as the Ondes Martenot and Theremin, this tight coupling 
was maintained even though the technology would have afforded a less direct mapping 
between gesture and sound. The advent of the synthesizer saw the augmentation of the 
traditional keyboard with patch boards, dials and switches which allowed the performer to 
initiate processes rather than be confined by the temporality of the gesture. One of the earliest 
synthesizer developers, Donald Buchla, res isted the keyboard altogether in favour of touch 
plate controllers. 
The art of mapping is as old as acoustic instrument design itself, but it is only since 
the invention of real-time electronic instruments that designers have had to explicitly 
build it into each instrument. (Hunt and Wanderley 2002) [106] 
The introduction of computer technology into the field has now meant that it is possible to 
build interfaces that are active, not just reactive. In this sense they can respond to a performer 
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and performance environment in accordance with a predetennined parameter map, in ways 
that the performer may or may not be consciously aware. Many computer based interfaces 
continue to evolve tightly coupled gestura! mapping using a variety of peripheral devices such 
as data gloves, motion detectors, velocity sensors etc. There are also, however, opportunities, 
afforded by computer based technologies, to explore the relationship between performer and 
sound source with the construction of responsive environments in a manner Di Scipio refers 
to as 'eco-systernic'. In this environment the performer and computer both exist in a 
relationship of 'ambient coupling', that is, the computer is responsive not purely to the 
performer but to the performer in the context of the perfonning environment. 
To deal with these matters in actual compositional work, I think the agent-performer 
should firstly be dropped, and the DSP routines implemented in such a way as to 
function only based on purely acoustical information including, in particular, the 
ambience noise. The ambience is the real - not virtual! - space hosting the 
performance. (Di Scipio 2003) [272] 
Di Scipio's model of a performance environment in some ways, breaks down the traditional 
notion of agency in an electroacoustic performance setting. His vision is not one of denying a 
performer agency in their relationship with technology, but mediating that agency through the 
performance environment. Such a performance paradigm is particularly appropriate in the 
context of this study as it allows for the indiscriminate mediation of agency fuelled by bio-
mechanical as well as cognate-mechanical behaviour. As Di Scipio asserts, this design 
concept does not preclude unmediated agency but subsumes it within the greater whole, while 
at the same time supporting a full-duplex mode of communication between the various 
elements, human and non human, of the performance. 
Direct man machine interactions (via control devices) are optional to an ecosysternic 
design, as they are replaced with a permanent indirect interrelationship mediated by 
the ambience. (Di Scipio 2003) [272] 
Di Scipio' s piece Texture-Multiple, for two winds, two strings, percussion, piano, and live 
electronics is an implementation of his eco-systemic design principle. Composed originally 
in 1993 this piece has been extended and augmented with each performance. The following 
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extract is from Christine Anderson's 2002 review of a performance by Ensemble Mosaik in 
Berlin. 
The computer intervenes in the instrumental action through a special technique of 
multiple granularization with different time-scale factors. This granularization is 
dependent on the resonant properties of the performance space, which is tracked by a 
microphone placed in the middle of the room. Mr. Di Scipio calls the resulting 
feedback loop an "ecological system ... in the triangle between musician, machine, 
and space.' ' In his words, the composition is not so much a piece of interactive music 
as an attempt to ''compose interaction through which music is created.'' The result is 
a highly exciting affair, not only for the audience but also for the performers. 
(Anderson 2002) 
For the purpose of this study, the notion of eco-systemic design has been adapted and 
augmented in the construction of performance environments for improvising musicians. 
Although Di Scipio's original concept was developed as a means of exploring man- machine 
interaction, it is a suitable framework in which experimental work examining performers' bio-
mechanical and cognate-mechanical response systems can be undertaken. The premise that 
conscious behaviour, whether volitional or not, has a causal relationship to environmental 
sensory information can be explored effectively using this architecture. There is no 
requirement on the part of the performer to contend with sensors, triggers or switches, merely 
to look, listen, feel and play. In this study Di Scipio's basic architecture wi ll be augmented to 
include visual feedback, although this will only be unidirectional from computer to performer. 
In implementing a performance system utilising this type of architecture in which a performer 
interacts with a technological device, a key component of the development process is the 
mapping of the performer's parameter space to that of the technological device. In their 
exploration of techniques in this field, Hunt et al suggest the deconstruction of the mapping 
process into three phases or levels. 
The first true stage of mapping takes these normalized data streams and extracts from 
them meaningful or tangible parameters ... The second stage of mapping allows the 
connection of 'user-side' perceptual parameters to ' system-side' ones, e.g. the 
connection of 'sax height' to 'brightness' (where the height is clearly gathered from 
the performer, but brightness is a descripti ve input to a synthesis process) ... The final 
stage in the mapping process consists of transforming the 'system-side perceptual 
parameters' into the available inputs to the available sub-systems. For example, 
'brightness' would need to undergo an interesting and non-trivial mapping process to 
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control the perceived brightness of a frequency modulation (FM) instrument. (Hunt 
and Wanderley 2002) [104] 
It is interesting to note the inclusion of stage two which, if the mapping process was 
implemented at its most lean, could be regarded as redundant. It would be possible to map 
the data stream directly onto the system functionality without first filtering it through 
' perceptual' space. 
There are two main reasons why this stage is included in thjs study. Firstly, because as 
identified in the discussion regarding tools, it is necessary for the point at which the software 
components interface between the instrumentalist and the delivery system to be fully 
configurable. For that reason the mapping or connection points need to be expressed in easy, 
controllable terms that are abstract from the underlying data and low level control processes. 
This consideration is relevant mainly in configuring and calibrating the system prior to 
performance but could also come to bear in situations where real-time alteration of parameters 
is necessary. 
The second reason relates to the performers perception of the relationship between the 
performer and the technological device. Goudeseune argues the case for measures that 
enhance a performer's understanding of how their behaviour has been mapped and qualifies 
tills by commenting on the differing nature of mappings that can be implemented, raising 
issues that could determine their effectiveness. 
If the performer can comprehend the mappings embedded in an instrument, obviously 
a more refined performance can result. This argues for static mappings over dynamic, 
and simple over complex (although we shall see that overly simple mappings can be 
sub-optimal). (Goudeseune 2002) [85] 
It is precisely this concern that the inclusion of the perceptual stage in the mapping process 
will address. Handled effectively at the perceptual stage, complexity and dynamic mapping 
can be implemented in a manner non-taxing to the performer. Arfib, Couturuier et al suggest 
mapping as a restricting influence on the performer. 
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One of the roles of a mapping is to define limits, which are also boundaries within 
which instrumental playing or composition can exert itself. (Arfib, Couturuier et al. 
2002) [141] 
In contrast to this opinion, mapping could be viewed as extending performers' limits, of 
offering a perceptual gateway into extended functionality. The role of mapping thus becomes 
a means of creating an illusion of limits, providing a manageable augmentation to a 
performers' expressive resource. 
Creating and managing the optimal relationship between a performer's limited cognitive 
resource and systems of immense complexity is perhaps the key to effective mapping. 
Stated colloquially, reducing how many dimensions of control an instrument has 
makes it less frightening to a performer. More fonnaUy, such a reduction concentrates 
the set of all possible inputs into a more interesting set by avoiding the redundancy 
inherent in the exponential growth of increasing dimensionality. Even more formally, 
it reduces the dimensionality of the set of synthesis parameters to the dimensionality 
of the set of perceptual parameters: it rejects all that the performer cannot actually 
understand and bear, while perfonning. Designing an instrument around the 
performer's cognition/perception instead of the engineer's convenience is echoed by 
Jacob, Sibert, McFarlane and Mullen (1994) in the context of visua l tasks: they 
conclude that 'choosing an input device for a task requires looking at the deeper 
perceptual structure of the task, the device, and the interrelationship between task and 
device'. (Goudeseune 2002) [94] 
Managing the performer' s cognitive overhead of controlling extended functionality is, 
therefore, an important function of the interface map. To this end, there needs to be an 
appreciation of the mapping that already exists if a performer's primary tool is a 
traditionaVacoust ic instrument. 
Both player and listene r understand device mappings of common acoustic instruments, 
such as the violin. This understanding allows both participants to make a clear 
cognitive link between the player's control effort and the sound produced, fac ilitating 
the expressivity of the performance. (Fels, Gadd et al. 2002) [ 110] 
The communication of this mapping to an audience, as a model of expression, is not within 
the boundary of this study as a discrete area of exploration. It is relevant however, in so far as 
it has a causal effect on the performance e nvironment, in which the audience has an obvious 
influence. As Hunt et a l suggest, it makes sense to endeavour to harness and build on the 
complex mapping that a lready exists in traditional instrumental music making. That is not to 
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say that the construction of new expressive tools with unfamiliar interfaces does not hold its 
own virtue, but that in performance paradigms, where there is an imperative to restrict the 
cognitive burden of interfacing with technology, this is an effective way to proceed. 
The saxophonist had built up almost two decades of performance subtlety on his 
instrument, and so it was felt that much of the complex acoustic mapping was 
inherently present in his existing performer-instrument system. The main task was 
therefore to convert the instrument's sound, and the player's performance gestures, 
into new sounds and graphical control. Note how different the situation would be if 
the player were using a novel electronic sax-like controller, and the entire sound 
synthesis system had to be defined and mapped. (Hunt and Wanderley 2002) [104] 
In using a traditional instrument as the controlling device in a computer interface, what is 
being constructed is a two tiered mapping system. This multi-level control system sees 
primary control of the computer system being mediated through the environment to a 
secondary control, which is the musician ' s instrument. What Goudeseune offers in his 
analysis of the use of secondary controllers is the potential to handle the complexity of the 
primary control system by building multi-functioning into the secondary controls. 
Introducing secondary controls reduces the number of primary controls, thereby 
simplifying the controller. Of course this is a compromise: 'simultaneous' adjustment 
of multiple controls is reduced. Also, the interface is deepened even while it is 
parroted: the performer' s mental model of the instrument is more elaborate and takes 
longer to learn. A range of compromise in fact exists. At one extreme there are k 
primary controls (strings on a stringed instrument, keys on a multiple touch-sensitive 
clavier) and no secondary controls, at the other extreme one primary control with a 
single k-way selector switch (e.g. the Ondes Martenot). Between these two extremes 
there may be primary controls with an n-way selector switch, where nm 2: k (bass 
guitar: m = 4 strings, n = 3-way pickup switch). If only a few secondary controls 
extend the interface of an orchestral instrument, they can often be operated by the feet, 
for instance as a bank of toggle switches or a three- or four-way 'gas pedal ' . 
(Goudeseune 2002) [88] 
The use of a traditional instrument as the secondary control device addresses other issues 
raised when interfacing musicians with digital technology. Wessel et al, in the construction 
of their conceptual framework for gestural mapping in musical performance, allude to the 
limitations of a system based on the direct mapping of human control data onto the software 
parameter space. They suggest that for volitional control of the software, as manifest in the 
performer's ' intent', the model they have adopted operates effectively, but for situations in 
which experimental rather than predictable behaviour is li kely to be exhibited by the 
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performer the model is likely to be less successful. This might suggest the suitability of 
directly mapped interfaces for composed music, in which the performance processes are fairly 
tightly defined with little room for variance on the whim of the performer, as opposed to 
performance processes in which the performer is encouraged to venture into unknown 
territory. 
One aspect that is not well captured is the way in which performers' intentions are 
elaborated upon by discovery of new possibilities afforded by the instrument. 
Experimental and otherwise exploratory intentions are certainly dear to the authors. 
We find that this albeit schematic framework allows us to view the roles of human 
motor learning, controller mapping, and generative software as an overall adaptive 
system. (Wessel and Wright) [1] 
It is significant that McNutt, who uses an acoustic instrument as her primary tool to interface 
with electronic systems, relishes the prospect of more control over the material in a 
performance situation. This desire may or may not exist because of the facility she already 
possesses to control the secondary device, but it certainly suggests an aspiration from the 
acoustic end of an electroacoustic collaboration for the ability to influence and to stretch the 
fabric of the performance. 
Giving the performer control over the flow of time is crucial; control over dynamics 
and timbres is also valuable. Some composers have even created works that give the 
performer real-time influence over the actual form and materials of the piece. 
Electroacoustic music that invites these kinds of creative collaboration presents vastly 
more satisfying models of chamber music than fixed accompaniment. (McNutt 2003) 
[300] 
It would be conjecture to suggest that presenting extended functionality through a familiar 
interface is more likely to provoke more extreme or radical use of that functionality than its 
access through a bespoke, direct interface. However, on a purely mechanical level it would 
seem reasonable to suggest that the cognitive overhead of contending with extended 
functiona lity via a controlling device with which there is limited familiarity would impede the 
extent to which experimentation could take place. 
5.3 Prosthetic Mental Functioning 
From the performer' s point of view, a composer's use of electronics will always 
involve some prosthetic elements that complicate the practice of her art. These can 
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stand in the way of the ideal collaboration between composers and performers. 
(McNutt 2003) [298] 
McNutt's view of technology as prosthetic is an interesting one. It is interesting on many 
levels not least of all because she locates the use of the technology, not with herself but with 
the composer. This is an intriguing distinction to make in the light of her obvious 
involvement with the development and use of those systems, and it serves to highlight the 
diversity that can ex.ist in the relationship between a tool and its user. It is interesting also, 
that from this perspective, the notion of a ' prosthetic element' is presented as impedance to 
her practice, and as a performer of composed music using technology, I am sure she is not 
alone. 
This contrasts with the general notion of prosthetics as a positive appendage, giving access to 
extended functionality and additional facility. It is this 'general ' interpretation of the term, 
which I would suggest, might be more appropriately applied in such a situation, if the 
performer was engaged with improvised rather than composed performance. In fact it is 
within the arena of improvised electroacoustk music that the notion of prosthetics could be 
expanded to include not just physical tools but conceptual tools also. There is a sense in 
which all physical tools could be regarded as prosthetic; Heidegger's hammer acts as an 
artificial extension to the arm offering greater leverage, more resistant material and increased 
impact with musical instruments operating in much the same way. Why then should a pocket 
calculator not be viewed in a similar vein? Conceptual tools offer an artificial extension to an 
existing facility and in that sense offer prosthetic mental functioning. This concept is not new 
and was developed, albeit using different nomenclature, by one of the pioneers of virtual 
reality, Fredrick Brooks, in the 1970's. Brooks believed in the use of technology to augment 
human potential rather than for its mimetic qualities. Howard Reingold recalls a conversation 
with Brooks at North Carolina University. 
I believe the use of computer systems for intelligence amplification is much more 
powerful today, and will be at any given point in the future, than the use of computers 
for artificial intelligence (AI). In the AI community, the objective is to replace the 
human mind by the machine and its program and its data base. In the lA community, 
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the objective is to build systems that amplify the human mind by providing it with 
computer-based auxiliaries that do the things the mind has trouble doing. (Reingold 
1991)[36] 
This philosophy seems to permeate the field of virtual reality, particularly amongst the 
leading lights in the early days of its existence. In expressing her personal philosophy 
towards performing with technology, McNutt conveys similar sentiments to the pioneers of 
virtual reality. Her desire to have her potential for human expression stretched and expanded 
in ways that autonomous performance would not allow seems to endorse the ethos prevalent 
in the field of virtual reality. 
I personally prefer the musical opportunities provided by interactive systems, and 
hope that composers will continue to explore these directions. I relish working with 
interactive partners that open new musical territory no human could provide. I want 
the machine to respond to me and challenge me in ways I could not have imagined, 
and to nourish my creative expression in performance. (McNutt 2003) [303] 
In contrast to the 'artificial' in artificial intelligence, which seeks to autonomously learn from, 
emulate and extrapolate human potential, the 'artificial' in prosthetics is a linkage between 
human centered processes and functionality that normally exists beyond reach. It is 
significant that McNutt in one instance refers to the 'complication ' of her practice in regard to 
composers' use of technology, while describing a dialogic situation with technology as be ing 
'nourishing '. She is perhaps articulating the feeling of technology as 'other' in the former 
and as 'extended self in the later. She c ites the composer Cort Lippe' s opinion as an 
endorsement of her own. 
I firmly believe that empowering performers with the ability to exercise control over 
an electronic part, based on a performer's musical expressiveness, is an important 
factor in computer music 's future. (McNutt 2003) [300] 
The significance of this increased awareness of the needs of performers, as well as 
composers, in the development of technological tools is compounded when composer and 
performer are one, as can be the case in improvisation. 
The empowerment to which Cort Lippe refers relates to performers who may or may not have 
limited influence on the material being played, but whose function is primarily to 'follow 
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instructions'. In a situation when a performer is creating and following their own instructions 
there is the potential to introduce prosthetic tools into each of these activities. It is of course a 
non-trivial task to view these processes distinctly because of the tightly coupled nature of 
their execution. It would also be a very burdensome undertaking for a performer to have to 
deal with a duality of prosthetic tools in real-time under performance conditions. 
The notion of mapping becoming transparent (Fels et al) describes a situation when the 
performer can comfortably cope with the cognitive load of the controlling device. 
As an example, the acoustic guitar is a well known instrument. The lay audience 
understands the manner in which the player's control gestures map to sound outputs 
even if they lack the physical proficiency to play the guitar themselves. This common 
understanding makes the guitar's mapping transparent to the audience. With enough 
practice, it also becomes transparent to the player. Under these (common) conditions, 
the guitar is an expressive instrument. (Fels, Gadd et al. 2002) [110] 
Here a situation is described where a prosthetic device is used to deliver the musical material 
and where the ' transparency' of the interface enhances expression. It doesn 't however, 
address the formulation of the material prior to its execution. 
In the delivery of composed mus1c, an appropriately designed physical tool is all that is 
required, unless no tool is needed. In improvised musical performance the situation is often 
the same. However, there is the potential to include a conceptual tool if required, such as 
chord sequences, graphic scores, etc. As Brooks implies, the key to developing conceptual 
tools that are liberating and carry a realistic overhead is to interface with innate human 
processes. To this end he defines three areas of potential in which the human mind is more 
powerful than any computer system likely to be developed in the foreseeable future. The 
three areas being pattern matching, evaluation and contextual recall. It is perhaps significant 
that these three areas have particular significance in the model of man-machine interaction 
that has been developed for the purpose of this study, to represent the paradigm of musical 
improvisation performance. Although Brooks describes his three areas in terms of discreet 
functioning, as a combinatorial system he has identified precisely the processes that interact 
in order to stimulate the manifestation of human behaviour. The example that Brooks gives 
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of "the pattern recognition power a one-week-old baby uses to recognize its mother's face 
from an angle and with a lighting it has never seen before." (Reingold 1991) [37] serves to 
illustrate two fundamental tenets of the model of the improvisation performance paradigm 
under examination. Firstly, that the magnitude and potential of the processing power that 
exists within the human domain dwarfs that of the computer domain, and secondly that the 
vast majority of this power lies outside the realm of consciousness. This underpins the notion 
that technology could usefully be harnessed, not to emulate human cognition, but to augment 
it by providing tools to release its potential. 
Brooks believes, it is possible to multiply that power by using the computer to show 
humans patterns in ways they are not normally able to perceive, and let the human 
side of the system decide which ones are meaningful. (Reingold 1991 ) [37] 
The supposition that the majority of cognitive processing power lies outside the conscious 
realm leads one to contemplate the potential of conceptual tools that also exist in this domain. 
It would be expeditious to remember at this point that a subconscious overhead is still an 
overhead. Just because someone is unaware that cerebral work is being done doesn't 
diminish its drain on the overall cognitive resource. What is perhaps the most intriguing 
aspect of this contemplation is how such a tool could manifest itself. It seems perverse at first 
to envisage a tool that cannot be perceived by it's user but consider, on the one hand, the 
'transparent guitar' that Fels et al evoke and, on the other, cognitive tools such as meditation 
and hypnotherapy that exert their influence in the sub-conscious domain. It's reasonable to 
question the validity of regarding something so ephemeral as a tool yet there are tangible 
benefits in their use. 
In many respects there is a commonality between such cognitive tools and a particular type of 
software application known as a TSR (Terminate and Stay Ready). Such programmes are 
executed but lie dormant until a pre-defined trigger spurs them into action, the post-hypnotic 
suggestion probably being the nearest cognitive equivalent. Situations when anger 
management or assertiveness training techniques are instinctively evoked might be regarded 
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as behaviour that occurs as a result of a tool which lies dormant in the subconscious until a 
pattern match for it's use occurs. 
It is worth, at this stage, returning to the technique pioneered by Milton Erickson for the 
delivery of hypnotic suggestion, the use of metaphor. Metaphor could be regarded as a 
second level of indirection Of representation. A phenomena that exists within the confines of 
a symbolic language but which is itself symbolic. 
In one sense metaphors are symbols created from symbols, where direct representation 
becomes implied as it is mediated through a meta-language. Metaphor is an important 
instrument in the perceptual mapping of a physical tool's functionality as well as providing a 
conceptual tool to exploit functionality that exists in the realm of the subconscious. Using 
familiar metaphors for physical tools reduces the cognitive burden of learning and operating 
them and can, as Fels e t al identify, provide a consistent mode of interaction. 
Metaphor can also be used as a design tool when creating new instruments. If a new 
synthesis engine is implemented, suggest a metaphor that encompasses its main 
characteristics. The metaphor may then dictate an appropriate controller for the device, 
so that the entire device is self-consistent. (Fels, Gadd et al. 2002) [114] 
This is not to say that metaphor cannot be used as a means of subverting accepted forms of 
representation. The example of the musical keyboard serves to illustrate both sides of 
metaphorical representation. The musical keyboard has served as a metaphor in instrument 
design, long after its purpose as an interface onto a mechanical instrument has been 
surpassed. As an interface onto modem synthesisers it has a metaphorical function providing 
a mechanism for ski ll transference and speedy access to electronic functionality. Contrast this 
pragmatic use with the deconstruction of the keyboard metaphor for artistic purposes. 
In the case of the piano, a range of finger positions is understood to activate a single 
key. This metaphor has been used in instruments that use a key model but do not have 
explicit keyboards, such as in the Virtual Piano created by Leonella Taraballa and 
Graziano Bertini at the CNUCE in Pisa in 1997. The Virtual Piano removes the 
keyboard entirely, relying on the familiar gestures of a pian ist without the physical 
keys. (Fels, Gadd et al. 2002) [112] 
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Therefore, metaphor is as equally effective in ironically subverting accepted modes of 
representation as it is in enforcing them. This may also be a useful way of viewing human 
behaviour stimulated by metaphor. Perhaps the subversion of an accepted mode of 
representation in cognitive terms is a metaphor that produces 'dysfunctional' behaviour. This 
negative manifestation could be the result of a metaphor having an inappropriate underlying 
representation, phobias being a prime example. Perhaps someone might exhibit a response to 
seeing a spider that would more appropriately be displayed on seeing a tiger, and so in a sense 
the spider becomes a metaphorical tiger. The reason this is interesting in the context of this 
study is that improvising musicians are as likely to hold a metaphorical representation of the 
activity they are engaged in as people in any other walk of life. 
In jazz metaphor is rife, the 'bridge ' , the ' turn around', the 'head' , ' swapping phrases' and 
'cooking' to name but a few. Subverting metaphors that exist conceptually is a hugely more 
challenging endeavor than overriding accepted modes of representation in the physical 
domain. As previously discussed (chapter 2), consciously attempting not to think about 
something is doomed to failure. There are, however, exciting possibilities for harnessing the 
power of metaphor in the development of new conceptual tools that allow the remapping of 
responsive behaviour with the use of hypnotic scripts. In using such a technique to deliver 
information pertaining to the performance environment, the performer requires less cognitive 
resource for the modus operandi and so frees up resources for the fabric of the performance. 
Another important aspect of a conceptual tool such as this, is the influence it can bring to bear 
on the balance of bio-mechanical and cognate-mechanical behaviour. A conceptual tool that 
resides in the sub-conscious domain can exh01t a certain amount of control over the level of 
conscious engagement the performer has with the material being delivered during 
performance, and in the case of this study with the relationship that exist with the 
technology. 
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5.4 The Performer's Perception 
The development work undertaken as part of this study will be described in the next chapter. 
However, it is worth taking a few moments to discuss the aspects of the design which one 
could perhaps regard as representing a paradigm shift in performance environments. 
Di Scipio offers a summary account of interactive performance systems which broadly covers 
the field in which the practical work for this study might be situated. 
Notwithstanding the sheer variety of devices and computer protocols currently 
available, most interactive music systems - including developments over the Internet 
- share a basic design, namely a linear communication flow: information supplied by 
an agent is sent to and processed by some computer algorithms, and that determines 
the output. This design implicitly assumes a recursive element, namely a loop between 
the output sound and agent-performer: the agent determines the computer's changes 
of internal state, and the latter, as heard by the agent, may affect his or her next action 
(which in turn may affect the computer internal state in some way, etc. (Di Scipio 
2003)[270] 
The significant aspect of Di Scipio' s observation is the identification of recursion as the 
mechanism that drives the interaction between the performer and the technological tool. In 
general terms this seems to be a fair reflection of both electronic and electroacoustic 
performance architectures, in as much as the performer's agency is controlled by the 
technology's output, which is caused by the performer's agency. 
The main system designed for this study represents a departure from this architecture in two 
respects. Firstly the eco-systemic principles that have influenced the design of the interface 
onto the technology mean that the recursion Di Scipio describes is compromised by the 
inclusion of environmental data into the feedback loop. 
The second and possibly more fundamental point of departure is the nature of 'agency' on the 
part of the performer. The inclusion of a conceptual tool into the system architecture removes 
the notion of the performer as conscious controller. It is probably this aspect of the 
performance environment that is the most radical in terms of the challenge it presents to 
accepted notions of agency and volition in improvised musical performance. This rich seam 
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of enquiry seems to be supported by Debono's vision of how perception and cognition are 
fertile areas of exploration for the arts. 
As a matter of fact, perception is more than simple sensing, and cognition is not solely 
driven by internal or representational activities. They are both taking the same 
pathway to translate a singular description of the world. This means that human 
thoughts and emotions not only participate in an aesthetic universal ability but also 
play equal parts in creation. Sensory access to matter has as great a significance for an 
artist as for a scientist. But the dialectics between the objective and the subjective part 
of an object being observed are not identical. As an illustration, the dynamic 
interrelation of cognition and art is now a new way to investigate levels of perception 
or reality and will probably bring to light new epistemological fields. (Debono 2004) 
[247] 
Marc Couroux is a composer and improviser dealing with psychological performance states 
which could perhaps be regarded as meta-musical and offers an interesting analysis of the 
contemporary music performance paradigm from the perspective of his own practice. 
Although Couroux's critique of contemporary musical performance practice is centred around 
the composer- performer- audience relationship, his observations in regard to the expansion 
of the performance paradigm beyond the construction of virtuosic performances is very 
pertinent to this project. Perhaps we see in Couroux's performative 'sea at large' a reflection 
ofDi Scipio's 'ecosystemic' approach to performance system design. 
In Evryali, the notion of "failure" doesn't come into play in as much as the performer 
is always required to engage the larger sonic picture adequately enough so as to give 
the "impression" that everything in the score is being played. Evryali becomes a 
largely personal conflict, a struggle with oneself to 'jest a successful image to an 
audience (the Olympian bravura is still omnipresent), despite the overwhelming odds. 
But the roots of a new performative paradigm lie there, in "The sea at large," one of 
the most fruitfu l areas to explore in instrumental music, though largely unexplored 
since. (Couroux 2002) [57] 
What Couroux succeeds in achieving is the re-framing of basic assumptions about 
performance practice, assumptions that underpin the notion of performance validity and of 
performers' integrity. 
I would suggest that it is in this spirit of reformation that this study attempts to expose the 
verisimilitude of other facets of the accepted nature of musical performance with particular 
reference to improvisation. Couroux' s challenge on the notion of virtuosity and the 
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imperative of accurate reproduction in the performance of composed music could be viewed 
as comparable with notions of control and volition in improvised performance. The time is 
perhaps ripe for the expansion of the traditional performance parameter space to include such 
areas that are so often shielded by convention. As Debono suggests, these are the domains 
where fields of enquiry become blurred, where artist and scientist draw closer together in their 
desire to explore human perceptions of reality. 
Precisely in this pre-conscious sphere could be the point where the arts can help 
science to get beyond itself. (Debono 2004) [247] 
In some ways the ideas of both Debono and Couroux allude to artistk practice that raise 
questions not just about how humans behave but about how humans think they behave. 
Debono acknowledges the evolving relationship that exists between art and cognition even in 
the work of artists who may not be conscious of its existence. 
It is likely that few artists are directly aware of these findings, but most of them are 
nevertheless working in this same direction: the understanding of human reality. 
When we see Rodin' s sculptures, they refer to human experience as much as to the 
aesthetic concept of beauty or purity. (Debono 2004) [247] 
Another example of this evolving relationship can be seen in the work on left/right brain 
interfaces by Garvey. His work raises interesting issues in relation to the style of visual 
interfaces adopted in this study. The interface developed by Garvey is concerned primarily 
with delivering visual information, in the form of two simultaneous video streams, to the left 
and right hemispheres of the bra in. The implications for this project are in the area of 
cognitive capacity and the brain's strategies for processing multiple streams of visual 
information. Although this work is primarily concerned with visual perception, the bas ic 
premise of working within and experimenting with a finite cogni tive resource is also central 
to this study. 
Coherence and integration are closely related to capacity limitations. We are unable to 
keep in mind more than a few objects at a time. The psychological refractory period, 
which is approximate ly 100-150 milliseconds, limits how fast we can make a 
discrimination choice. Attempting to do two things at the same time is difficult, 
because one action interferes wi th the other. Edelman and Tononi conclude that "the 
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limited capacity and serial succession of conscious states constitute the price that is 
paid for their integration - for the fact that they are reducible to a simple sum of 
independent components. (Garvey 2002) [321] 
Although not explicitly mentioned by Garvey, the psychological concept of chunking, 
described in relation to musical improvisation in chapter 2, is one that is central to the 
cognitive processes stimulated by his interface. Garvey's work in visual perception is framed 
in the context of how a viewer might perceive a narrative that was presented to them 
bilateral! y. 
The consumer of an art work is perhaps the most obvious focus in an art production system 
for the exploration of cognitive processes. Within the context of this study, this is not the 
case. The approach to the overall design of the performance environment for this study 
embraces the notion that the performer, as system component, is as open to psychological 
influence as any other human component, including the audience. There is an intriguing twist 
in this scenario in that the audience can observe the subliminal affect on the performer as well 
as being affected themselves. This further reflects the eco-systemic nature of the performance 
environment. 
On a closer look, the role of the agent-performer appears itself ambivalent (no 
criticism implied), in that it is the only signifier of the system's external conditions 
and, at the same time, it represents an internal component of the overaJJ meta-system 
including man, machine and environment. (Di Scipio 2003) [270] 
5.5 Unilateral and Bilateral Brain Processing 
The effect of right and left brain processing on the creation of art as opposed to the 
consumption or perception of art has been explored extensively by Betty Edwards in the 
development of conceptual tools to improve people' s ability to draw. The theoretical 
principles that underpin her work were first developed by the Nobel Prize winning 
psychobiologist Rodger W. Sperry. He undertook research into brain-hemisphere functions in 
1968. 
His stunning findings, that the human brain uses two fundamentally different ways of 
thinking, one verbal, analytic, and sequential and one visual, perceptual, and 
simultaneous, seemed to cast light on my questions about drawing. The idea that one 
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is shifting to a different-from-usual way of thinking/seeing fitted my own experience 
of drawing and illuminated my observation of my students. Edwards [xii] 
The conceptual tools developed by Edwards gives the artist a process by which they can move 
cerebral processing from the left to the right hemisphere of the brain. The effect of achieving 
this is to avoid the creation of symbolic representations of visual information. This allows the 
artist to draw what they see from primitive visual information rather than pre-constructed 
units. The side-effects of this process are similar to those of a hypnotic trance. Edwards 
describes her students experiencing an unawareness of the passing of time and if voices were 
present, being able to perceive their sound but not their meaning. 
The method that Edwards uses to achieve this effect is to present the brain with a task which 
is more suited to the right hemisphere than the left. In this situation what seems to occur, is 
an initial attempt by the left hemisphere to cope with the task, followed by a period of 
decreased activity on the left and an increase on the right. This is induced by giving the 
artists tasks in which they are required to look at their subject in a manner which prevents 
them recognising the component parts as objects. 
It seems that when the left hemisphere cannot offer symbolic interpretation of the information 
it is presented with, it hands it over to the right hemisphere for processing. In visual art this 
technique has proved to be very effective, and once mastered, can be utilised in a range of 
situations. 
Lnvoking 'visual disorientation ' as a means of pacifying the left hemisphere is obviously more 
suited to visual rather than non-visual tasks. It is interesting that disorientation is a common 
method used to induce a hypnotic trance. Momentarily jumbling words into a meaningless 
order within a hypnotic script seems to have much the same effect as Edwards ' technique. 
The problem that the method of visual disorientation presents in a musical context is that 
symbolic representations of music are largely restricted to music notations. 
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There is perhaps potential to exploit these ideas in composed music, read from a score, but it 
is the act of playing in improvised music where the art is cited, not the act of writing, because 
creation and delivery in improvised music exist in real time. The process and the artefact in 
visual art and composed music are in many cases discreet and in the cases where they are not, 
this technique would perhaps not be appropriate. In order that the underlying principles of 
these techniques can be utilised in the development of a conceptual tool for improvising 
musicians, another approach to inducing the left/right switch needs to be developed. 
There is a certain amount of anecdotal evidence to suggest that, as opposed to Edwards' 
approach of defeating the left hemisphere with an impossible task, there may be a case for 
merely occupying it with an unrelated task. Stan Tracey has for more than six decades been a 
hugely influential pianist in British jazz and is also revered for his compositions. 
I write far better stuff and more logical, watching television. I can watch a television 
program and I'll drift off the program in my mind onto the music that I've been 
writing. Because I'm not concentrating so hard on doing it ideas come easier. A lot 
of the stuff I've written has be done while I've been watching television, it really 
works. (Tracy 2004) 
Tracey seems to have intuitively found a technique which lubricates the flow of ideas, based 
not on the suppression of activity in his left hemisphere but stimulating it with an activity 
which is completely unrelated to the task in hand. It seems that for Tracey, giving the left 
hemisphere something to do prevents it from stifling creative processes in the right 
hemisphere. It would be interesting to know what types of television programs were more or 
less successful in the use of this technique, although it is perhaps reasonable to assume that an 
element of dialogue would have been involved, given the left hemisphere's propensity to 
decode language. 
This would seem to be a reasonable assumption on two counts. Firstly, it is unlikely that in 
the prolonged use of this techniques Tracey would be able to avoid listening to dialogue, and 
secondly, because it could offer an explanation of why the technique is so successful for him. 
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Robert Zatorre has undertaken an extensive examination of the auditory cortical regions of the 
brain using brain imaging techniques to monitor brain activity under a range of conditions. 
He has observed significant differences in the manner in which the left and right hemispheres 
process auditory information. 
With respect to speech processing, a vast body of data indicates that certain aspects of 
speech decoding depend critically on left auditory cortical regions. Current evidence 
suggests that there are functional hierarchies, such that early stages of processing 
depend on core areas bilaterally with 'higher' word-recognition mechanisms being 
associated with more anterior and ventral auditory regions in the left hemisphere. 
Zatorre [39] 
Zatorre has identified a general level of auditory perception which provokes brain activity in 
both hemispheres prior to any interpretation of the sound. On the recognition of the sound as 
speech, processing shifts to the left hemisphere. This may go some way to explain why when 
listening to a speech signal and a non-speech signal, the speech can be decoded reasonably 
easily, whereas simultaneously decoding two speech channels is problematic. Both situations 
involve the perception and decoding of two discreet signals but the former example is 
parallel-processed by the left and right hemispheres. 
Interestingly, a similar scenario cannot be applied to the right hemisphere. The process of 
perceiving and decoding speech sounds is a resource hungry activity because of the speed at 
which temporal and tonal information has to be decoded. The right hemisphere seems to be 
optimized for slower sound events and consequently can simultaneously handle more of them. 
Charles Ives, in an extreme example of this phenomena, composed a piece of music called 
Three Pieces in New England, in which he simulates two marching bands simultaneously 
playing different pieces of music. Although regarded by some, from an aesthetic point of 
view, as cacophonous, it is possible for the audience to decode the different streams of 
musical information in real-time and to further distinctly perceive the timbres of the 
instruments involved. This would almost certainly be a right hemisphere function. 
Thus, the predominant role of the left hemisphere in many complex linguistic 
functions might have arisen from a slight initial advantage in decoding speech sounds. 
The important role of the right hemisphere in aspects of musical perception -
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particularly those involving tonal pitch processing - might then have been in some 
sense a consequence of, and is complimentary to, this specialization of language. 
Zatorre [44] 
5.6 Modes of Interference 
It seems appropriate at this point to posture a plausible framework for the development of a 
cognitive tool for use by an improvising musician. A tool that can be assimilated into the 
design of a performance architecture broadly based on the eco-systemic principles discussed 
earlier. 
The overall framework centres on a 
single improvising musician using a 
conventional musical instrument. The 
environment also has within it a 
computer based system which 
produces audio visual output. The key 
to understanding the type of 
performances that might emanate 
from this environment is in the way 
information is mapped between the 
various components. The term 
'various components' is used here to 
reinforce the notion that from an 'eco-
systemic' viewpoint, the performance 
environment comprises more than just 
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Figure 5.1 Performance Parameter Space 
the performative components; audience, 
physical environment, acoustic properties etc. are all influential. 
The mapping of information between components of the environment is configurable at two 
points within this particular interpretation of the performance parameter space, those points 
being at the gateway into the computer and the performer (Figure 5.1). 
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The mapping of environmental data onto the behaviour of the computer takes the form of a 
parameterised software component that is, in normal circumstances, configured before the 
commencement of the performance. This has been developed using the eco-systernic 
principles discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. The reality of this is that the only 
live data input into the computer is the acoustic activity in the performance space, which is of 
course primarily but not exclusively produced by the performer. This acoustic information is 
then mapped onto the software component via a configuration interface where the various 
parameters that govern the component's behaviour can be set. Although the computer will 
respond sonically and visually to the information it receives, it is important to understand that 
although the performer can affect the behaviour of the computer, the relationship between 
action and response is not likely to be explicit. The software has the capacity to make 
'autonomous' decisions and can also vary its behaviour over the course of the performance. 
The second configuration point within the architecture is the mapping of environmental data 
onto the performer's behaviour, which takes the form of a hypnotic script, and is also 
delivered prior to the performance. It is significant that equivalent nomenclature has been 
employed in this study to describe the way both the performer and computer interface with 
external data. This is because a 'systems' approach to the development of both these tools 
has been taken, even though in general usage the term system is applied much more readily to 
a computer than to a human being. 
It is interesting that we routinely regard physical processes as systems, nervous, digestive, 
limbic, endocrine, immune etc., but rarely processes involving emotion or mental functioning. 
We don 't tend to regard crying, speaking or memory as a system. The approach taken in this 
study to the construction of a conceptual tool with which to address the cognitive limitations 
of an improvising musician bears similarity to the systemic approach to hypnotherapy devised 
by Dylan Morgan. 
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The pattern is clear. The Hypnotherapist is reducing the activity of nearly all systems 
one by one. Higher-order faculties which are harder to observe, such as an internal 
verbal analysis of what is going on and a critical analysis of its content, are typically 
also reduced. There is, however, at least one exception to the general rule that systems 
are inactivated: and that is the aural system. The Subject must continue to be able to 
hear the Hypnotherapist. Ideally this system should become more active than usual: 
the intention is for the listener to respond more than usual to what is said by the 
Hypnotherapist. This may be accompanied by a reduction of attention to other sounds. 
Another possible exception will be a particular other system that the Hypnotist is 
aiming to change: it may well be that the goal is to enhance its activity. The 
Hypnotherapist may, for example, be aiming to enhance a memory or to activate the 
imagination. (Morgan 1996) 
In this study the architecture of the main system prototype exists on various conceptual levels, 
ranging from the abstract and theoretical aspect of its design, through its system level design, 
to the performance level design and finally the realisation of a performance. The discussion 
so far has centred on the abstract and theoretical considerations of its design. The following 
chapter will elucidate the evolution of my practical work, beginning with the definition of an 
analytical framework with which to view the various systems. This forms a chronology of 
early developments together with events and encounters that influenced the main system's 
design. The software prototype which has been produced can be implemented in different 
ways, using different parameters to create very different performance environments, that is to 
say, the realisations documented in this study are in a sense exemplars. 
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Chapter 6 - Evolution Of The System 
The research I have undertaken in the completion of tills study has had a profound influence 
on my practice as an improvising musician and interface designer. If I look back over the 
work that I have completed during this period I can trace the evolution of thoughts and ideas 
that have grown and developed with each addition to my portfolio. With the benefit of 
hindsight it is now possible to abstract trends and characteristics from these works which 
reflect themes in my thesis. 
All the works described in this chapter are documented on the CD Rom (Appendix 1). The 
disk contains some systems diagrams, screen captures, performance documentation and video 
footage where available. The works contained on the disk are as follows: 
1. Musaic - Interface for solo performer 
2. Lost Hour - Installation 
3. Scribbler - Durational audio visual system 
4. Hexagram - Interface for improvising ensemble 
5. FreeKey - Interface for solo improvis ing performer 
6. Milieu - "Moving The Traffic and The Sun" for solo performer 
Before looking at the various works in detail it is worth looking at some general 
characteristics in order to construct a simple analytical framework which can be applied to the 
individual works. 
6.1 Generic Characteristics 
I have grouped together relevant characteristics into four broad classifications. The first 
relates to audio visual content and describes the type of material the system outputs to the 
performance environment. The second is re lated to performer feedback and response. This 
section classifies the performer's perception of the feedback delivered by the system and the 
types of response it is like ly to provoke. The third section classifies the ways in which the 
system can respond to the performer. At first glance this may seem indistinguishable from 
feedback, but it must be appreciated that the system may respond to the performer in ways 
that are not fed back. In that sense the response repertoire of a system may be far broader 
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than mere feedback. Last is the performer' s goal state which classifies ways in which a work 
may manipulate or influence a performer's goal state during performance. 
If there is a theme that runs through these classification systems it is that many of the areas 
employ classification systems based on whether the performer is conscious of some aspect of 
the work or not. 
6.1.1 Audio Visual Content 
It is important to classify the audio visual content in terms of its position on the continuum 
between static (fixed) and dynamic (generative) as this fundamentally affects its relationship 
with the performer. In terms of assessing the level of 'fixedness', the approach I have taken is 
to consider the audio visual content in terms of its form (structure of the piece) and content. I 
have classified this aspect in relation to the work's responsiveness to the performer. That is to 
say; if the content is fixed regardless of the performer, if it is variable but changing in a fixed 
relationship with the performer, or if the content is variable and changing independently of 
the performer etc. 
Figure 6.1 Audio Visual Content 
CONTENT Autonomous Responsive FORM Autonomous Responsive 
Fixed ../ Fixed 
Generative Generative ../ 
Mixed Mixed 
Fig 6.1 would represent a work in which content is delivered in response to the behaviour of 
the performers but whose response mapping was fixed for the duration of the piece. 
However, the form of the piece would be dynamically generated but would not be responsive 
to the behaviour of the performer. 
6.1.2 Performer Feedback And Response 
In referring to feedback I am considering the communication channel that feeds back 
information to the performer in response to their behaviour. If both audio and visual channels 
are used the consequences of the performer's behaviour will be fed back to them using both 
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channels simultaneously. However, the performer's behaviour may be mapped differently on 
each channel. How the performer interprets the feedback is dependent on their goal state and 
how they respond is dependent on their behavioural map. This process will be influenced by 
the performer's cognitive load because their responsiveness to feedback may be diminished if 
the mode of interaction is too burdensome. 
I have classified the performer's response to feedback in two broad categories, reactive and 
predictive. If the performer' s response is reactive they are more likely to exhibit 'bio-
mechanical' behaviour. If it is predictive their behaviour is likely to be 'cognate-mechanical'. 
The former is manifest in behaviour that is in response to audio visual events. The latter is 
resultant on an extrapolation of events in order to produce a response appropriate to the 
prediction of an event. This type of response is based on a forecast drawn from previous and 
current experience. An example of the first type of response in improvised ensemble playing 
might be if one player plays a loud high note and another player reacts by playing a similar 
gesture. An example of the second type might be if a player becomes aware of a gestura) 
movement by another player and successfully synchronises a response to coincide with the 
climax of the gesture. 
Figure 6.2 Feedback and Response 
Reactive Predictive 
Audio ./ 
Visual ./ 
The example in figure 6.2 would represent a situation where a performer would have to react 
spontaneously to the work's audio output but was able to foresee the trajectory of the visual 
output and react accordingly. 
6.1.3 System Response 
Some of the works in the portfolio are responsive to their environment. These works vary 
significantly in the manner in which they respond. Two aspects against which a response can 
be categorised are its stimulus and its retort. For the majority of the responsive works the 
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stimulus is sound. The sound is captured and using Fourier analysis the frequency bins are 
mapped to parameters in the system. It is the mapping that determines the retort and can be 
categorised as unified or distributed, static or dynamic. Unified mapping indicates that there 
is a single set of responses that can be mapped to the incoming data, so in other words, the 
work will make one response at a time. A distributed mapping implies that the work may 
distribute the incoming data to a number of processes and so respond in a number of ways 
simultaneously. The static nature of the mapping implies that it is fixed for the duration of 
the performance. If the facility exists to change the mapping during the performance either 
by self organisation or human intervention then the mapping is classified as dynamic. 
Figure 6.3 System Response 
Static Dynamic 
Unified ,/ 
Distributed 
ln fig 6.3 a work that had this system response classification would produce a set of responses 
in series but may not consistently respond in the same way to the same stimulus. 
6.1.4 Performer Goal State 
This refers to the goal state of the performer during engagement with the interface, i.e. the 
performance. It has been identified in the previous chapters that goal states in everyday life 
are often nested, except, for example, in life threatening situations. This means that at any 
time an existing goal state can be inte rrupted by the requirement to service a goal state of a 
higher priority. The goal states that are implicit within each of the works in this portfolio 
di ffer significantly. Nesting is not the whole picture; but within the context of a performance 
the hierarchical stack of goal states for a performer is immense. Performers do not cease to 
monitor all other aspects of their existence just because they are playing music. However, 
within the subset that pertains to their involvement in a performance, it is possible that 
prioritising goals can be a dynamic process. Let us also remember that it is possible for the 
performer to be engaged with a goal state about which they have no conscious awareness. It 
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is this domain that I have explored in order to expand the traditional notions of a performance 
paradigm to include parameters that would allow the manipulation of behavioural mapping. 
This became more explicit as my work developed. Therefore, it feels appropriate to classify 
this aspect of my work as being implicit or explicit and to classify the performer's 
engagement with goal states determined by the work as being conscious or not conscious. It 
is worth noting that the combination 'implicit' and ' not conscious' exists all the time to some 
degree in all human activities not just improvised music making. 
Figure 6.4 Performer Goal States 
Conscious Not Conscious 
Implicit 
Explicit .;' 
In fig 6.4 a work which engages with a performer's goal states explicitly and on a 
subconscious level could be doing so using hypnotic suggestion either via an induced trance 
or by using Erickson style metaphoric stories. 
6.2 Musaic 
I developed this interface for a collaborative performance with Dr Pauline Amos for the 
"Strange Noise" season held in Totnes during 200 l. Pauline is primarily a visual artist, but 
also creates work in a performance setting. In this instance Pauline has pre-recorded some 
short extracts of dialogue. These were integrated into a larger sample bank from which the 
system autonomously made selections during the performance. Pauline improvised a 
narrative in response to the soundscape created by the system creating a dynamic between her 
real and virtual self. 
The requirement was to create a visual interface which would behave in an unpredictable 
manner and create a soundscape with which she could interact. I captured a number of short 
samples of Pauline's voice and designed other audio samples which were combined into a 
single library. The visual interface was to give an indication of the system's current state but 
not an indication of what was to come. To this end I designed a simple eight by eight grid of 
- 100 -
tiles, initially of similar colour. I based the amount of information that the interface 
communicated around Millers '7 plus or minus 2' rule of cognitive capacity. The eight rows 
of tiles represented four channels of sound, two rows for each channel. Each tile on the upper 
row represented a sound in the library and each tile on the lower row represented the volume 
of each channel; left to right representing low to high. The system randomly selected tiles on 
the grid after a fixed period of time (approximately 6 seconds). When a tile was selected it 
changed colour to green with only one green tile being allowed on each channel at a time. 
When another tile on a channel was selected it turned the existing green tile blue. Once a tile 
was blue it was no longer active and was ignored by the system. As each tile became green 
on a row, so the samples and relative volumes would change. The performance ended when 
all the tiles were blue. By looking at the grid Pauline could determine what possible volume 
levels and number of samples were left for each channeL Essentially the grid communicated 
eight pieces of information giving a picture of the current state of the system. 
Figure 6.7 Musaic Classification 
Audio Visual Content 
CONTENT Autonomous Responsive FORM Autonomous Responsive 
Fixed .., Fixed 
Generative Generative .., 
Mixed Mixed 
Performer Feedback and Response System Response 
Reactive Predictive Static Dynamic 
Audio .., Unified n/a n/a 
Visual .., Distributed n/a n/a 
Performer Goal State 
Conscious Subconscious 
Implicit .., 
Explicit 
ln this work the grid and musical content is fixed but the order is self organising. The 
performer reacts instinctively because there is no way of predicting what is going to happen 
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next. The only accurate prediction the performer can make is how much of the piece is 
remaining. There is a significant cognitive overhead for the performer if they are to use the 
interface to monitor the state of the system throughout the piece, but there is no imperative for 
them to do this. There is no facility within the work to explicitly alter the goal state of the 
performer. 
Pauline's performance worked reasonable well from my point of view. She accompanied 
herself on an electric guitar, although I think in retrospect I would have preferred solo voice. 
The system produced a sonic backdrop of considerable interest even in sections when the 
voice was not present, but it was clear to me that the visual interface was either not visually 
engaging enough to hold Pauline's attention or was too complex to decode. This may have 
been a result of the very limited time she had to become acquainted with it. Although from an 
aesthetic point of view it produced an acceptable performance, as an experiment in performer 
interaction I regarded it as only a limited success. 
6.3 Lost Hour 
This work was created in collaboration wi.th Nic Sandiland from Middlesex University. It 
was a site specific interactive instaJlation as part of the Nightwalking conference, a 
commission by ResCen, the Centre for Research into Creation in the Performing Arts and the 
Greenwich Dance Agency, London 2002. 
The premise of the piece was to explore the ' lost hour' between Greenwich meantime and 
British summertime. The installation comprised a sonar device for translating distance into 
MIDI, a line marked on the floor to represent the hour and a projection of a clock. Visitors 
could waJk up and down the hour line and the sensor picked up their distance along the line 
and relayed it as MIDI messages to the software which changed the hands on the projected 
clock and triggered samples. As the participant walked the line, the clock went forwards or 
backwards in time creating changes in the soundscape. 
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Figure 6.8 Lost Hour Classification 
Audio Visual Content 
CONTENT Autonomous Responsive FORM Autonomous Responsive 
Fixed ./ Fixed ./ 
Generative Generative 
Mixed Mixed 
Performer Feedback and Response System Response 
Reactive Predictive Static Dynamic 
Audio ./ Unified ./ 
Visual ./ Distributed 
Performer Goal State 
Conscious Subconscious 
Implicit ./ 
Explicit 
The clock and soundscape were responsive to the position of the participant (performer) along 
the hour line. The responses were fixed and so the participant had no influence over the audio 
visual material, just when it was delivered. The work had a single mode of response which 
remained the same for the duration of the piece. Both the audio and visual feedback enabled 
the user to pre-empt the response to their next gesture after a brief period of engagement. The 
work made no attempt to explicitly change the goal state of the user. The user was mindful of 
all aspects of the environment. 
6.4 Scribbler 
This work was the first environment I developed that was responsive to sound. It comprises a 
piece of software that monitors an acoustic signal and makes a graphical response. The 
decisions about the nature of the mark making are based on the data it receives. The system 
choices, colour, probability of moving, thickness of line etc. are parameterised, so that the 
mapping between the sound and system can be altered. This work is something of an 
anomaly because it was not designed as a performance environment but as a durational piece 
that responds to sound over long periods and creates a type of 'acoustic trace', it is therefore 
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hard to classify its characteristics using this system. I have used this software in a number of 
environments, examples of which can be seen in Appendix 2. 
Figure 6.9 Scribbler Classification 
Audio Visual Content 
CONTENT Autonomous Responsive FORM Autonomous Responsive 
Fixed Fixed 
Generative ./ Generative ./ 
Mixed Mixed 
Performer Feedback and Response System Response 
Reactive Predictive Static Dynamic 
Audio n/a n/a Unified n/a n/a 
Visual ./ Distributed n/a n/a 
Performer Goal State 
Conscious Subconscious 
Implicit n/a n/a 
Explicit n/a n/a 
The output from this system is purely visual and within the process of execution it is hard to 
distinguish between form and content within it. There is very little that is fixed in terms of 
what the system produces either at a micro or macro level so classifying both its form and 
content as generative and responsive seems appropriate. Because there is no one person 
classed as a performer in this work the feedback is more an indication of the work's state 
rather than communicating information intended to stimulate human behaviour. I have 
classified it as reactive because I think it very unlike ly that an observer could predict the 
work's response to its environment. The work has a unified response to its environment but 
the nature of the response changes in accordance with some probability parameters that are 
set at runtime. 
6.5 Hexagram 
This piece was created in collaboration with Michael Mclnemey for a performance with the 
ensemble 'Works' at Dartington. The ensemble comprised Michael on piano and shakuhachi , 
- 104-
Tony Moore, cello, and Jeff Cloke, e lectronics. The ensemble engaged in free improvisation 
while the system listened and generated sequences of hexagrams that were projected behind 
the performers. The projection also included a very slow moving Yin Yang symbol which 
transformed from black to white at a speed almost indiscernible to the human eye. When one 
transformation had taken place the piece ended. The performers could view the projection 
and therefore were aware of the cumulative effect their playing was having on the images 
being generated. 
Figure 6.10 Hexagram Classification 
Audio Visual Content 
CONTENT Autonomous Responsive FORM Autonomous Responsive 
Fixed Fixed ./ 
Generative Generative 
Mixed ./ Mixed 
Performer Feedback and Response System Response 
Reactive Predictive Static Dynamic 
Audio ./ Unified ./ 
Visual ./ Distributed 
Performer Goal State 
Conscious Subconscious 
Implicit ./ 
Explicit 
In this work, although the output was only visual, it was responsive to the sound of the 
musicians. The overall structure was essentia lly fixed but the possibility of slight variation 
did exist. I therefore classified the form as fixed and not responsive to the environment as 
any variation would be virtually undetectable by the performers and would have no effect on 
the performance. The work gave a single stream of responses to the performer' s actions but 
the responses were stochastic and therefore changed over time. There was no facility within 
the program to subliminally influence the performer' s hierarchy of goal states. 
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Thls perlormance convinced me that I should progress my ideas with perlormance interlaces 
using solo perlormers. The members of the ensemble were very familiar with each others 
playing, and not with the responsive interlace and so the vast majority of the interaction was 
inter-player. The visual projection added an extra dimension to the perlormance but was 
engaged with far more by the audience than the performers. Because the interlace had a 
timed cycle, the musicians seemed a little uneasy in places, having to synchronise with an 
external time source. I was happy that the interface responded in quite a subtle way to the 
sound of the ensemble, but unfortunate! y there was no reciprocal effect on the musicians. 
6.6 FreeKey 
An early version of this piece was used in a concert by the Sam Richards ensemble 
GruveWelderz in 2003. More recently this piece was performed with pianist Dave Holland as 
part of the Totnes Jazz Collective's lOth Anniversary concert in Totnes 2005. The piece is 
designed to be used by a solo instrumentalist using a keyboard instrument. The piece uses 
imagery based on the keys of a keyboard which are animated, transformed and with which the 
perlormer interacts. The animation produces a soundtrack based on its own visual behaviour 
which is generated in real-time during the performance. 
Audio Visual Content 
CONTENT Autonomous Responsive FORM Autonomous Responsive 
Fixed Fixed ../ 
Generative Generative 
Mixed ../ Mixed 
Performer Feedback and Response System Response 
Reactive Predictive Static Dynamic 
Audio ../ Unified n/a n/a 
Visual ../ Distributed n/a n/a 
Performer Goal State 
Conscious Subconscious Figure 6.11 FreeKey Classificatioll 
Implicit ../ 
Explicit 
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This work although not responsive to the sound of the performer did produce audio and visual 
material. The structure of the piece was fixed within certain limits but within the sections of 
the piece the content was largely generative. The interface is designed such that the animated 
agents on the screen create sonic material. The level of predictability in the manner in which 
they do this varies throughout the piece. Therefore the cognitive burden on the performer 
varies correspondingly. Although the work doesn't respond to the performer it could be 
regarded as responding to itself. There was no explicit facility within the program to 
subliminally influence the performer's hierarchy of goal states but the act of engaging with 
the visual interface and the process of predicting its behaviour places a cognitive burden on 
the performer which will inevitably influence their hierarchy of goal states. This was the 
result of an attempt to build something implicit into the interface which had this effect. 
The performance by Dave Holland, documented on the CD was interesting on a number of 
levels. Firstly, the level of engagement between performer and the digital interface was much 
more focused than my experience of working with an ensemble. I observed Dave staring 
intently at the screen for large sections of the piece. It was interesting also to hear Dave 
reflect on his instinct to try and predict the behaviour of the interface and interact accordingly. 
This was particularly significant because it was my intention to try and illicit this type of 
behaviour from the performer by providing the visual agents with a trajectory that could be 
followed by the performer. I think it was significant also that Dave mentioned a pull he 
experienced towards recreating material from rehearsal. This indicated to me that the sonic 
material produced by the system did not vary enough from performance to pe rformance, 
because far from leading Dave away from habitual playing it seemed to encourage him. I 
concluded that too high a proportion of the piece was fixed and that the generative aspect 
should have been more dominant and given greater freedom to influence the performer. 
6.7 Milieu 
This system represents a departure from the previous work. In all the previous work the 
systems created represent finished artefacts. This system, however, is a tool with which to 
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create finished artefacts and so there is a sense in which the resultant projects are instances of 
Milieu. There are general characteristics that all projects created using Milieu will share, 
which is an aspect I am comfortable with. After all, it could be said that there are general 
characteristics that all performances have in common. I feel that the tool is flexible enough to 
produce divergent work delivering a wide range of challenging opportunities for the 
performers that engage with it. 
Because Milieu is not an end in itself, but rather a framework for creating other works, the 
classification of its characteristics are carried forward to works that are created with it. It is 
designed to create works comprising multiple sections of fixed duration with each section 
delivering generative content. The prototype system has a simple agent based architecture 
which spawns instances of agents based on a number of agent classes. The agents' 
behaviours, used to generate the visual content, are responsive to the sound of the 
performance environment and the sonic content is 
l ····- A&ent Cropldl:s ... 
then generated in response to this. Throughout the Oau.O"""' l.GA(l }bt 
s .. j 
performance there is the facility to alter the s-
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parameter mapping between incoming signal and 
the visual algorithms, and between visual and 
sonic algorithms. Performances created using this 
Blonclnc 
system are intended to explicitly allow the 
performance designer to interact with the goal 
states of the performer. The performances it has 
been used to generate have achieved this by using 
a pre-recorded hypnotic script prior to the 
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performance. If required it is possible for this part sowRe [ s ... s.._l 
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of the process to be fully integrated into the 
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performance. 
Figure.6.12 Milieu Parameters 
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A piece constructed using Milieu comprises one or more sections of fixed duration and each 
section contains up to eight conceptual agents. Each conceptual agent has around twenty-
eight audio visual parameters that govern its internal state and behaviour. Figure 6.12 shows 
the parameters for one conceptuaJ agent. 
When the performance begins, instances of the conceptual agents are spawned on to the 
display space; these are referred to a child agents or agent instances. The rate at which they 
are spawned is set by the 'birth rate' attribute. Some of the conceptual agents' parameters set 
the level of probability of an agent instance exhibiting a certain type of behaviour. Therefore 
when new instances are created they share characteristics but not exact attribute values. For 
example a new instance of an agent may share a life expectancy with other instances from the 
same conceptual agent but wouldn't expire at exactly the same time. One of the visual 
parameters of a conceptual agent can be selected as being responsive to the incoming acoustic 
signaJ and the level of responsiveness can also be set. The audio material is generated via 
MIDI and can be set to respond to one of the visual attributes. This causes a type of chain 
reaction where the acoustic signal stimulates a visual response which in turn produces an 
audio response, the nature of which is determined by how they have been patched together. 
The sections and the conceptual agents can be saved independently so that they can be used 
again, either in the same piece or a different one. Because the piece is configured to run on a 
dual display it is possible for the configuration screens to be opened and parameters changed 
at run-time. 
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Figure 6.13 Milieu Classification 
Audio Visual Content 
CONTENT Autonomous Responsive FORM Autonomous Responsive 
Fixed Fixed ./ 
Generative ./ Generative 
Mixed Mixed 
Performer Feedback and Response System Response 
Reactive Predictive Both Static Dynamic 
Audio ./ Unified 
Visual ./ Distributed ./ 
Performer Goal State 
Conscious Subconscious 
Implicit 
Explicit ./ 
6.8 Milieu Performances 
I have documented two pieces created with Milieu, one was performed at Concourse -
Dartington 2005 by saxophonist Dave Murphy and the other was created and filmed in a lab 
situation, for demonstration purposes, with no audience (DVD Appendix 1). The first 
example is a piece entitled "Moving The Sun and The Traffic". 
The title of the piece represented an exploration of volition and control and was inspired by 
an account of a victim of brain damage who perceived everything they saw as being under 
their control. (Copelman 2003) The piece was intended to explore an improvising musician's 
sense of conscious control in their performance. 
Prior to meeting the performer, the basic design of the performance was constructed by 
creating performance and section configuration files. A title screen was designed and eight 
agents were configured. The graphics I used for the agents were largely selected from a 
number of files I had created when developing the system, I did not intend to use them in the 
final performance but actually most of them worked well together and so they remained. We 
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bad been asked to perform for approximately fifteen minutes and so I decided to work with 
the idea of sixteen one minute sections. I wanted the sections to have a certain amount of 
continuity and not to have clearly marked transitions. I hoped to achieve this by including 
connecting material in adjacent sections, either by reusing agents or changing agents but still 
continuing with behavioural traits. I explored the idea of using on board synthesis to provide 
the systems audio response but technical performance issues meant that the system felt more 
secure using an external sound module. I configured a number of patches using a Korg Triton 
which were then set to respond to midi channels corresponding to the agents. I spent a 
considerable amount of time matching the audio patches to the visual agents and then 
configuring the agent's responsiveness. The process was very compositional in nature, 
having to relate localised aesthetic decision making to wider more structural concerns. This 
process was very iterative and continued after I had started rehearsals with the performer. 
One decision that I didn't revisit was the number and duration of the sections, this was 
probably the first thing I decided upon and it endured until the performance. 
The preparation with the performer for the Concourse performance comprised four stages. 
Stage one was an initial meeting at which the performer observed and experimented with the 
interface and decisions were made about the design of the performance. The second stage 
was a rehearsal using the configured system. At this stage the performer engaged with the 
first hypnotic script (Appendix 3). The script was related to improvisation in general and not 
specific to the piece, it was played to the performer on CD. The CD was listened to on 
headphones after which the rehearsal was undertaken. The third stage was the actual 
performance, where the performance environment was created in an appropriate space with 
sound and projection facilities. The performer again listened to an hypnosis script (Appendix 
3) before embarking upon the performance. This time the hypnosis script was specific to the 
piece. Stage four was an interview, based loosely on a prepared questionnaire, in which the 
performer relayed their experience of performing the piece. 
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The Concourse performance was very encouraging. The performer's engagement with the 
interface was focused and unrelenting, moving around the performance space to explore the 
response of the system in relation to his proximity to the microphone. Dave explained 
afterwards that he used this technique to try and decode how the interface was generating 
material in response to his playing. Dave' s experience of using the hypnotic script prior to 
the performance was very positive; he suggested that it would have been even more effective 
if the delivery of the script could have led straight into the performance. This was actually 
my intention, but logistically in this performance it was not possible. Because there was very 
limited time to try the system in the performance space, I was concerned that if the system 
generated very intense responses the balance between it and the performer would be 
problematic. Thjs situation did not occur. I was happy with the sequencing of the section 
although their durations would have benefited with some adjustments, in particular some 
seemed very short. The most satisfying aspect of this piece for me was the response I got 
from Dave in the interview I conducted after the performance. Aesthetically there was room 
for improvement in terms of the systems audio visual output, but in terms of exerting 
influence on the performers improvisatory behaviour, I felt I had made real progress. 
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Appendix 1 - CD Rom and DVD 
CONTENTS 
CDRom DVDVideo 
Introduction to the portfolio Introduction 00.00 
Musaic Overview 03:00 
performance information The Parameter Space 09:45 
system diagram An Example System 13:15 
screen capture The Demonstration 19:15 
project The End 43:30 
Lost Hour 
performance information 
system diagram 
screen capture 
project 
Scribbler 
system diagram 
screen capture 
project 
Hexagram 
system diagram 
screen capture 
project 
FreeKey 
performance information 
system diagram 
screen capture 
video clip 
project 
Milieu 
performance information 
system diagram 
screen capture 
video clip 
project 
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Appendix 2 - Scribbler Output Examples 
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Example 1 
Tube journey Paddington to Kings Cross - 2003 
Binaural rec:o 45 minutes 
Parame1en for · craateScrtbbiB• 
OK I I Ulttlllll l l. ~ 5 Scale of movement 
-J 
Rate of lirection change: ~F ~ 6 
Range of Red: 
lllttttt tiiU n l 
-_) .!.l!J 41 
Range of Green: 
................ 
-_) ..1!J 74 
............... , 
..1!J 102 Range of BkJe: 
-J-
Choice of li1e thickness: ~ j" " ' " I ..!..UJ 2 
................. ill 20 Pr~ of II"'I'fflg: 
-}--
Range of pcmtie movements: 
............ 
-_) ..1!J 5 
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Example2 
Flight from Exeter to Edinburgh - 2004 
Binaural 1 house 
Par...aten for ·createScrlbble• 
................ ~ 16 Scale of moverneri: 
-_)-- OK 
Rate of ciection change: '''' ' '''} 
c~ 
ill s 
Range of Red: 
................ 
_)- .!.L!J 195 
Range of Green: .::: j "' ""' "' ~ 54 
Range of Bk.le: ~j"" ""' "' ill 37 
Drice of li1e thickness: ~F ~ 6 
Probabity of movr.g. .:::j""'"""' ~ 10 
Range of pcmiJie ~ ~j"""' ..1..£j :ll 
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Appendix 3 - Hypnotic Scripts 
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Improvisation Script 1 
Structure 
1. general empathetic conversation 
2. brief description of Hypnosis 
3. introduce the project 
4. conversation focusing invoking an experience 
5. eyes close, become relaxed 
6. imagining a very positive playing experience 
7. being aware of and savouring what has taken place 
8. coming back in a happy, relaxed and satisfied state of mind 
Techniques used 
1 . Embedded suggestion 
2. Dependent suggestion 
3. Presupposition 
4. Illusory choice 
5. Conscious/Unconscious split 
6. Nominalisation 
Script Outline 
1. general conversation 
• I know how busy you must be so I hope that as well as helping me out you'll 
get something from this experience, even if you just feel really refreshed at 
the end or have a really good relaxing nights sleep. 
• So a big thank you and, I hope this will be beneficial to you in your playing 
and you'll have a really enjoyable time. 
2. brief description of Hypnosis 
• All you have to do is sit and relax here and listen carefully to what I say. 
• Many people don't realise that they enter a hypnotic state many times during 
a day. These occur when your attention has a particular focus which 
diminishes the amount of sensory information that you are aware of. Reading 
a book on a train or watching a film are good examples. 
• Don't expect anything miraculous to happen, all you need to do it turn your 
attention inwards and listen to my voice. 
• Your conscious mind may or may not be aware that you have entered a 
trance, all you have to do is relax and enjoy the experience. 
• This first session is about giving you the experience of an induction and 
allowing you to explore in your imagination a range of creative and inspiring 
musical experiences. 
3. introduce the project 
• Before you enter a nice deep relaxing trance let me say a few words about 
the project. 
• I've been involved in various types of improvised music for many years and 
I've always been intrigued by the actual process of improvising. 
• In some ways we invoke similar processes to improvisation when we speak 
but in this case we're encoding and delivering linguistic information in real-
time rather than musical material. 
• We know that our subconscious mind regulates many of our human 
subsystems including our behaviour. Sometimes we are conscious of its 
influence, perhaps when something scares us, and other times we are not, for 
instance when we are digesting food. 
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• I am interested in the sub-conscious' influence on the act of musical 
improvisation and its effect on the musicians perception of their performance. 
• Improvising musicians from Evan Parker to Stephan Grappelli have used 
descriptions such as 'slightly shocking', 'a feeling of being out of 
yourself', 'being half asleep' etc. to convey the feelings they experience when 
conscious control of their playing has been relinquished to the subconscious. 
• These moments can be quite rare but for many musicians it is the possibility 
of their occurrence that makes the practice of improvised music making so 
worthwhile. 
• This project is an exploration of this phenomenon 
4. conversation focusing invoking an experience 
• So ... this session is about allowing you to experience the exhilaration of a 
great musical improvisation with your imagination. 
• Improvising works best when we're in the flow, when our conscious mind 
doesn't restrict what we play or guide us towards our habitual and mechanical 
modes of playing. 
• You have almost certainly experienced this before, either as a player or as an 
audience member. Perhaps you aspire to achieve a certain subliminal state 
in your playing or perhaps deliver a particularly moving experience for your 
audience. 
• In a moment I'm going to ask you to bring to mind a time and place when that 
might have happened or imagine a situation when it could happen. 
5. eyes close, become relaxed 
• Take a moment to make sure you are comfortable and that you feel well 
supported. 
• All you need to do is relax and listen carefully to my voice and to what I'm 
about to say. 
• Some people find it easier to enter a trance with their eyes shut, so if you 
haven't already, you may feel more comfortable to take a moment to close 
your eyes. 
• That's right, you might like to concentrate on your breathing for a few 
moments, getting a sense of the relaxing ebb and flow of your breath as it 
enters and leaves your body. 
• Good, just allowing your breath to naturally come and go and as each breath 
leaves you perhaps get a sense of becoming more relaxed. 
• As musicians we are only too aware of unwanted tension in our bodies. Lets 
just spend a few moments moving our attention around our body, relaxing the 
various muscle groups and allowing us to enter beautifully peaceful state of 
mind. 
• Perhaps you could start by guiding your awareness down to one of your feet, 
either the left or the right it doesn't matter, having a sense of how each of 
your toes feel. Allowing your toes to loosen up and feel comfortable and 
warm as the blood circulates freely around them. 
• Now you might like to move your attention to the other foot and enjoy the faint 
tingling sensation as the toes on that foot loosen and relax. 
• Take some time now to gradually move your awareness up your body, 
lingering on different areas as you go. You may move firstly to your calf 
muscles or your knee joint or your ankle, it doesn't matter which part of your 
legs you go to, just enjoying the sensation of relaxing where ever you send 
your attention. That's great. 
• As each area of your body relaxes you may become more aware of the sound 
of your body, your heartbeat, the flow of air as you breath or possibly the faint 
rumbling of your stomach. 
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• Very often when the body relaxes in this way, all of the various parts function 
as they should and the flow of blood to the stomach allows it to relax and 
unwind. 
• Perhaps you'd like to move your attention to the upper part of your body, 
maybe your arms or hands or possibly your shoulders or neck. Allowing your 
limbs to perhaps give a little bit as your muscles loosen and a beautifully 
warm glow flows around your body. That's great. 
6. imagining a very positive playing experience 
• Ok, very good, now as you enjoy a deep sense of calm perhaps you could 
bring to mind a situation in which you are improvising on your instrument. 
You may evoke a memory of a performance that you are particularly proud of 
or it may be an imaginary performance. 
• Which ever it is, it would be good to get a sense of all the things that make 
your performance so special. You may like to turn your attention to the 
sounds of the performance space, perhaps there are sounds from an 
audience or from other musicians, possible ambient sounds in the space or 
sounds entering the space from outside. Get a real sense of your contribution 
to the sonic soundscape of the performance space, whether it be inside or 
outside, quiet or noisy. 
• notice how the tips of your fingers feel as you touch your instrument or any 
other part of your body that comes into contact with your instrument. You can 
allow yourself to experience pleasure from the physicality of your instrument 
• just spend a moment enjoying the sounds and the silences that emanate from 
your instrument and focus on the relationship between them and the 
emerging soundscape. 
• you may get a sense of how it feels when all the various elements fall into 
place, it may be an exhilarating or ecstatic feeling or perhaps a feeling of 
complete freedom. 
• imagine the sense of liberation you enjoy when the music flows from your 
sub-conscious, without the need to think about it. You may have a feeling of 
relaxed confidence or feel emotionally elevated 
• you may notice the ease with which you can produce the most engaging and 
satisfying sounds on your instrument 
• part of the enjoyment and satisfaction of your performance is perhaps due to 
the security you feel because you have faith in your subconscious to produce 
new and interesting music. 
7. being aware of and savouring what has taken place 
• You may want return to a feeling of peaceful relaxation and allow the 
exhilaration of your special performance to gradually diminish into calmness. 
• You may want to remember the sense of ease with which you played and the 
sense of confidence you felt during your performance so that you can recall it 
on other occasions 
• As the sounds fade you may take a moment to savour and enjoy a deep 
sense of satisfaction about what you have just played. 
• You may feel a sense of contentment or reassurance that your subconscious 
is there for you to call upon when ever you want. 
8. Coming back in a happy, relaxed and satisfied state of mind 
• Gradually begin to sense the room around you, the sounds, the temperature 
• When you're ready you may make some small movement to put you back in 
touch with where you are 
• In your own time open your eyes and have a stretch 
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Improvisation Script 2 
Structure 
1 . get comfortable with context 
2. background information about piece, mapping 
3. eyes close - relaxation/induction 
4. talk through the piece 
• focus on visual interface, allow it to determine your musical behaviour 
• create a sense of trust in subconscious to handle playing 
• create positive state of mind to begin the piece 
5. coming back feeling stimulated and looking forward to playing 
Techniques used 
1 . Embedded suggestion 
2. Dependent suggestion 
3. Presupposition 
4. Illusory choice 
5. Conscious/Unconscious split 
6. Nominalisation 
Script Outline 
1. get comfortable with context 
• I'm really please that you've agreed to be involved in this project and I really am 
very grateful for the time and effort you've put into it. 
• I want to just give you a bit more information about this piece so that you will be 
really happy and relaxed with what's going on and so that you'll feel focused 
and inspired when you play. 
2. background information about piece, mapping 
• You have already seen the interface in rehearsal and have seen how the 
agents on screen display differing type of behaviour. 
• The agents are responsive to the ambient sound of the room which affects a 
number of parameters. These parameters are then mapped onto the agents 
behaviour. 
• Each behaviour has its map set slightly differently which produces the differing 
behaviour. 
• You may see a parallel with how people behave in everyday life, two people 
may react very differently to an identical situation because their internal 
behavioural maps have been setup differently. 
• Some elements of our behavioural mapping enter our conscious awareness 
and some don't. For instance, I may be aware that entering a small space 
makes me uneasy but I may be completely unaware that driving makes me 
aggressive. Others may notice but I may not be aware myself. 
• When an improvising musician stands up to play in front of an audience there 
behaviour will inevitably be affected by a huge range of parameters, ranging 
from how much practice they have done to how hungry they are, and it is via 
their behavioural mapping that these parameters will influence their 
performance. 
• In this performance the audio visual interface has effectively expanded your 
parameter space and consequently placed an additional demand on your 
mapping mechanism. 
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• This is a wonderful opportunity for you to see what this mapping produces in 
terms of your musical expression. 
• PAUSE 
• I want to just take a few moments to for you relax in preparation for the 
performance and to make a few suggestions to help you get the most from this 
experience. 
3. eyes close - relaxation/induction 
• OK, make sure you feel comfortable and that you feel well supported. 
• All you need to do is relax and listen carefully to my voice and to what I'm about 
to say. 
• Allow any ambient noised to just come and go, enjoying them as they pass and 
then returning back to my voice, keeping focused on my voice and to what I 
have to say. 
• If you haven't already, you might like to close your eyes to help you concentrate 
on what I am about to say. 
• That's right, you could take a few moments to focus on your breathing, getting a 
sense of the tension and release of your breath as it flows in and out of your 
body. 
• PAUSE 
• Good, this is a great time to enjoy the anticipation of the performance and to 
enjoy a feeling of optimism about your playing 
• just allowing your breath to naturally come and go and as each breath leaves 
you can perhaps allow yourself to become more relaxed. 
• I just want you to turn your attention to the various muscle groups you call upon 
when you play your instrument. 
• Perhaps you could start with your fingers, just getting a sense of any stiffness 
or tension you are holding in your joints. Just being aware of that for a few 
moments before letting it release. You may get a sense of it flowing away or 
evaporating or what ever, but just savour that sense of release. 
• In your own time, you might like to move your awareness to other areas of your 
body associated with playing your instrument. Your forearms or elbows perhaps 
or maybe your neck, shoulders and face. 
• PAUSE . 
• As you move from area to area enjoy the exquisite sense of release as stiffness 
and tension is replace by strong fluid mobility and an overwhelming sense of 
ease of movement. 
• As each area becomes fluid and mobile you may experience an enhanced 
sense of confidence that your physical apparatus is well lubricated and 
responsive and ready to fly into action. 
4. talk through the piece 
• In preparation for the performance you are about to give, you might like to 
imagine the performance environment. Perhaps you can visualise yourself in 
relation to the microphone and the screen that you are watching. lt doesn't 
have to be exactly as it is in tonight's performance but just a sense of the 
relationship between the various components of the performance environment. 
• You may like to have a sense in your mind of a giving and receiving relationship 
with the animated agents. Of receiving visual stimulation and offering musical 
material , in a spirit of sharing and mutual support. 
• As you consider these relationships you feel an increasing sense of clarity 
about your relationship with the sonic landscape of the performance. You can 
perhaps feel what its like to have clear sense of when and what to play and feel 
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confident in playing your part in the creation of a rich and interesting 
performance. 
• You have perhaps already realised that your positive and optimistic feelings 
towards this performance are based on your complete trust in your sub 
conscious to stimulate your playing while you conscious mind is engaged with 
the audio visual interface. 
• Imagining still then, the performance as it unfolds, feel the sense of euphoria 
and amazement you experience as your engagement with the interface allow 
your playing to develop in new and unpredictable ways. 
• Just stay with this feeling for a moment, feeling happy to be taken by the music 
to new territory, responding to the demands of your subconscious with ease 
and clarity and technical precision. 
• PAUSE 
• As and when these feelings return to you during your performance, run with 
them, embrace them and enjoy them and when the performance is over you 
may find that the positive feelings you have experience will remain with you as 
a resource for you to draw upon in your future playing. 
• PAUSE 
• Take your attention back to the present time and take a few moments now to 
prepare yourself for the opening of the performance. 
• You may feel the positive affects of adrenaline or a sense of expectation but 
you are certainly likely to feel a quiet calm confidence in your ability as a player 
and in your ability to thrive in this performance environment. 
• You are likely to be quite relaxed about the opening sequence and happy that 
you will instinctively start playing when the time is right and that this instinctively 
responsive mode of playing will continue for the duration of the performance. 
• lt is highly likely that you will be aware of the timing of the sixteen one minute 
sections and that the ending of the piece will provoke a clear sense of closure 
in you and in your playing. 
5. Coming back feeling stimulated and looking forward to playing 
• OK, now, feeling stimulated and ready to play, it's time to bring your attention 
back to the room your in and to the present time. 
• Make yourself aware of the room around you, the sounds, the temperature 
• When you're ready you may make some small movement to put you back in 
touch with where you are 
• When you're ready open your eyes, loosen your arms and legs and get your 
circulation flowing nicely. 
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Improvisation Script 3 
Structure 
1. Empathetic Introduction 
2. Relaxation 
3. Explore the idea of a connection/relationship/association/link 
4. Visualise a cross town train connection 
5. Explore the idea of a train connection 
6. Introduce the idea of a train connection as a metaphor for improvising 
7. Talk through relationship with agents 
8. Leaving a positive impression 
9. Beginning the performance 
Techniques used 
1 . Embedded suggestion 
2. Dependent suggestion 
3. Presl,lpposition 
4. Illusory choice 
5. Conscious/Unconscious split 
6. Nominalisation 
Script Outline 
1. Empathetic Introduction 
• this recording is intended to prepare you for the performance you are about to 
give. 
• having listened to this recording you will feel confident in undertaking this 
performance and will feel comfortable with your relationship with the audio 
visual interface with which you will be interacting 
• it is quite possible that during the performance you will have no recollection of 
the things that have been suggested to you in this recording yet what I am 
about to tell you may have a significant influence on your improvisation 
• the effect of listening to this recording could be very profound or very subtle, 
either way it's effect will manifest itself in your playing. 
• it is important to enjoy and embrace the positive effect this has on your playing 
regardless of the intensity of it's influence. 
• enjoy the stimulation you feel when the performance is over even if it is not 
clear to you what the effect on your playing has been. 
2. Relaxation 
• before we begin to explore the nature of this performance it may be a nice idea 
to adopt a comfortable position, feeling well supported 
• it may be easier to engage with this process if you take a few moments to close 
your eyes. 
• just get a sense of your eye lids for a few moments, take your awareness to 
your eyes and your eye lids and air on your eyes and the weight of your eye lids 
• after a few moments, if you haven't already you may like to gently close your 
eyes, just feeling the weight of your eye lids pulling your eyes closed 
• just enjoy that feeling of your eyes being closed, the weight of your eye lids 
evaporating into a relaxed feeling around your eyes 
• get a real sense of the tension in your eyes falling away, and as it does the 
relaxation you experience starting to emanate from your eyes to your forehead 
and your cheeks 
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• you may want to just hold on to that exquisite feeling and the tension you are 
holding in various parts of your face begins to drop away 
• Pause 
• you may bring to mind the ripples in a pool of water gently rolling outwards as 
the relaxing feeling begins to spreads outwards around your face 
• pause 
• allow the release to extent to your mouth, your nose and chin enjoying the 
growing sense of relaxation you feel 
• just take a few moments to enjoy the ripples as they release any tension you 
might be holding, perhaps in your neck or shoulders or perhaps lower down 
your body. 
3. Explore the idea of a connection/relationship/association/link 
• as the tension is released from the your various joints and muscles your sense 
of relaxation becomes deeper and deeper 
• with each muscle or tendon that releases tension you might like to contemplate 
the nature of connectedness. Joints connecting bones, tendons connecting 
muscles and so on. 
• in one sense connections are the fabric of relationships between components 
• you may like to contemplate the potential for connections to create new 
relationships between entities, new connections forming new relationships 
4. Visualise a cross town train connection 
• train travellers often have to make connections during the course of a journey 
• you might like to take a few moments to get a sense of making a train 
connection, the station smells, the hard concrete floors, perhaps tube trains or 
buses, taxis or bustling streets. 
• you may hear the sound of chattering voices but not hear what they're saying , 
foreign languages or maybe children laughing and shouting. 
• all these vivid sounds and images and feelings contribute to the sense of 
making a connection 
5. Explore the idea of a train connection 
• As you hear the sounds and sense husel and bussle you may being to 
appreciate the many possible connection routes 
• you may like to contemplate the possibility and potential of making new 
connections 
• Surprise encounters could alter the route or change connection 
• New connection could lead to the same destination by a very different route 
• New connection leads to a new destination 
6. Introduce the idea of a train connection as a metaphor for improvising 
• in improvisation it is often exciting to end up somewhere new 
• making new connections gives the enjoyment of undertaking a different journey 
• we often experience the buzz of anticipation of potential possibilities when well 
established connections are abandoned 
• embracing encounters with new provocations can bring the delight and 
stimulation of entering new territory. 
• unlike travelling, in improvisation you can feel confident that new connections 
always lead to a safe destination even if they are unfamiliar 
7. Talk through relationship with agents 
• in the interface you are about to engage with the agents will exert a certain level 
of influence over the journey 
• you may like to think of the agents as presenting opportunities 
• you will find the agents reacting to and possibly provoking your musical 
behaviour. 
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• trusting in your subconscious will allow your performance to flow naturally 
without the need for conscious control or force 
• the path as it unfold is always your path even though it may be unfamiliar 
• although at some points you may feel stretched as a performer you can always 
feel safe and stimulated in any unfamiliar situation you may find yourself in 
8. Leaving a positive impression 
• when the performance is over you may feel challenged even though you have 
been enriched by your experience 
• your connections will have made the journey and completing that journey may 
leave you with a sense of peace and contentment 
• the connections you have forged will remain with you and give you the base 
from which to explore further in other performances 
• your inner confidence will continue to grow as you accept what ever journey is 
presented to you and what ever connections you create 
9. Beginning the performance 
• you may become aware that the interface has started and the time has come 
for you to begin interacting with it. 
• you may like to spend a few moments absorbing the sonic landscape in which 
you find yourself, the sound of the agents, the ambience of the room, the 
journey 
• when you feel comfortable you may like to begin to engage with your instrument, 
getting a sense of what it feels like. 
• gently beginning to press keys or valves or whatever, feeling the temperature of 
it's exterior, it's weight. 
• you could just move into a playing position, feeling your breath and a sense of 
anticipation of entering the performance. 
• as your anticipation grows you may feel you breathing becoming a little more 
pronounced or maybe erratic. 
• whenever you feel happy, when the time is right, when the moment moves you, 
enter the performance 
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Milieu -A Technical Overview 
All performance environments created using Milieu work using the same basic principle. A performance comprises a number of sections; each 
section has a fixed duration and can have allocated to it a maximum of eight agents. The agents have both visual and sonic behaviour which 
can be configured when the piece is being designed. The agent's behaviour is configured via a number of parameters which setup its general 
visual and sonic behaviour. When the system is activated the agents will spawn many instances of themselves on the screen and each 
instance will inherit the visual and sonic behaviour from the parent agent's parameter set. Most of the parameters are probabilistic, which 
means that none of the instances of the agents will share exactly the same behaviour, they will just inherit general characteristic. 
An important aspect of the system is the processing of the acoustic signal that the computer accepts from the performance space, which is 
undertaken using a Fourier transform. Each agent has a parameter which sets the range of frequencies that it will respond to. lt also has 
another parameter that sets how responsive the agent will be to the incoming signal. One of the agent's parameters must be selected to be 
controlled by the acoustic signal, in which case its on-screen parameter setting is overwritten by the data arriving from the acoustic signal. 
The audio behaviour doesn't have a parameter that is directly controlled by the acoustic signal but it must have one parameter that is linked to 
one of the graphical parameters. This means that if that graphical parameter is changed by the agent it will cause a change in the acoustic 
parameter to which it is linked. If the graphical parameter happens to be the one which is controlled by the acoustic signal, then indirectly the 
sonic parameter to which it is linked will also be affected by the acoustic signal. 
The chain of control that is setup using the system's parameters is at the heart of its configuration and use. lt is possible to create situations 
where the agent's visual and sonic behaviours respond in very different ways to the acoustic signal and in so doing create agents that respond 
obviously to the acoustic signal, not obviously or not at all. 
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How Milieu Is Used 
The Milieu development tool is not intended for distribution. lt is a personal tool which I have developed for use in my own work and work I 
have undertaken in collaboration with others. Using the tool to create performance environments relies quite heavily on my knowledge of its 
inner workings and the structure and location of the various data files that it uses. This guide is intended to describe the process of engaging 
with the tool using a simple, iterative approach to designing a new performance environment. 
Introduction 
This guide will go through the various stages of creating a performance system using the Milieu software. In order to simply communicate the 
concepts underlying this software tool I will use a design methodology based on four phases. This is offered as an exemplar and is by no 
means the only approach that could be adopted. The first phase involves making certain 'global' design decisions about the performance, the 
second involves the creation and configuration of the animated agents and the third is the development of the form or narrative of the piece. 
The design process is quite iterative and so it is inevitable that these three phases will be revisited as the system develops. Once the narrative 
has been developed that fourth phase evolves the performer's behavioural map by means of constructing and recording a trance induction 
script. 
Phase 1 
Milieu creates performances that comprise any number of durational sections with each section being of fixed length and containing up to eight 
audio visual agents. The first phase is therefore to setup the various sections and give them their durations. The performance information is 
held in a text file inside the performance folder. Each section of the piece must have a folder placed inside the sections folder, and the folder 
name must be identical to the section as referred to in the piece (performance file). I usually begin this process by copying sections from 
previous systems and renaming them, then editing the performance file to add the new names and durations. 
Phase2 
Each section has to be allocated a number of agents, up to a maximum of eight. There are two text files inside each of the section folders 
which contain a list of the agents being used in that section. The various sections need not necessarily use the same agents and so a system 
comprising two sections could use sixteen different agents, eight in the first section and eight in the second. In this phase each agent is 
individually configured. The easiest way to do this is to view the agents one at a time inside a section, alter the parameters until the desired 
result is achieved and then save the agent in the agentProfiles folder. The audio profiles and visual profiles are held in separate files. The 
parameters and their function are set out below. 
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Phase3 
Phase three is when the agents are combined and added to sections. The easiest way to do this is to edit the AAS.txt (audio) and GAS.txt 
(visual) files inside each of the sections folders. Most of the configuration files can be edited quite simply using a text editor apart from the 
agent profile. The agent profile files are quite complex and I have found it much safer to make alterations to an agents profile from within the 
system using the configuration windows. This phase tends to rely on trial and error to achieve the desired audio visual response from the child 
agents, I tend create the agent configurations one at a time and compiling a library of agents before combining them in phase 4. 
Phase4 
In this phase the concept of the piece in terms of the performer's behavioural response to the interface is developed. The characteristic of the 
audio visual activity and type of interactive relationship the performer will have with the system are codified in a written narrative which is then 
recorded. This narrative uses various techniques to influence the performer's behavioural response to the interface. The recording is then 
played to the performer either before the piece or after the piece has commenced. 
Visual Parameters 
AgentSize 
AgentSizeProb 
AgentSizelnc 
AgentMoveProb 
AgentMovelnc 
AgentDirProb 
AgentBiendlnc 
AgentBiendProb 
AgentMaxBiend 
AgentColourRange 
AgentBirth Rate 
AgentBinResponse 
AgentResponse 
Initial size of child 
Probability of size change 
The increment of size change 
The probability of the agent moving position 
The increment of each movement 
The probability of changing direction 
The increment by which the agent will decay 
The probability of the agent decaying 
Maximum decay a child agent is born with 
The range of colours change 
Rate at which child agents are instantiated 
Frequency range the child is most responsive 
Parameter that is affected by audio stream 
Audio Parameters 
Audio length 
AudiolengthProb 
Audiolengthlnc 
AudioVoiProb 
AudioPitch 
AudioPitchMoveProb 
AudioPitchlncProb 
AudioMode 
AudioChannel 
AudioMeter 
AudioMeterProb 
AudioSendData 
AudioResponselevel 
AudioGetData 
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The initial length of each MIDI event 
The probability of the length changing 
The increment for the change of length 
The probability of the volume changing 
The fundamental pitch for the child agent 
The probability of moving to another pitch 
Distance from the current pitch to the new pitch 
The pitch cluster for the child agent 
The midi channel that child agent sends data on 
The speed of the inner pulse of the agent 
Level of deviation from the pulse 
Parameter that gets visual data 
The response level to the incoming data 
The visual parameter that passes incoming data 
Structure Diagram 
Open A/V Dialog 
Configuration Idle 
Open Performance 
Stop Section Section Playing 
Configuration Active 
.-------L..-----&.---.t--S_ta_rt_S_e_c_tio_n _ ___.f Start !Section 
Configuration Active 
Start Timers 
__ 1 Stop Section Start Performanc~ 1 f ~~~--~----~--~ p< ve Perfor r anee 
Stop Performance Performance Playing Configuration Active 
. 
Open AI ~ Dialog 
Dialog Box Active 
Configuration Active 
Change 1'Save 
Pararr ~ters 
Param~ters 
Changeci1Sav ed 
Updated Agent 
Parameters 
Open AN Dialog 
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! Activate Timer 
Step Frame 
Timers Active 
Spawn Child Agent 
Child Agent Active 11+----. 
Receive Audio Signal 
Child Agent 
Responsive 
Audio Visual 
Beha\ iour 
Milieu Source Code 
Movie Script 
--this script hold the handlers that call the initialisation and close down routines. There are also hadlers to trap keyboard activity and run dialog boxes. 
--the main handlers for loading performance data and moving from section to section in the performance are also here 
global gDebugMode,gStartStop 
--graphics globals 
global gChildUst,gWhichSprite,gAgentSettings -- list to hold current agent setting to seed new child agents 
global si, sr, st, sb, sheight,swidth, gPosH, gPosV,gOidPosV,gOidPosH, gAgentCounter, gAgentSNumlist 
--xtra tft & midi globals 
global gFFTCounter, gasFFTobj, gSampleValues, gFFTValues, gMIDiioXtra 
-- MIAW globals 
global gWindowName, gPerformanceMovie 
-- agents graphics dialog box globals 
global gGraphicSettingDialog, gGraphicDialogPropUst, gGraphicDialogltemUst, gBigAgentUst 
global gGraphicParamUst, gGraphicReaiPoslist, gGraphicParam, gGraphiclist,gGraphicMemberlist 
-- agents audio dialog box globals 
global gAudioSettingDialog, gAudioDialogProplist, gAudioDialogltemUst 
global gAudioParamlist, gAudioReaiPoslist, gReaiPos, gAudioParam, gAudiolist 
-- shared between graphic and audio dialog 
global gAgents, gSections, gAgentAudiolist,gAgentTimerlist,gAgentTimerScripts,gOpenDialog 
-- performance dialog box globals 
global gPerformanceSettingDialog, gPerformanceDialogProplist, gPerformanceDialogltemUst 
global gPerformanceParamlist, gPerformanceReaiPoslist --, gReaiPos, gAgents 
global gPerformanceParam, gPerformanceSections, gPerformancelist,gDurationlist,gSectionName 
-- performance globals 
global gMasterSeconds, gMasterMinutes,gPerformanceTimer, gDisplayTimer,gPerformanceParamNum,gSectionChoice 
global gPiayingSection,gSectionDuration,gPiayingPerformance,gCurrentSection,gTotaiTimeSeconds 
global gSplashGraphic,gAudioScript,gAudioBacking 
-- global file paths 
global gGraphicsFilePath,gAudioFilePath,gGraphicsSettingPath,gAudioSettingPath,gPerformanceSettingFilelist 
global gNewFileName, gSectionPath,gAgentGraphicUst,gSectionFileName,gCDROM 
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on startMovie 
gDebugMode = 1 
gStartStop:= false 
initialiseGiobals 
initialise Paths 
initialiseXtras 
initialiseController 
end 
on openPerformance 
screen Clean 
tempData = openAndReadText("") 
if tempData<> VOID then 
member("performancefilename").text = gNewFileName 
gPerforrnanceUst = value(tempData) 
listToField(gPerforrnancelist, "sectionlist", 1) 
listT oField(gPerforrnancelist, "duration list" ,2) 
loadGraphicFiles 
--load sections into one big list, to solve hiatus problem 
repeat with i = 1 to gPerforrnancelist.count 
gSectionChoice = i 
loadSectionSettings i 
agentGraphicDialogSetup(gAgents, gGraphicParam, gSections) 
agentAudioDialogSetup(gAgents, gGraphicParam, gSections) 
gBigAgentlist[1 ].append(gGraphicDialogProplist) 
gBigAgentlist[2].append(gGraphicDialogltemlist) 
gBigAgentlist[3].append(gGraphicReaiPoslist) 
gBigAgentUst[ 4].append(gAudioDialogProplist) 
gBigAgentlist[S].append(gAudioDialogltemlist) 
gBigAgentlist[6].append(gAudioReaiPoslist) 
end repeat 
loadAIISectionData 1 
else 
end if 
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getSetupMedia 1 
getSetupMedia 2 
getSetupMedia 3 
end 
on getSetupMedia whichMedia 
case whichMedia of 
1: message = "Please select backing audio file if desired" 
2: message = "Please select script audio file if desired" 
3: message= "Please select splash graphic if desired" 
end case 
alert message 
tempfilename = getNewFileName() 
if tempfilename <> VOID then 
case whichMedia of 
1: gAudioBacking = tempfilename 
2: gAudioScript = tempfilename 
3: gSplashGraphic = tempfilename 
end case 
end if 
end 
on loadGraphicFiles 
gGraphicMemberlist=O 
gGraphicUst = getfiles(gGraphicsFilePath) 
it gGraphiclist = 0 then 
alert the moviename&": No Graphics File" 
else 
repeat with i = 1 to gGraphiclist.count 
newmember=the number of members of castlib("graphics")+ 1 
importFilelnto(member(newmember, "graphics"),gGraphicsFilePath&"\"&gGraphiclist[i]) 
gGraphicMemberlist.append(member(newmember,"graphics").name) 
end repeat 
end if 
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end 
on savePerformance 
repeat with i = 1 to member("sectionlist").line.count 
gPerformanceUst[ij[1] = member("sectionlist").line[i] 
gPerformanceUst[ij[2] = member("durationlist"). line[ij 
end repeat 
saveText string(gPerformancelist) 
end 
on checkKey 
--caiiDialogBox the Key 
case the Key of 
SPACE: 
if gStartStop = True then 
if the windowlist.count = 0 then 
alert "no window to close" 
halt 
else 
(the activewindow).forget() 
end if 
else 
go next 
gStartStop = True 
end if 
end case 
end 
on caiiDialogBox whichBox 
--using numbers to move to scenes 
case whichBox of 
1: -- PERFORMANCE 
if gOpenDialog[whichBox]=false then 
if objectP( gPerformanceSettingDialog ) then 
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lnitialize(gPerformanceSettingDialog, [#windowProplist:gPerformanceDialogProplist,#windowltemlist:gPerformanceDialogltemlist]) 
WindowOperation( gPerformanceSettingDialog, #show ) 
end if 
gOpenDialog[whichBox]=true 
else 
gPerformanceSettingDialog.stop(TRUE) 
gOpenDialog[whichBox]=false 
end if 
2: -- GRAPHIC 
if gOpenDialog[whichBox]=false then 
if objectP( gGraphicSettingDialog) then 
lnitialize(gGraphicSettingDialog, [ #windowProplist:gBigAgentlist[1 ][gSectionChoice], #windowltem List:gBigAgentlist[2][gSectionChoice]]) 
gGraphicDialogPropUst.name = "Graphic:"&gSectionName 
WindowOperation( gGraphicSettingDialog, #show ) 
end if 
gOpenDialog[whichBox]=true 
else 
gGraphicSettingDialog.stop(TRUE) 
gOpenDialog[whichBox]=false 
end if 
3: -- AUDIO 
if gOpenDialog[whichBox]=false then 
if objectP( gAudioSettingDialog ) then 
lnitialize(gAudioSettingDialog, [ #windowProplist:gBigAgentlist[ 4][gSectionChoice], #windowltem Ust:gBigAgentlist[S][gSectionChoice]]) 
gAudioDialogProplist.name = "Audio:"&gSectionName 
WindowOperation( gAudioSettingDialog, #show ) 
end if 
gOpenDialog[whichBox]=true 
else 
gAudioSettingDialog.stop(TR U E) 
gOpenDialog[whichBox]=false 
end if 
4: midiShutUp 
0: cleanup 
SPACE: --go "s1 " 
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otherwise: 
--alert "Key not programmed" 
end case 
end 
on displayTime 
gTotalTimeSeconds = gTotaiTimeSeconds- 1 
timeStamp gTotalTimeSeconds 
end 
on timeStamp secs 
gMasterMinutes = integer(secs) I 60 
member("time").text = "Total Time Remaining- "&gMasterMinutes&":"&string(integer(secs-(gMasterMinutes*60))) 
end 
on getReadyToRumble whichType 
-- trying to distinguish between play section and play performance 
if whichType = "section" then 
if the windowlist.count=O or (the windowlist.count=1 and gCDROM =true) then --1 then 
--show time on controller window 
g T otaiTimeSeconds = gPerformanceUst[gSectionChoice ](2) 
timeStamp gTotaiTimeSeconds 
loadSection 
else 
startSection 
end if 
else if whichType = "performance" then 
gSectionChoice= 1 
if the windowlist.count= 0 or (the windowlist.count= 1 and gCDROM = true) then --1 then 
-- tot up the times of all the sections 
gTotalTimeSecondS=O 
repeat with i = 1 to gPerformancelist.count 
gTotatnmeSeconds = gTotalTimeSeconds+gPerformancelist(i][2] 
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end repeat 
timeStamp gTotaiTimeSeconds 
loadSection 
else 
start Performance 
end if 
end if 
end 
on loadSectionSettings choice 
gSectionFileName = member("sectionlist").line[choice1 
gSectionName=gSectionPath&gSectionFileName 
gPerformanceUst[choice][11=gSectionName 
gSectionDuration = integer(member("durationlist"). line[choice]) 
gPerformanceUst[ choice ][2]=gSectionDuration 
member("sectionlist"). line[choice).hilite() 
member("durationlist").l ine[choice).hilite() 
gAgentGraphicUst = value(openAndReadText(gSectionName&"\GAS. txt")) 
gAgentAudioUst = value( openAndReadT ext(gSectionName& "\A AS. txt")) 
listT oField(gAgentGraphicUst, "agentG raphicli st") 
listToField(gAgentAudiolist, "agentAudiolist") 
gAgents = gAgentGraphiclist.count 
end 
on loadSectionParameters choice 
gGraphicDialogProplist=gBigAgentUst[ 1 ][choice) 
gGraphicDialogltem List=gBigAgentUst[2)[ choice) 
gGraphicReaiPoslist=gBigAgentUst[3][ choice 1 
gAudioDialogPropUst=gBigAgentlist[ 4)[ choice 1 
gAudioDialogltemUst=gBigAgentlist[5][ choice 1 
gAudioReaiPoslist=gBigAgentUst[6][choice1 
end 
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on loadAIISectionData choice 
gSectionChoice = choice 
db "LOADALLSECTIONDAT A - gSectionChoice: " & gSectionChoice & " gAgents: " & gAgents 
loadSectionSettings choice 
loadSectionParameters choice 
end 
on loadSection sectionName 
put "loadSection" 
gPerformanceMovie = window gWindowName 
if the deskTopRectlist.count > 1 then 
gPerformanceMovie = window gWindowName 
db the deskTopRectlist.count&" displays available" 
gPerformanceMovie. rect = the deskTopRectlist[2] 
else 
--just for the CD ROM 
gPerformanceMovie = window "Performance1 " 
db "Only one display" 
end if 
open gPerformanceMovie 
end 
on startSection 
put "start Section" 
if gPiayingSection =FALSE then 
starttimer 
gDisplayTimer = time0ut("timer2").new(1 000, #display Time) 
gPiayingSection = TRUE 
Tell gPerformanceMovie to startTimers 
else 
gPiayingSection = FALSE 
if gOpenDialog[2]=true then 
caiiDialogBox 2 
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end if 
if gOpenDialog[3]=true then 
caiiDialogBox 3 
end if 
dean Up 
end if 
end 
on startPerformance 
put "start Performance" 
it gPiayingPerformance =FALSE then 
starttimer 
gDisplayTimer = time0ut("timer2").new(1 000, #displayTime) 
gPiayingPerformance = TRUE 
Tell gPerformanceMovie to startTimers 
else 
gPiayingPerformance = FALSE 
Tell gPerformanceMovie to stopTimers 
cleanUp 
end if 
end 
on idle 
if gPiayingSection= TRUE and the timer >= gSectionDuration*60 then 
cleanUp 
else if gPiayingPerformance =TRUE then 
if the timer >=gPerformancelist[gSectionChoice)[2] *60 then 
gSectionChoice = gSectionChoice+ 1 
if gSectionChoice > gPerformanceUst.count then 
gSectionChoice= 1 
loadAIISectionData gSectionChoice 
member("sectionlist").line[gSectionChoice].hilite() 
member("durationlist").line[gSectionChoice].hilite() 
gPiayingPerformance=FALSE 
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Tell gPerformanceMovie to stopTimers 
Tell gPerformanceMovie to goBackToStart 
db "end of section list, stop timers and back to start" 
else 
member("sectionlist").line[gSectionChoice].hilite() 
member("durationlist").l ine[gSectionChoice].hilite() 
loadAIISectionData gSectionChoice 
gCurrentSection = gSectionChoice 
db "IDLE - section no: "&gSectionChoice&" agents: "&gAgents&" name: " &gPerformanceUst[gSectionChoice][1]&" time: 
"&gPerformancelist[gSectionChoice ][2] 
Tell gPerformanceMovie to startTimers 
starttimer 
if g0penDialog[2]=true then 
caiiDialogBox 2 
caiiDialogBox 2 
end if 
if gOpenDialog[3]=true then 
caiiDialogBox 3 
caiiDialogBox 3 
end if 
end if 
end if 
end if 
end 
on cleanUpController 
gPerformanceTimer.forget() 
gDisplayTimer. forget() 
gMasterSeconds = 0 
gMasterMinutes = 0 
end 
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on stopMovie 
screenCiean 
deanUpCasts 
dean Up 
kiiiGiobals 
cleanUpXtras 
end stopMovie 
on screenCiean 
member("Time").text = "Time Remaining - 0:0" 
member("sectionlist").text = '"' 
member("durationlist").text = "" 
member("display1 ").text = "" 
member("agentGraphiclist").text = "" 
member("agentAudiolist").text = "" 
member("performancefilename").text = "" 
window(gWindowName).close() 
window(gWindowName).forget() 
end 
on getNextSample 
SampleValues = gasFFTobj.getSamples(1, 1 0.) 
return SampleValues 
end 
on listToField whichlist, whichField, whichColumn 
member(whichField).text = "" 
if whichColumn = VOID then 
repeat with i = 1 to whichlist.count 
if i = whichlist.count then 
member(whichField).text =member(whichField).text & whichlist[i] 
else 
member(whichField).text =member(whichField).text & whichlist[i]& RETURN 
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end if 
end repeat 
else 
repeat with i = 1 to whichlist.count 
if i = whichlist.count then 
member(whichField).text =member(whichField).text & whichlist[ij[whichColumn] 
else 
member(whichField).text =member(whichField).text & whichlist[i][whichColumn]& RETURN 
end if 
end repeat 
end if 
end 
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Create Child Agent 
--this is the main parent script which is responsible for all the properties and behaviours of the agents, the monitoring of the audio signal and the MIDI output 
property pAgentSize,pAgentSizeProb,pAgentSizelnc,pAgentMoveProb,pAgentMovelnc 
property pAgentDirProb,pAgentBiendlnc,pAgentBiendProb,pAgentMaxBiend,pAgentColourRange 
property pAgentBirthRate,pAgentBinResponse,pAgentResponse,pAgentGraphic 
property pAudioLength,pAudiolengthProb,pAudiolengthlnc,pAudioVoiProb,pAudioPitchMoveProb 
property pAudioPitch,pAudioMode,pAudioChannel,pAudioResponselevel,pAudiolengthDir,plengthCounter 
property pAudioGetData, pAudioMeter, pAudioMeterProb,pAudioSendData,pModeNumber,pPitchDir 
property pVol,pVoiDir 
-- additional ones needed 
property pNoteOnOff, pNoteNum 
property pSizeDirChange 
-- agent parent script, declare properties shared by all handlers in this object. 
property pSpriteNumber, pAgentNumber, pSectionNumber, pOidDir, pDir 
-- some old stuff 
property pStartWidth, pStartHeight,pPosH, pPosV 
-- stuff from another handler when it was parted 
global gPosH, gPosV, gOidPosH, gOidPosV, gNibCounter, gOidDir,gasFFTobj,sl, sr, st, sb, sheight,swidth 
global gAgentCounter, gAgentSNumUst 
-- agents graphics dialog box globals 
global gGraphicSettingDialog, gGraphicDialogProplist, gGraphicDialogltemUst 
global gGraphicParamUst, gGraphicReaiPoslist 
global gGraphicParam, gGraphicUst 
-- agents audio dialog box globals 
global gAudioSettingDialog, gAudioDialogProplist, gAudioDialogltemUst 
global gAudioParamlist, gAudioReaiPoslist, gReaiPos,gModelist,pAudioPitchlncProb 
global gAudioParam, gAudioUst, gModeNamelist,gMeterCounterlist 
-- shared between graphic and audio dialog 
global gAgents, gSections, gCurrentSection, gBigAgentlist 
--call new to create a new instance of the object. Retum me returns the reference (or name) 
-- of the object to the handler making the "new" call. 
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on new me, mySpriteNumber, myAgentNumber, mySectionNumber 
pSpriteNumber=mySpriteNumber -- passed in, used in other handles 
pAgentNumber=myAgentNumber 
pSectionNumber=mySectionNumber 
loadAgentProperties -- assign values from dialog box to agent parameters initi 
initialiseAgentPosition -- give agent starting position based on last new agent 
return me 
end 
on stepframe me 
checkAudiolnput -- get ftt and assign new value to reponse parameter 
checkSize 
checklnkAndColour-- assign new parameters to agent 
checkMove -- see if move is needed 
checkBiend -- see if blend change is needed 
checkAudioResponse 
end 
on checkAudioResponse 
-- store graphical data from choosen parameter 
case pAudioGetData of 
1: --"Graphic Data Display " 
2: newValue = pAgentSize 
3: newValue = pAgentSizeProb 
4: newValue = pAgentSizelnc 
5: newValue = pAgentMoveProb 
6: newValue = pAgentMovelnc 
7: newValue = pAgentDirProb 
8: newValue = pAgentBiendlnc 
9: newValue = pAgentBiendProb 
1 O:newValue = pAgentMaxBiend 
11 :newValue = pAgentColourRange 
12:newValue = pAgentBirthRate 
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13:newValue = pAgentBinResponse 
14:newValue = pAgentResponse 
15: --"graphicsFile " 
16: --"saveFile " 
17: --"loadFile 
end case 
newValue=newValue*2 
if random (1 OO)<pAudioResponselevel then 
if newValue <>0 then 
-- send graphical data to sound parameter 
case pAudioSendData of 
1: --"Graphic Data Display " 
2: pAudiolength = newValue 
3: pAudioLengthProb = newValue 
4: pAudioLengthlnc = newValue 
5: pAudioVoiProb = newValue 
6: 
if random(1 00)>40 then 
pPitchDir=-pPitchDi r 
end if 
if pNoteNum+pAudioPitch+pPitchDir<120 and pNoteNum+pAudioPitch+pPitchDir>20 then 
pAudioPitch=pAudioPitch+pPitchDir 
end if 
7: pAudioPitchMoveProb = newValue 
8: pAudioPitchlncProb = newValue 
9: pAudioMode = newValue 
1 O:pAudioChannel = newValue 
11 :pAudioMeter = newValue 
12:pAudioMeterProb = newValue 
13:pAudioMeterDirProb = newValue 
14:pAudioResponselevel = newValue 
15: --"graphicsFile " 
16: --"saveFile " 
17: --"loadFile 
end case 
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end if 
end if 
--check whether to change volume 
if random(1 OO)<pAudioVoiProb then 
--check whether to change direction of volume 
if random(1 00)<(1 00-pAudioVoiProb) then 
pVoiDir=-pVoiDir 
end if 
pVol = pVol+pVoiDir 
end if 
-- decide length of note 
if random(1 OO)<pAudiolengthProb then 
--check direction of movement 
if random(1 00) < (1 00-pAudiolengthProb)then 
pAudiolengthDir=-pAudioLengthDir 
end if 
if (pAudiolength + (random(pAudiolengthlnc)*pAudiolengthDir))>O then 
pAudiolength = pAudiolength + (random(pAudiolengthlnc)*pAudiolengthDir) 
end if 
end if 
-- decide to play and which note 
if pNoteOnOft="oH" then 
-- check note length 
if plengthCounter>pAudiolength then 
sendMidi("oH" ,pNoteNum,pVol,pAudioChannel) 
pNoteOnOff = "on" 
plendthCounter=O 
else 
plengthCounter=plengthCounter + 1 
end if 
else 
--check to see if pitch has changed 
if random (1 OO)<pAudioPitchMoveProb then 
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pNoteNum = gModelist[pModeNumber][random(gModelist[pModeNumber].count)] 
end if 
--check to see if meter needs distorting 
if pAudioMeterProb>O then 
--check whether to move+ or -from meter 
if random(1 OO)<(pAudioMeterProb) then 
pAudioMeter= pAudioMeter+random(pAudioMeterProb) 
else 
pAudioMeter= pAudioMeter-random (pAudioMeterProb) 
end if 
end if 
-- check meter to see if note should be played 
if gMeterCounterlist[pAgentNumber) mod (1 01 -pAudioMeter) = 0 then 
pNoteNum=pNoteNum+pAudioPitch 
send Midi ("on" ,pNoteNum, pVol,pAudioChannel) 
pNoteOnOff = "off" 
if gMeterCounterlist[pAgentNumber] >= 100 then 
gMeterCounterlist[pAgentNum ber]=O 
end if 
end if 
end if 
end 
on checklnkAndColour 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).trails =false 
if pAgentColourRange >= 1 then 
sprite(pSpriteNumber) .color = rgb( random (pAgentColourRange), random(pAgentColourRange ), random (pAgentColourRange)) 
end if 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).ink = 36 --is background transparentpAgentlnk 
end 
on checkSize 
if random(1 00) < pAgentSizeProb then 
if random(1 00)< 20 then 
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if pSizeDirChange = "grow" then 
pSizeDirChange = "shrink" 
else 
pSizeDirChange = "grow" 
end if 
end if 
if pSizeDirChange = "grow" then 
sprite(pSpriteNumber). width =sprite(pSpriteNumber). width+ pAgentSizelnc 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).height = sprite(pSpriteNumber).height+pAgentSizelnc 
else 
sprite(pSpriteNumber). width =sprite(pSpriteNumber). width- pAgentSizelnc 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).height = sprite(pSpriteNumber).height-pAgentSizelnc 
end if 
end if 
end 
on initialiseAgentPosition 
if random (1 00) < pAgentMoveProb then 
--keep it on the screen 
if gPosH[pAgentNumber] > swidth then 
gPosH[pAgentNumber] = 0 
else if gPosH[pAgentNumber] < 0 then 
gPosH[pAgentNumber] = swidth 
end if 
if gPosV[pAgentNumber] > sheight then 
gPosV[pAgentNumber] = 0 
else if gPosV[pAgentNumber] < 0 then 
gPosV[pAgentNumber] = sheight 
end if 
if random(1 OO)<pAgentDirProb then 
pDir = random(8) 
end if 
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case pDir of 
1 :gPosH[pAgentNumber] = gPosH[pAgentNumber] - pAgentMovelnc 
2:gPosV[pAgentNumber) = gPosV[pAgentNumber) + pAgentMovelnc 
gPosH[pAgentNumber] = gPosH[pAgentNumber] - pAgentMovelnc 
3:gPosV[pAgentNumber) = gPosV[pAgentNumber) + pAgentMovelnc 
4:gPosV[pAgentNumber] = gPosV[pAgentNumber) + pAgentMovelnc 
gPosH[pAgentNumber] = gPosH[pAgentNumber] + pAgentMovelnc 
5:gPosH[pAgentNumber) = gPosH[pAgentNumber) + pAgentMovelnc 
6:gPosV[pAgentNumber] = gPosV[pAgentNumber]- pAgentMovelnc 
gPosH[pAgentNumber) = gPosH[pAgentNumber) + pAgentMovelnc 
7:gPosV[pAgentNumber] = gPosV[pAgentNumber] - pAgentMovelnc 
8:gPosH[pAgentNumber] = gPosH[pAgentNumber) - pAgentMovelnc 
gPosV[pAgentNumber) = gPosV[pAgentNumber) - pAgentMovelnc 
end case 
end if 
pPosH=gPosH[pAgentNumber] --global (needs to be passed from a list) 
pPosV=gPosV[pAgentNumber] --global (needs to be passed from a list) 
-- the things below only need to be set once 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).visible = true 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).puppet = true 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).moveableSprite = true 
sprite(pSpriteNumber) .locV=pPosV 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).locH=pPosH 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).blend = pAgentMaxBiend 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).height = pAgentSize 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).width = pAgentSize 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).moveableSprite = TRUE 
pTimelapsed=1 0 
pNoteOnOff = "off" 
pSizeDirChange="grow" 
end 
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on checkAudiolnput 
if not objectp{gasFFTobj) then return 
SampleValues = gasFFTobj.getSamples{10, 1.0) 
FFTValues = gasFFTobj.getFFT{100.0,TRUE,TRUE) -- two trues mean the bins get equal ised down to 10 
if FFTValues = 0 or FFTValues = 0 then 
put "FFT error reading values:"&gasFFTobj.getError() 
else 
maxBin = FFTValues.max() 
repeat with i = 1 to FFTValues.count 
if FFTValues[i] = maxBin then 
highBin=i 
end if 
end repeat 
if pAgentBinResponse=highBin then 
newVal ue=FFTVal ues[pAgentBinResponse] 
newValue=integer(newValue) 
else 
newValue=O 
end if 
case pAgentResponse of 
1: --"Graphic Data Display " 
2: --pAgentSize 
pAgentSize = newValue 
3: --pAgentSizeProb 
pAgentSizeProb = newValue 
4: --pAgentSizelnc 
pAgentSizelnc = newValue 
5: --pAgentMoveProb 
pAgentMoveProb = newValue 
6: --pAgentMovelnc 
pAgentMovelnc = newValue 
7: --pAgentDirProb 
pAgentDirProb = newValue 
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8: --pAgentBiendlnc 
pAgentBiendlnc = newValue 
9: --pAgentBiendProb 
pAgentBiendProb = newValue 
1 0: --pAgentMaxBiend 
pAgentMaxBiend = newValue 
11 : --pAgentColourRange 
pAgentColourRange = newValue 
12: --pAgentBirthRate 
pAgentBirthRate = newValue 
13: --pAgentBinResponse 
pAgentBinResponse = newValue 
14: --pAgentResponse 
pAgentResponse = newValue 
15: --"graphicsFile " 
16: --"saveFile " 
17: --"loadFile 
end case 
end if 
end 
on checkMove 
if random(1 00) < pAgentMoveProb then 
--keep it on the screen 
if pPosH > swidth then 
pPosH = 0 
else if pPosH < 0 then 
pPosH = swidth 
end if 
if pPosV > sheight then 
pPosV = 0 
else if pPosV < 0 then 
pPosV = sheight 
end if 
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if random{1 OO)<pAgentDirProb then 
pDir = random{B) 
end if 
case pDir of 
1 :pPosH = pPosH - pAgentMovelnc 
2:pPosH = pPosH - pAgentMovelnc 
pPosV = pPosV + pAgentMovelnc 
3:pPosV = pPosV + pAgentMovelnc 
4:pPosH = pPosH + pAgentMovelnc 
pPosV = pPosV + pAgentMovelnc 
5:pPosH = pPosH + pAgentMovelnc 
6:pPosH = pPosH + pAgentMovelnc 
pPosV = pPosV- pAgentMovelnc 
7:pPosV = pPosV - pAgentMovelnc 
B:pPosH = pPosH - pAgentMovelnc 
pPosV = pPosV - pAgentMovelnc 
end case 
sprite{pSpriteNum ber) .locV=pPosV 
sprite{pSpriteNumber).locH=pPosH 
end if 
end makeMove 
on checkBiend 
if random{1 OO)<pAgentBiendProb then 
if sprite{pSpriteNumber).blend - pAgentBiendlnc <1 then 
sendMidi{"off" ,pNoteNum, 127,pAudioChannel) 
Appendix 4 - Page 26 
the actorlist[pSpriteNumber]=VOID 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).member=VOID 
else 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).blend = sprite(pSpriteNumber).blend - pAgentBiendlnc 
end if 
end if 
end changeBiend 
on loadAgentProperties 
pos = pAgentNumber 
repeat with i = 1 to gGraphicParam 
case i of 
1: --"Graphic Data Display " 
2: pAgentSize = gBigAgentUst[2][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection][pos]. value]. value 
3: pAgentSizeProb = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection ][pos]. value]. value 
4: pAgentSizelnc = gBigAgentUst[2][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist(3][gCurrentSection ][pos]. value]. value 
5: pAgentMoveProb = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection ][pos ]. value]. value 
6: pAgentMovel ne = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection ][pos ]. value]. value 
7: pAgentDirProb = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection][pos]. value]. value 
8: pAgentBiendlnc = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection ][pos ]. value]. value 
9: pAgentBiendProb = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection ][pos]. value]. value 
1 0: pAgentMaxBiend = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentUst[3][gCurrentSection][pos]. value]. value 
11 : pAgentColourRange = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection][pos]. value]. value 
12: pAgentBirthRate = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection][pos]. value]. value 
13: pAgentBinResponse = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection][pos].value].value 
14: pAgentResponse = gBigAgentUst[2][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentUst[3][gCurrentSection ][pos]. value]. value 
15: pAgentGraphic = gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection][pos]. value]. value 
16: --"saveFile 
17: --"loadFile 
end case 
pos = pos+gAgents 
end repeat 
truncGraphicName = pAgentGraphic.char(1 .. pAgentGraphic.length-4] 
memberCheck = member(member(truncGraphicName,"graphics")).number 
if memberCheck = -1 then 
db "Sorry, "&member(pAgentGraphic.char[1 .. pAgentGraphic.length-4], "graphics")&" member doesn't exist." 
repeat with i = 1 to the number of members of castlib("graphics") 
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db "Cast member" && i && "is a" && member(i, "graphics").name 
end repeat 
else 
sprite(pSpriteNumber).member = member(pAgentGraphic.char[1 .. pAgentGraphic. length-4),"graphics") 
end if 
pos = pAgentNumber 
repeat wi th i = 1 to gAudioParam 
case i of 
1: --"Audio Data Display " 
2: pAudiolength = gBigAgentlist[5][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist(6][gCurrentSection][pos).value).value 
3: pAudiolengthProb = gBigAgentlist[ 5][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[6][gCurrentSection][pos]. value). value 
4: pAudiolengthlnc = gBigAgentlist[ 5][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[6)[gCurrentSection ](pos). value]. value 
5: pAudioVoiProb = gBigAgentlist[5][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[6][gCurrentSection ][pos]. value). value 
6: pAudioPitch = gBigAgentlist[5][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist(6][gCurrentSection][pos]. value]. value+20 
7: pAudioPitchMoveProb = gBigAgentlist[5](gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist(6][gCurrentSection ][pos]. value). value 
8: pAudioPitchlncProb = gBigAgentlist[5][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[6][gCurrentSection][pos].value).value 
9: pAudioMode = gBigAgentlist[5][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[6][gCurrentSection][pos).value).value 
1 0: pAudioChannel = gBigAgentlist[5][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[6][gCurrentSection ][pos]. value). value 
11 : pAudioMeter = gBigAgentlist(5][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[6][gCurrentSection ][pos]. value]. value 
12: pAudioMeterProb = gBigAgentlist(5][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[6](gCurrentSection ][pos). value). value 
13: pAudioSendData = gBigAgentlist[5][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[6][gCurrentSection][pos].value).value 
14: pAudioResponselevel = gBigAgentlist[5](gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[6][gCurrentSection][pos). value). value 
15: pAudioGetData = gBigAgentUst[5][gCurrentSection][gBigAgentlist[6][gCurrentSection][pos]. value]. value 
16: --"saveFile " 
17: --"loadFile 
end case 
pos = pos+gAgents 
end repeat 
--changes graphic response parameter name to a number 
repeat with i = 1 to gGraphicParamlist.count() 
if pAgentResponse = gGraphicParamlist[i] then 
pAgentResponse = i 
exit repeat 
end if 
end repeat 
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-- changes audio graphic response parameter name to a number 
repeat with i = 1 to gGraphicParamUst.count() 
if pAudioGetData = gGraphicParamUst[i] then 
pAudioGetData = i 
exit repeat 
end if 
end repeat 
repeat with i = 1 to gAudioParamlist.count() 
if pAudioSendData = gAudioParamUst[i] then 
pAudioSendData = i 
exit repeat 
end if 
end repeat 
-- changes mode name to a number 
repeat with i = 1 to gModeNameUst.count 
if gModeNamelist[i]=pAudioMode then 
pModeNumber = i 
end if 
end repeat 
pAudiolengthDir = 1 
plengthCounter=O 
pVol = 80 
pVoiDir=1 
pNoteNum=gModelist[pModeNumber][random(gModelist[pModeNumber].count)] 
pPitchDir=1 
end loadAgentProperties 
on checkMe meNum, meData 
if pSpriteNumber = meNum then 
db "Sprite:" & pSpriteNumber & " - " & meData 
end if 
end 
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Timer Script 
--this parent script controls the birthrate of the child agents, it is called from a list of timer objects 
property pWhichAgent,pWhichSprite,pWhichSection 
global gMeterCounterlist 
on new me, myAgentNum, mySectionNum 
pWhichAgent=myAgentNum 
pWhichSection=mySectionNum 
return me 
end 
on calledByTimer me 
pWhichSprite = findAgentSpace() 
gMeterCounterList[pWhichAgent]=gMeterCounterList[pWhichAgent]+ 1 
the actorlist(pWhichSprite] = new(script"createChildAgent",pWhichSprite, pWhichAgent, pWhichSection) 
end 
-- finds a space for a agent in the actorlist 
on findAgentSpace 
IWhichSprite = 2 --WAS 1 
foundspace =FALSE 
repeat with i = the actorlist.count down to 2 --WAS 1 
if the actorlist[i] = VOID then 
(the actorlist).deleteAt(i) 
else 
exit repeat 
end if 
end repeat 
repeat while foundspace = FALSE 
if IWhichSprite <= the actorlist.count() then 
if the actorlist[IWhichSprite] = VOID then 
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foundspace = TRUE 
else 
IWhichSprite = IWhichSprite + 1 
end if 
else 
foundspace =TRUE 
end if 
end repeat 
return IWhichSprite 
end 
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Report Back 
-- handlers in this script process input into the fields of the controller window 
global gSectionChoice, gSectionName, gAgentChoice, gAgentGraphicName, gAgentAudioName 
global gAgentGraphicUst, gAgentAudiolist, gSectionPath, gGraphicParam, gSections, gSectionDuration 
global gAgents, gWindowName, gSectionFileName, gCurrentSection 
property pThisField 
on mouseUp 
pThisField = sprite(the clickOn).member 
case pThisField.name of 
"sectionlist" : 
gCurrentSection = the mouseline 
loadAIISectionData gCurrentSection 
"AgentGraphiclist '' : 
gAgentChoice = the mouseline 
gAgentGraphicName=pThisField.line[gAgentChoice] 
gAgentAudioName=member("agentAudtolist").line[gAgentChoice] 
pThisField.line[gAgentChoice].hilite() 
member("agentAudiolist").line[gAgentChoice].hilite() 
"durationlist": 
gCurrentSection = the mouseline 
loadAIISectionData gCurrentSection 
end case 
end 
on keyUp 
if pThisField = VOID then 
the keyboardFocusSprite = 4 
pThisField = sprite(4).member 
end if 
case pThisField.name of 
"sectionlist" : 
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-- change section 
"AgentGraphiclist" : 
-- change agent! 
"durationlist": 
-- change duration 
--keycode 125 is down and 124 is up 
if the keycode= 125 then 
if gCurrentSection < pThisField. lines.count then 
gCurrentSection = gCurrentSection + 1 
loadAIISectionData gCurrentSection 
else 
gCurrentSection = 1 
loadAIISectionData gCurrentSection 
end if 
else if the keycode = 126 then 
if gCurrentSection > 1 then 
gCurrentSection = gCurrentSection - 1 
loadAIISectionData gCurrentSection 
else 
gCurrentSection= pThisField. lines.count 
loadAIISectionData gCurrentSection 
end if 
end if 
if the Key = RETURN then 
delete pThisField.line[gCurrentSection+ 1] 
loadAIISectionData gCurrentSection 
end if 
end case 
end keyUp 
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Button 
-- these handlers control the button functionality 
global gAgentTimerlist ,gPiayingSection,gPiayingPerformance,gSectionChoice, gCDROM 
on mouseEnter me 
sprite(the currentSpriteNum).foreColor = 18 
case the framelabel of 
"s1 ": -- scene 1 buttons 
case the currentSpriteNum of 
1 0: show= "No Performance Open" 
11 : show= "No Performance Open" 
12: show= "No Performance Open" 
13: show= "No Performance Open" 
14: show= "Open Performance" 
15: show= "No Performance Open" 
16: show= "No Performance Open" 
17: show= "Midi Shut Up" 
otherwise 
show= "BUTION NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
"s2": -- scene 2 buttons 
case the currentSpriteNum of 
10: show= "Section Configuration" 
11 : show= "Graphic Configuration" 
12: show= "Audio Configuration" 
13: 
if the windowlist.count = 0 or (the windowlist.count=1 and gCDROM = TRUE) then 
show= "Start Performance" 
else if gPiayingPertormance = FALSE then 
show= "Play Performance" 
else 
show= "Stop Performance" 
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end if 
14: show= "Open Performance" 
15: show= "Save Performance" 
if the windowlist.count=O or (the windowlist.count=1 and gCDROM = TRUE) then 
show= "Start Section "&gSectionChoice 
else if gPiayingSection = FALSE then 
show= "Play Section "&gSectionChoice 
else 
show= "Stop Section "&gSectionChoice 
end if 
17: show= "Midi Shut Up" 
otherwise 
show= "BUTION NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
"s3": -- scene 3 buttons 
case the currentSpriteNum of 
1 0: show = "scene 3 button 1" 
11 : show = "scene 3 button 2" 
12: show = "scene 3 button 3" 
13: show = "scene 3 button 4" 
14: show = "scene 3 button 3" 
15: show= "scene 3 button 4" 
17: show = "Midi Shut Up" 
otherwise 
show= "BUTION NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
"s4": --scene 4 buttons 
case the currentSpriteNum of 
1 0: show = "scene 4 button 1" 
11 : show = "scene 4 button 2" 
12: show = "scene 4 button 3" 
13: show = "scene 4 button 4" 
14: show = "scene 3 button 3" 
15: show = "scene 3 button 4" 
17: show= "Midi Shut Up" 
otherwise 
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show= "BUTTON NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
otherwise 
show= "SCENE NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
member("display1 ").text = show 
end mouseEnter 
on mouseleave 
sprite(the currentSpriteNum).foreColor = 2 
member("display1 ").text = "" 
end 
on mouseUp me 
case the framelabel of 
"s1 ": -- scene 1 buttons 
case the currentSpriteNum of 
10: --caJIDialogBox 1 
11 : --caiiDialogBox 2 
12: --caiiDialogBox 3 
13: --getReadyT oRumble 
14: go "s2" 
open Performance 
15: --savePerformance 
17: show= "Midi Shut Up" 
otherwise 
show= "BUTTON NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
"s2": -- scene 2 buttons 
case the currentSpriteNum of 
10: caiiDialogBox 1 
11: caiiDialogBox 2 
12: caiiDialogBox 3 
13: getReadyToRumble("performance") 
14: go "s2" 
open Performance 
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15: savePertorrnance 
16: getReadyToRumble("section") 
17: midiShutUp 
otherwise 
show= "BUTION NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
"s3": -- scene 3 buttons 
case the currentSpriteNum of 
14: go "s2" 
openPertorrnance 
15:savePertorrnance 
17: midiShutUp 
otherwise 
show= "BUTION NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
"s4": -- scene 4 buttons 
case the currentSpriteNum of 
10: 
11 : 
12: 
13: 
14: go "s2" 
openPertorrnance 
15:savePerlorrnance 
17: midiShutUp 
otherwise 
show= "BUTION NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
otherwise 
show= "SCENE NOT ACTIVE" 
end case 
end 
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MIDI 
--This script contains handlers configures the MIDI xtra and has handlers to send and receive MIDI data. 
global gMIDiioXtra 
global glnPorts, gOutPorts 
global glnputPort, gOutputPort 
global glnChan, gOutChan 
global gNotesDown 
on midiShutUp 
repeat with Z= 1 to 16 
repeat with j = 1 to 1 0 
repeat with i = 1 to 200 
sendMidi("off",i,O,z) 
end repeat 
end repeat 
end repeat 
end 
on sendMidi onoff, noteNum, vol, chanNum 
if onoff="on" then 
SendMessage( gMIDiioXtra, [#noteOn, chanNum, noteNum, vol]) 
else 
SendMessage( gMIDiioXtra, [#noteOff, chanNum, noteNum, vol]) 
end if 
end 
on SelectlnputPort num 
Closelnput( gMIDiioXtra ) 
err= Openlnput( gMIDiioXtra, num, 32768 ) 
put "Openlnput returned: " & getProp( err, #text ) 
glnputPort = num 
end 
Appendix 4 - Page 38 
on SelectlnputChannel num 
SetChanneiFilter( gMIDiioXtra, 0. 0 ) --reset filter state 
SetChanneiFilter( gMIDiioXtra, [#note], num) --receive note mesages only 
glnChan = num 
end 
on SelectOutputPort num 
CloseOutput( gMIDiioXtra) 
set err to OpenOutput( gMIDiioXtra, num) 
put "OpenOutput returned: " & getProp( err, #text ) 
set gOutputPort to num 
end 
on SelectOutputChannel num 
set gOutChan to num 
end 
on getMidi 
repeat while MessagesPending( gMIDiioXtra) 
set msg to GetNextMessage( gMIDiioXtra) 
put msg --uncomment this to see all messages in the message window 
set type to getProp( msg, #type ) --could be msg.type in 07 
if type = #noteOn or type = #noteOff then 
if type = #noteOn then 
KeyboardNoteOn( getProp( msg, #number )) 
else if type = #noteOff then 
KeyboardNoteOff( getProp( msg, #number ) ) 
end if 
setProp( msg, #number, getProp( msg, #number )+ 7 ) --transpose up a 5th 
setProp( msg, #channel, gOutChan ) --reroute to output channel 
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set err to SendMessage( gMIDiioXtra, msg) 
if getProp( err, #code ) <> 0 then 
put "MIDiio Error: " & getProp( err, #text ) 
end if 
end if 
end repeat 
end 
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Initialise Everything 
--this script initialises all global variables, xtras and paths 
--graphics globals 
global gChildlist -- A list to hold the child object references. 
global gWhichSprite -- Counts the number of sprites 
global gAgentSettings -- list to hold current agent setting to seed new child agents 
global si, sr, st, sb, sheight,swidth, gPosH, gPosV,gOidPosV,gOidPosH, gAgentCounter, gAgentSNumlist 
--fft globals 
global gFFTCounter, gasFFTobj, gSampleValues, gFFTValues 
--midi globals 
global gMIDlioXtra 
-- agents graphics dialog box globals 
global gGraphicSettingDialog, gGraphicDialogPropUst, gGraphicDialogltemlist, gBigAgentlist 
global gGraphicParamUst, gGraphicReaiPoslist,gGraphicsFilePath 
global gGraphicParam, gGraphiclist,gGraphicFilelist 
-- agents audio dialog box globals 
global gAudioSettingDialog, gAudioDialogProplist, gAudioDialogltemlist 
global gAudioParamlist, gAudioReaiPoslist, gReaiPos,gAudioSettingPath 
global gAudioParam, gAudiolist,gAudioFilePath,gModeNamelist,gModelist 
-- shared between graphic and audio dialog 
global gSections, gAgentAudiolist,gAgentTimerlist,gAgentTimerScripts, gOpenDialog 
-- PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
global gWindowName -- MIAW globals 
global gAgents, gSectionChoice, gNumOfSections, gWhichScript, gDurationlist, gSectionlist, gPerformanceName 
global gPerformParam,gPerformParamlist,gGraphicsSettingPath,gSectionPath,gGraphicProfilePath,gAudioProfilePath 
global gTotaiTime, gPerformanceMovie 
-- performance globals 
global gMasterSeconds,gMasterMinutes,gPerformanceTimer,gDisplayTimer,gPiayingSection,gCurrentSection,gDebugMode 
global gCDROM,gPiayingPerformance,gMeterCounterlist 
on initialiseGiobals 
gBigAgentlist = [0,0,0.0.0.01 
gOpenDialog = [FALSE,FALSE,FALSE] 
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--gBigAgentlist.append([]) 
gCurrentSection= 1 
gAgentCounter=O 
gAgentSNumUst=O 
the keyDownScript= "checkKey" 
gWhichSprite = 1 
gChildlist = [:) 
gAgentSettings = 0 
gPosH = D 
gPosV = 0 
gOidPosH=O 
gOidPosV=O 
gG raphicFilelist=D 
gFFTCounter= 1 
gAgentnmerUst=O 
gAgentnmerScriptS=O 
gDurationlist=O 
gModeNamelist=D 
gPiayingSection=F ALS E 
gPiayingPerformance=FALSE 
--setup dialog box with cols(agents),rows(parameters) and sections 
--rows needs to include label row and value display row 
gAgents = 8 --this is here for stand alone performance, i.e. no controller 
gGraphicParamUst = 0 
gGraphicReaiPoslist = 0 
gGraphicParam = 17 
gAudioParamUst = 0 
gAudioReaiPoslist = 0 
gAgentAudioUst=D 
gAudioParam = 17 
gSections = 3 -- start group, row and end group 
gTotaiTime=O 
gMeterCounterUst=O 
repeat with i = 1 to gAgents 
gMeterCounterlist.append(O) 
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end repeat 
if the windowlist.count=1 then 
gCDROM= TRUE 
db "CDROM version" 
else 
gCDROM = false 
db "non-CDROM vers1on" 
end if 
-- load parameter names, should be in sync with default.txt files and createAgent parent script 
repeat with i = 1 to gGraphicParam 
case i of 
1: gGraphicParamlist.append("Data Display") 
2: gGraphicParamlist.append("Size ") 
3: gGraphicParamlist.append("SizeProb ") 
4: gGraphicParamlist.append{"Sizelnc ") 
5: gGraphicParamlist.append{"MoveProb ") 
6: gGraphicParamlist.append{"Movelnc ") 
7: gGraphicParamlist.append{"D1rProb ") 
8: gGraphicParamlist.append{"Biendlnc ") 
9: gGraphicParamlist.append("BiendProb ") 
10: gGraphicParamUst.append("MaxBiend ") 
11: gGraphicParamUst.append("ColourRange ") 
12: gGraphicParamUst.append{"BirthRate ") 
13: gGraphicParamUst.append{"B1nResponse ") 
14: gGraphicParamUst.append("Respond to ") 
15: gGraphicParamUst.append("GraphicsFile") 
16: gGraphicParamUst.append("SaveFile ") 
17: gGraphicParamUst.append("LoadFile ") 
end case 
end repeat 
repeat with i = 1 to gAudioParam 
casei of 
1: gAudioParamlist.append("Data Display ") 
2: gAudioParamUst.append{"Length ") 
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3: gAudioParamUst.append("LenghtProb ") 
4: gAudioParamUst.append("Lengthlnc ") 
5: gAudioParamUst.append("VolumeProb ") 
6: gAudioParamUst.append("Pitch ") 
7: gAudioParamUst.append("PitchMoveProb") 
8: gAudioParamUst.append("PitchlncProb ") 
9: gAudioParamUst.append("Ciuster ") 
10: gAudioParamlist.append("Channel ") 
11: gAudioParamlist.append("Meter ") 
12: gAudioParamlist.append("MeterProb ") 
13: gAudioParamlist.append("ResponceParam") 
14: gAudioParamlist.append("Responcelevel") 
15: gAudioParamlist.append("RespondTo ") 
16: gAudioParamlist.append("SaveFile ") 
17: gAudioParamlist.append("LoadFile ") 
end case 
end repeat 
--load names of modes 
repeat with i = 1 to 1 0 
case i of 
1: gModeNameUst.append("Harvey------") 
2: gModeNameUst.append("Maidley-----") 
3: gModeNameUst.append("Reaney------") 
4: gModeNameUst.append("Hunter------") 
5: gModeNamelist. append("G rey--------") 
6: gModeNameUst.append("Lorimer-----") 
7: gModeNameUst.append("Jones-------") 
8: gModeNameUst. append(" Brem ner -----") 
9: gModeNameUst. append("Charl ton----") 
10: gModeNamelist.append("Ciark-------") 
end case 
end repeat 
gModelist =0 
repeat with i = 1 to 1 0 
casei of 
1 :gModelist.append([1]) 
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2:gModelist.append{[1 ,6,8]) 
3:gModelist.append{[1 ,5,8, 12]) 
4:gModelist.append{[1 ,4, 7,1 0]) 
5:gModelist.append([1 ,6, 11 ,16,21]) 
6:gModelist.append{[1 ,3,5,6,8, 10, 12]) 
7:gModelist.append{[1 ,3,5,7,9, 11 ]) 
8:gModelist.append{[1 ,2,4,5, 7 ,8, 1 0,11 ]) 
9:gModelist.append{[1 ,2,3,5,6, 7 ,9, 10,11 ]) 
1 O:gModelist.append{[1 ,2,3,4,5,6, 7,8,9, 10,11 , 12]) 
end case 
end repeat 
-- initialise starting positions for graphic 
if gCDROM = TRUE then 
sr = 500 
si= 0 
st = 0 
sb = 330 
else 
sr = 1 024 -- the stage Right 
si = 0 --the stageleft 
st = 0 --the stage Top 
sb = 768 --the stageBottom 
end if 
sheight = sb - st 
swidth = sr - si 
repeat with i = 1 to gAgents 
gPosH .append( random ( swidth)) 
gPosV.append(random(sheight)) 
gOidPosV.append(O) 
gOidPosH.append(O) 
gAgentAudioUst.append("no sound") 
end repeat 
end 
on db message, priority 
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if gDebugMode = 1 then 
put message 
else if gDebugMode = 2 then 
alert message 
else if gDebugMode = 3 and priority = 1 then 
alert message 
end if 
end 
on initialisePaths 
gGraphicsSettingPath=the moviepath&"agentProfiles\graphicProfile\GraphicDefault" 
gAudioSettingPath=the moviepath&"agentProfiles\audioProfile\AudioDefault" 
gGraphicProfilePath="agentProfiles\graphicProfile" 
gAudioProfilePath="agentProfiles\audioProfile" 
gGraphicsFilePath="graphics" 
gAudioFilePath="audio" 
gPerformanceSettingFilelist=the moviepath&"performances\PerformanceDefault" 
gSectionPath="sections\" 
gWindowName="performance1 " 
end 
on initialiseController 
-- PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
gMasterSeconds = o 
gMasterMinutes = 0 
gPerformanceParam=4 
gPerformanceParamUst=O 
gAgents = 1 
gPerformanceParamNum = 1 
gNumOfSections = 1 
gDurationlist = 0 
gSectionlist =0 
gPerformanceReaiPoslist = 0 
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gPerformanceUst = 0 
repeat with i = 1 to 7 --gPerformanceParam 
case i of 
1: gPerformanceParamUst.append("Title : ") 
2: gPerformanceParamlist.append("Section : ") 
3: gPerformanceParamUst.append("Duration : ") 
4: gPerformanceParamlist.append("FileName : ") 
5: gPerformanceParamUst.append("Data Display : ") 
6: gPerformanceParamlist.append("Open File : ") 
7: gPerformanceParamUst.append("Save File : ") 
end case 
end repeat 
end 
on initialiseXtras 
--initialise MIDI 
if Not objectP( gMIDiioXtra ) then 
openXLib "MIDiio" 
gMIDiioXtra = New( xtra "MIDi io" ) 
Register( gMIDiioXtra, "Tim Sayer","MIX1 00-01 064-31326-557075-07" ) 
lnit( gMIDiioXtra) 
if Not objectP( gMIDiioXtra )then 
db "MIDiio xtra failed" 
else 
db "MIDiio xtra created" 
end if 
else 
db "MIDiio xtra already exists" 
end if 
glnPorts = GetlnputPorts( gMIDiioXtra ) 
SelectlnputPort(1) 
SelectlnputChannel(1) 
gOutPorts = GetOutputPorts( gMIDiioXtra) 
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db "glnPorts:" & glnPorts 
db "gOutPorts: " & gOutPorts 
if gOutPorts = 0 then 
alert "No MIDI output port has been detected. th1s application will not fuction correctly" 
end if 
Select0utputPort(2) 
SelectOutputChannel(1) 
-- initialise fft xtra 
if Not objectP( gasFFTobj) then 
gasFFTobj = new(Xtra "asFFT","Tim Sayer","01 yySxEIFEHA 7rgA62FKJEBFr9tTHsHmAcZ") 
gSampleValueS=O 
gFFTValueS=O 
if Not objectP( gasFFTobj) then 
db "FFT xtra failed" 
else 
db "FFT xtra created" 
end if 
else 
db "FFT xtra already exists" 
end if 
-- bins 400 and timesmooth 2 
gasFFTobj.setParams(400,2) 
end 
on goStart 
put "Go to start" 
Tell gPerformanceMovie to goBackToStart 
Tell gPerformanceMovie to stopTimers 
dean Up 
getReadyToRumble "performance" 
end 
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on startTimers 
repeat with i = 1 to gAgentTimerUst.count 
gAgentTimerUst[i] 0 forget() 
end repeat 
gAgentTimerScripts =0 
gAgentTimerUst=O 
go "s2" 
IDurlist = 0 
repeat with i = 1 to gAgents 
IDurUsto append(gBigAgentlist[2][gCurrentSection ][gBigAgentlist[3][gCurrentSection][ ( 11 *gAgents)+i]o value] 0 value) 
end repeat 
repeat with whichAgent = 1 to gAgents 
gAgentTimerScriptso append( new( script "timerScript", whichAgent,gSectionChoice)) 
gAgentTimerUst.append(timeout("agentTimer"&whichAgent)onew(IDurlist[whichAgent], #calledByTimer,gAgentTimerScripts[whichAgent] )) 
end repeat 
end 
on stopTimers 
repeat with i = 1 to gAgentTimerUst.count 
gAgentTimerUst[i] 0 forget() 
end repeat 
gAgentTimerScripts =[] 
gAgentTimerUst=[] 
the actorlist=[] 
end 
on SearchAndReplace input, stringToFind, stringTolnsert 
output= "" 
findlen = stringToFindolength - 1 
repeat while input contains stringToFind 
currOffset = offset(stringToFind, input) 
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output= output & input.char [1 .. curr0ffset] 
delete the last char of output 
output= output & stringTolnsert 
delete input. char [1 .. (currOffset + findlen)] 
end repeat 
set output = output & input 
return output 
end 
on getfiles whichDir 
filelist = [ ] 
whichPath = the moviePath&whichDir 
repeat with i = 1 to 1 00 
n = getNthFileNamelnFolder(whichDir, i) 
if n = EMPTY then exit repeat 
filelist.append( n) 
end repeat 
return filelist 
end 
on searchFile which File, whichDir 
found=FALSE 
repeat with i = 1 to 1 00 
n = getNthFileNamelnFolder(whichDir, i) 
if n = whichFile then 
found= TRUE 
exit repeat 
end if 
end repeat 
return found 
end 
on cleanUp 
the actorlist = D 
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repeat with i = 1 to gAgentTimerUst.count 
gAgentTimerUst[i]. forget() 
end repeat 
gAgentTimerScriptS=O 
gAgentTimerlist=D 
gMasterSecondS=O 
gMasterMinuteS=O 
gPiayingSection=FALSE 
if gDisplayTimer <> VOID then 
gDisplayTimer.forget() 
end if 
member("Time").text = "Time Remaining - 0:0" 
midiShutUp 
if the windowlist <> D then 
window(gWindowName).close() 
wi ndow(gWindowName). forget() 
end if 
end 
on cleanUpCasts 
repeat with i = 1 to the number of members of castlib("graphics") 
member(i, "graphics").erase() 
end repeat 
repeat with i = 1 to the number of members of castlib("audio") 
member(i , "audio").erase() 
end repeat 
end 
on cleanUpXtras 
if objectP( gMIDiioXtra ) then 
midiShutUp 
set gMIDiioXtra to 0 
closeXLib "MIDiio" 
end if 
if objectP(gasFFTobj) then 
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set gasFFT obj to 0 
end if 
if objectP(gGraphicSettingDialog) then 
set gGraphicSettingDialog to 0 
end if 
if objectP(gAudioSettingDialog) then 
set gAudioSettingDialog to 0 
end if 
end 
on kiiiGiobals 
gChildlist=VOID 
gWhichSprite=VOID 
gAgentSettingS= VOID 
si=VOID 
sr=VOID 
st=VOID 
sb=VOID 
sheight= VOID 
swidth=VOID 
gPosH=VOID 
gPosV=VOID 
gOidPosV=VOID 
gOidPosH=VOI D 
gAgentCounter= VOID 
gAgentSNumUst=VOI D 
gFFTCounter=VOID 
gasFFTobj=VOID 
gSampleValueS=VOID 
gFFTValueS=VOI D 
gMIDiioXtra=VOID 
gGraphicSettingDialog=VOI D 
gGraphicDialogProplist= VOID 
gGraphicDialogltemlist=VOID 
gBigAgentlist=VOID 
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gGraphicParamlist=VOI D 
gG raphicReal Poslist= VOID 
gG raphicsFilePath= VOID 
gGraphicParam=VOI D 
gGraphiclist= VOID 
gGraphicFilelist=VOI D 
gAudioSettingDialog=VOID 
gAudioDialogProplist= VOID 
gAudioDialogltemUst=VOID 
gAudioParamlist= VOID 
gAudioReaiPoslist= VOID 
gReaiPoS=VOID 
gAudioSettingPath=VOID 
gAudioParam=VOID 
gAudiolist=VOID 
gAudioFilePath= VOID 
gModeNamelist= VOID 
gModelist=VOI D 
gSectionS=VOID 
gAgentAudioUst=VOID 
gAgentTimerlist=VOID 
gAgentTimerScriptS= VOID 
gWindowName=VOI D 
gAgentS=VOID 
gSectionChoice= VOID 
gNumOfSectionS=VOI D 
gWhichScript= VOID 
gDurationlist= VO I 0 
gSectionlist= VOI o 
gPerfonnanceName=VOI 0 
gPerfonnParam=VOI D 
gPerfonnParamlist=VOIO 
gGraphicsSettingPath= VO I 0 
gSectionPath=VOIO 
gGraphicProfilePath= VOI 0 
gAudioProfilePath= VO I 0 
Appendix 4 - Page 53 
gTotaiTime=VOID 
gPerfonnanceMovie= VOID 
gMasterSecondS= VOID 
gMasterMinuteS=VOI D 
gPerfonnanceTimer=VOI D 
gDisplayTimer=VOI D 
gPiayingSection= VOID 
gPiayingPerfonnance= VOID 
gCurrentSection=VOI D 
gDebugMode=VOID 
gCDROM=VOID 
end 
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File 10 
--this script contains handlers to open, read and save configuration data to text files 
-- read file 
global gNewFileName 
on openAndReadText filename 
-- create the FileiO instance 
fileObj = new(xtra "FileiO") 
if filename = "" then 
-- set the filter mask to text files 
if the platform contains "mac" then 
setFilterMask(fileObj, "TEXT") 
else 
setFilterMask(fileObj, "Text Files,· . txt,AII Files.· .*") 
end if 
-- open dialog box 
filename = displayOpen(fileObj) 
gNewFileName = filename 
-- check to see if cancel was hit 
if filename = "" then return "" 
end if 
if filename<> VOID then 
-- open the file 
openFile(fileObj,filename, 1) 
-- check to see if file opened ok 
it status(fileObj) <> 0 then 
err = error(fileObj,status(fileObj)) 
alert "Error:"&&err 
return "" 
end if 
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-- read the file 
text = readFile(fileObj) 
-- close the file 
closeFile(fileObj) 
--return the text 
return text 
end if 
end 
on getNewFileName 
-- create the FileiO instance 
fileObj = new(xtra "FileiO") 
-- open dialog box 
filename = displayOpen(fileObj) 
-- close the file 
closeFile(fileObj) 
--return the filename 
return filename 
end 
--save file 
on saveText text 
-- create the FileiO instance 
fileObj = new(xtra "FileiO") 
-- set the filter mask to text files 
if the platform contains "mac" then 
setFilterMask(fileObj, "TEXT") 
else 
setFilterMask(fileObj,"Text Files,*.txt ,AII Files,*.*") 
end if 
-- save dialog box 
filename = displaySave(fileObj,"","") 
-- check to see if cancel was hit 
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if filename = '"' then return FALSE 
-- delete existing file, if any 
openFile (file0bj,filename,2) 
delete(fileObj) 
-- create and open the file 
createFile(fileObj,filename) 
openFile(file0bj,filename,2) 
-- check to see if file opened ok 
if status(fileObj) <> 0 then 
err= error(fileObj,status(fileObj)) 
alert "Error:"&&err 
return FALSE 
end if 
-- write the file 
writeString(fileObj, text) 
-- set the file type 
if the platform contains "Mac" then 
setFinderlnfo(fileObj, 'TEXT ttxt") 
end if 
-- close the file 
closeFile(fileObj) 
return TRUE 
end 
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Agent Audio Dialog Box 
--this script contains handlers to setup the audio dialog box 
global gAudioSettingDialog, gAudioDialogProplist, gAudioDialogltemlist 
global gAudioParamlist, gAudioReaiPoslist, gReaiPos, gAgentAudiolist 
global gAgents, gAudioParam, gSections, gAudiolist, gGraphiclist, gGraphicParams 
global gAudioSettingPath,gAudioFilePath, gSectionName,gAudioProfilePath 
global gModeNamelist,gGraphicParamlist 
-- temp globals 
global gTxt, gTxt1 
on agentAudioDialogSetup col, row, sections 
gAudioSettingDialog = new(xtra "mui") 
gAudioDialogProplist = GetWindowProplist(gAudioSettingDialog) 
gAudioDialogProplist.name = "Audio:"&gSectionName 
gAudioDialogProplist.callback = "theAudioCaiiBack" 
gAudioDialogProplist. width = 200 
gAudioDialogProplist.modal = false 
gAudioDialogProplist.closeBox = TRUE 
gAudioDialogltemUst = 0 
gAudioReaiPoslist=[] 
-- Set up the beginning of the dialog box 
templtemProplist = GetltemProplist(gAudioSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist. type = #windowBegin 
gAudioDialogltemlist.append(duplicate(templtemProplist)) 
gReaiPoS=1 
repeat with i = 1 to row 
repeat with j = 1 to sections 
case j of 
1:-- Set up the beginning of an overall group 
templtemProplist = GetltemProplist(gAudioSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #groupHBegin 
gAudioDialogltemlist.append(duplicate(templtemProplist)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
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2:-- puts a row of titles from parameter list 
templtemProplist = GetltemPropUst(gAudioSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #label 
templtemProplist.value = gAudioParamlist[i] 
templtemProplist.title = "paramlabel" & i 
gAudioDialogltemUst.append(duplicate(templtemProplist)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
--create columns 
repeat with k = 1 to gAgents 
templtemProplist = GetltemPropUst(gAudioSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.title = "P" & i & "A ' & k 
gAudioDialogltemlist. append( duplicate(templtem Proplist)) 
gReaiPoS=gReaiPos+ 1 
gAudioReaiPoslist.append(gReaiPos) 
end repeat 
3:-- end group 
templtemProplist = GetltemProplist(gAudioSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #groupHEnd 
gAudioDialogltemlist.append(duplicate(templtemProplist)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
end case 
end repeat 
end repeat 
-- Last, set up end of window 
templtemProplist = GetltemProplist(gAudioSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #windowEnd 
gAudioDialogltem List. append( dupl icate(templtemProplist)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
--load with default settings 
--gAudiolist = getfiles(" .. \audio") 
gAudioUst = getfiles(gAudioFilePath} 
-- repeat with i = 1 to gAgents 
-- loadAudioSettings i, gAudioSettingPath&i&".txt" 
-- end repeat 
repeat with i = 1 to gAgentAudioUst.count 
loadAudioSettings i, gAgentAudiolist[i] 
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end repeat 
end 
on importlntoCast whichFiles,whichCast 
memberUst = [ ] 
whichPath = the moviePath&whichCast 
repeat with i = 1 to whichFiles.count() 
audioFile = whichPath &"\" & whichFiles[i] 
importFilelnto(member(i,whichCast),audioFile) 
memberlist.append(member(i ,whichCast).name) 
end repeat 
return memberlist 
end 
on loadAudioSettings agentNum, defaultfile 
defaultfile = gAudioProfilePath& "\"&defaultfile 
gAudioMemberUst = importlntoCast( gAudioUst, "audio") 
tern pAgentData=O 
tempAgentData = openAndReadText(defaultfile) 
--this formating is needed to turn string into a value {list) .. don't ask me why, took me a day to find out 
tempAgentData = SearchAndReplace(tempAgentData, "<Void>", "void") 
tempAgentData = value(tempAgentData) 
whichParam = agentNum 
paramCounter = tempAgentData.count 
tempAgentData[1].value = "-AGENT "&agentNum&"-" 
audioFile = tempAgentData[paramCounter-2).value 
if searchFile(audioFile&".wav",gAudioFilePath) then 
importFilel nto(mem ber(agentNum, "audio") ,audioFile&". wav ") 
else if searchFile(gAudioFilePath&".mp3",gAudioFilePath) then 
importFilel nto(member(agentNum, "audio") ,gAudioFilePath& "\"&audioFile&" .m p3") 
else 
--put audioFile & " NOT FOUND" 
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end if 
repeat with i = 1 to paramCounter 
case i of 
9: 
tern pAgentData[i].attributes. valuelist=gModeNamelist 
13: 
tern pAgentData(i] .attributes. valuelist=gAudioParam List 
15: 
tempAgentData[i].attributes. v aluelist=gGraphicParam List 
end case 
gAudioDialogltemlist[gAudioReaiPoslist[whichParam]]= tempAgentData[i] 
Item Update(gAudioSettingDialog, gAudioReaiPoslist[whichParam], gAudioDialogltem Ust[gAudioReal Poslist[whichParam]]) 
whichParam = whichParam + gAgents 
end repeat 
end 
on theAudioCaiiBack (event, eventData, itemProplist) 
gAudioDialogltemlist(eventData].value = itemProplist.value 
if symboiP(event) then -- basic error check 
case event of 
#windowOpening: 
#itemChanged : 
--find which agent had been changed 
foundAt = -1 
repeat with i = 1 to gAudioReaiPoslist.count 
if gAudioReaiPoslist[i]=eventData then 
foundAt = i 
end if 
end repeat 
if foundAt = -1 then 
else 
if foundAt mod gAgents = 0 then 
whichAgent = gAgents 
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else 
whichAgent = foundAt mod gAgents 
end if 
end if 
if itemProplist. type = #lntegerSiiderH then 
gAudioDialogltemUst[gAudioReaiPoslist[whichAgent]].value = ": -- - "& string(itemPropUst.value) & "--- :" 
Item Update(gAudioSettingDialog, gAudioReal Poslist[whichAgent], gAudioDialogltem List[gAudioReal Poslist[whichAgent]]) 
else if itemProplist. type = #Popuplist then 
-- load Audio into cast member 
if itemPropUst.title = "audiolist" then 
audioFile = itemProplist.value 
if searchFile(audioFile,gAudioFilePath) then 
importFilelnto(member(whichAgent,"audio"),gAudioFilePath&"\"&audioFile) 
else 
--put audioFile & " NOT FOUND" 
end if 
end if 
end if 
#itemCiicked : 
foundAt = -1 
repeat with i = 1 to gAudioReaiPoslist.count 
if gAudioReaiPoslist[i]=eventData then 
foundAt = i 
end if 
end repeat 
if foundAt = -1 then 
-put"DEBUG: sorry not found on gAudioReaiPoslist" 
else 
if foundAt mod gAgents = 0 then 
whichAgent = gAgents 
else 
whichAgent = foundAt mod gAgents 
end if 
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case ( itemProplist.type ) of 
#bitmap : beep 
#defaultPushButton : beep 
#pushButton : 
case itemProplist.title of 
"Save Settings": 
saveAudioSettings whichAgent 
"Load Settings": 
loadAudioSettings whichAgent, "" 
otherwise put "Button " & itemProplist.title & " not recognised" 
end case 
#canceiPushButton : beep 
end case 
end if 
#windov.Opening: put "Window Opening" 
#windowCiosed: put "Window Closed" 
#windowZoomed : put "Window Zoomed" 
#windowResized :put "Window Resized" 
otherwise : 
end case 
else 
--put "other event occured" 
end if 
end 
on saveAudioSettings agentNum 
tempAgentData=O 
whichParam = agentNum 
alist=gAudioParam-2 
repeat with i = 1 to gAudioParam 
case i of 
1: gAudioDialogltemUst[gAudioReaiPoslist[whichParam]].value="Agent "&agentNum 
end case 
tempAgentData.append(gAudioDialogltemlist[gAudioReaiPoslist[whichParam]]) 
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whichParam = whichParam + gAgents 
end repeat 
tempAgentData=string(tempAgentData ) 
save Text tempAgentData 
end 
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Agent Graphics Dialog Box 
--this script contains handlers to setup the graphics dialog box 
global gGraphicSettingDialog,gGraphicDialogltemlist,gGraphicDialogProplist,gGraphicReaiPoslist 
--global smi leylndex 
global gGraphicParamUst, gReaiPos,gGraphicsSettingPath 
global gAgents, gGraphicParam, gSections, gGraphicUst, gAudiolist, gDurationUst 
global gAgentTimerlist, gGraphicsFilePath,gGraphicProfilePath 
--from reportback 
global gSectionChoice, gSectionName, gAgentChoice, gAgentGraphicName, gAgentAudioName 
global gAgentGraphicUst, gAgentAudiolist,gNewFileName,gGraphicFileUst,gGraphicMemberUst 
--temp globals 
--global gTxt, gTxt1 
on agentGraphicDialogSetup col, row, sections 
gGraphicSettingDialog = new(xtra "mui") 
gGraphicDialogProplist = GetWindowProplist(gGraphicSettingDialog) 
gGraphicDialogProplist.name = "Graphics:"&gSectionName 
gGraphicDialogProplist.callback = "theGraphicCaiiBack" 
gGraphicDialogProplist.width = 200 
gGraphicDialogProplist.modal =false 
gGraphicDialogProplist.doseBox = TRUE 
gGraphicDialogltemlist = 0 
gGraphicReaiPoslist = 0 
-- Set up the beginning of the dialog box 
templtemProplist = GetltemProplist(gGraphicSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #windowBegin 
gGraphicDialogltemlist.append(duplicate(templtemProplist)) 
gReaiPoS=1 
repeat with i = 1 to row 
repeat with j = 1 to sections 
case j of 
1:-- Set up the beginning of an overall group 
templtemProplist = GetltemPropUst(gGraphicSettingDialog) 
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templtemProplist.type = #groupHBegin 
gGraphicDialogltemlist.append( dupl icate(tem pltem Proplist)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
2:-- puts a row of titles from parameter list 
templtemProplist = GetltemProplist(gGraphicSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #label 
templtemProplist.value = gGraphicParamUst[i] 
templtemProplist.title = "paramlabel" & i 
gGraphicDialogltemUst.append(duplicate(templtemPropUst)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
--create columns 
repeat with k = 1 to gAgents 
templtemProplist = GetltemProplist(gGraphicSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.title = "P" & i & "A" & k 
gGraphicDialogltem List. append( dupl icate(tem pit em Proplist)) 
gReaiPoS=gReaiPos+ 1 
gGraphicReaiPoslist.append(gReaiPos) 
end repeat 
3:-- end group 
templtemProplist = GetltemProplist(gGraphicSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #groupHEnd 
gGraphicDialogltem List. append( dupl icate(templtem Proplist)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
end case 
end repeat 
end repeat 
-- Last, set up end of window 
templtemProplist = GetltemProplist(gGraphicSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #windowEnd 
gGraphicDialogltemlist.append(duplicate(templtemProplist)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
--load with default settings 
gG raphicRielist=O 
repeat with i = 1 to gAgentGraphiclist.count 
loadGraphicsSettings i, gAgentGraphiclist[i] 
end repeat 
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end 
on loadGraphicsSettings agentNum, defaultfile 
fileNameNoPath = defaultfile 
if defaultfile <> "" then 
defaultfile = gGraphicProfilePath&"\"&defaultfile 
end if 
if gGraphicUst = [] then 
alert the moviename&": No Graphics File" 
else 
tempAgentData=O 
tempAgentData = openAndReadText(defaultfile) 
-- this formating is needed to turn string into a value (list) .. don't ask me why, took me a day to find out 
tempAgentData = SearchAndReplace(tempAgentData, "<Void>", "vo1d") 
tempAgentData = value(tempAgentData) 
whichParam = agentNum 
paramCounter = tempAgentData.count 
tempAgentData[1 ). value = agentNum& ": "&fileNameNoPath 
tempAgentData[15).attributes.valuelist = gGraphicUst 
--easier to dump the duration data into a seperate list 
gDurationlist.append(tempAgentData[12). value) 
repeat with i = 1 to paramCounter 
case i of 
14: 
tempAgentData[i].attributes.valuelist=gGraphicParamlist 
end case 
gGraphicDialogltem Ust[gGraphicReal Poslist[whichParam ])=tempAgentData[i] 
ltemUpdate(gGraphicSettingDialog, gGraphicReaiPoslist[whichParam], gGraphicDialogltemlist[gGraphicReaiPoslist[whichParam]]) 
whichParam = whichParam + gAgents 
end repeat 
end if 
end 
on theGraphicCaiiBack (event, eventData, itemProplist) 
gGraphicDialogltemlist[eventData).value = itemProplist.value 
if symboiP(event) then -- basic error check 
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case event of 
#windowOpening: 
put "inside WindowOpening" 
repeat with i = 1 to gAgents 
end repeat 
#itemChanged : 
--find which agent had been changed 
foundAt = -1 
repeat with i = 1 to gGraphicReaiPoslist.count 
if gGraphicReaiPoslist[i]=eventData then 
foundAt = i 
end if 
end repeat 
if foundAt = -1 then 
--put"DEBUG: sorry not found on gGraphicReaiPoslist" 
else 
if foundAt mod gAgents = 0 then 
whichAgent = gAgents 
else 
whichAgent = foundAt mod gAgents 
end if 
end if 
if itemProplist. type = #lntegerSiiderH then 
gGraphicDialogltemUst[gGraphicReaiPoslist[whichAgent)].value = ": --- "& string(itemPropUst.value) & " --- :" 
Item Update(gGraphicSettingOialog, gGraphicReal Poslist[whichAgent], gGraphicDialogltem Ust[gG raphicReal Poslist[whichAgent}]) 
if itemPropUst.title = "p12" then 
gAgentTimerlist[whichAgent].period=itemProplist.value 
end if 
else if itemProplist.type = #Popuplist then 
-- load graphic into cast member 
if itemPropUst.title = "graphicslist" then 
end if 
end if 
#itemCiicked : 
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foundAt = -1 
repeat with i = 1 to gGraphicReaiPoslist.count 
if gGraphicReaiPoslist(i]=eventData then 
foundAt = i 
end if 
end repeat 
if foundAt = -1 then 
--put"DEBUG: sorry not found on gGraphicReaiPoslist" 
else 
if foundAt mod gAgents = 0 then 
whichAgent = gAgents 
else 
whichAgent = foundAt mod gAgents 
end if 
case ( itemProplist.type ) of 
#bitmap : beep 
#defaultPushButton : beep 
#pushButton : 
case itemProplist.title of 
"Save Settings": 
put "Save agent " & foundAt 
saveGraphicSettings whichAgent 
"Load Settings": 
loadGraphicsSettings whichAgent, "" 
otherwise put "Button " & itemProplist.title & " not recognised" 
end case 
#canceiPushButton : beep 
end case 
end if 
#windowOpening: put "Window Opening" 
#windowCiosed: put "Window Closed" 
#windowZoomed : put "Window Zoomed" 
#windowResized :put "Window Resized" 
otherwise : 
end case 
else 
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put "other event occured" 
end if 
end 
on saveGraphicSettings agentNum 
tem pAgentData=O 
whichParam = agentNum 
glist=gGraphicParam-2 
repeat with i = 1 to gGraphicParam 
case i of 
1: gGraphicDialogltemUst[gGraphicReaiPoslist[whichParam]]. value="Agent "&agentNum 
end case 
tempAgentData.append(gGraphicDialogltem Ust[gGraphicReal Poslist[whichParam]]) 
whichParam = whichParam + gAgents 
end repeat 
tempAgentData=string(tempAgentData ) 
saveText tempAgentData 
end 
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Performance Dialog Box 
--this script contains handlers to setup the performance dialog box 
global debugMode 
global gPerformanceSettingDialog, gPerfonnanceDialogProplist, gPerfonnanceDialogltemUst 
global smileylndex 
global gPerformanceParamlist, gPerfonnanceReaiPoslist, gReaiPos 
global gAgents, gPerformanceParam, gSections, gPerformancelist, gAudioUst, gDurationlist 
global gAgentTimerlist,gPerfonnanceParam Num ,gPerformanceSettingFilelist 
on performanceDialogSetup col, row, sections 
gPerfonnanceSettingDialog = new(xtra "mui") 
gPerfonnanceDialogPropUst = GetWindowProplist(gPerfonnanceSettingDialog) 
gPerfonnanceDialogPropUst.name = ":------ Performance Configuration Settings ------: " 
gPerfonnanceDialogProplist.callback = "thePerformanceCaiiBack" 
gPerfonnanceDialogPropUst. width = 200 
gPerfonnanceDialogPropUst.modal =false 
gPerfonnanceDialogPropUst.doseBox = TRUE 
gPerfonnanceDialogltemUst = D 
-- Set up the beginning of the dialog box 
templtem Proplist = Getltem Proplist(gPerfonnanceSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #windowBegin 
gPerfonnanceDialogltem List. append( dupl icate(templtem Proplist)) 
gReaiPoS=1 
repeat with i = 1 to row 
repeat with j = 1 to sections 
case j of 
1:-- Set up the beginning of an overall group 
templtemProplist = GetltemPropUst(gPerfonnanceSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #groupHBegin 
gPerfonnanceDialogltem List. append( dupl icate(templtem Proplist)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
2:-- puts a row of titles from parameter list 
templtemProplist = GetltemPropUst(gPerfonnanceSettingDialog) 
Appendix 4 - Page 71 
templtemProplist.type = #label 
templtemProplist.value = gPerformanceParamlist[i] 
templtemProplist.title = "paramlabel" & i 
gPerformanceDialogltemUst.append(duplicate(templtemPropUst)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
-- create columns 
repeat with k = 1 to gPerformanceParamNum 
templtemProplist = GetltemPropUst(gPerformanceSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.title = "P" & i & "A" & k 
gPerformanceDialogltemUst.append( duplicate(templtem PropUst)) 
gReaiPoS=gReaiPos+ 1 
gPerformanceReaiPoslist.append(gReaiPos) 
end repeat 
3:-- end group 
templtemProplist = GetltemPropUst(gPerformanceSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #groupHEnd 
gPerformanceDialogltemUst.append(duplicate(templtemPropUst)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
end case 
end repeat 
end repeat 
-- Last, set up end of window 
templtem Proplist = Getltem Proplist(gPerformanceSettingDialog) 
templtemProplist.type = #windowEnd 
gPerformanceDialogltemUst.append(duplicate(templtemPropUst)) 
gReaiPos = gReaiPos+ 1 
--load with default settings 
repeat with i = 1 to gPerformanceParamNum 
loadPerformanceSettings i, gPerformanceSettingFilelist&i&". txt" 
end repeat 
end 
on thePerformanceCaiiBack (event, eventData, itemPropUst) 
gPerformanceDialogltemUst[ eventData]. value = itemProplist. value 
if symboiP(event) then -- basic error check 
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case event of 
#windoYv()pening: 
put "inside WindowOpening" 
repeat with i = 1 to gAgents 
--gPerformanceDialogltemlist[gPerformanceReaiPoslist[whichAgent]].value 
end repeat 
#itemChanged : 
--find which agent had been changed 
foundAt = -1 
repeat with i = 1 to gPerformanceReaiPoslist.count 
if gPerformanceReaiPoslist[i]=eventData then 
foundAt = i 
end if 
end repeat 
if foundAt = -1 then 
-put"DEBUG: sorry not found on gPerformanceReaiPoslist" 
else 
if foundAt mod gAgents = 0 then 
whichAgent = gAgents 
else 
whichAgent = foundAt mod gAgents 
end if 
end if 
if itemProplist.type = #lntegerSiiderH then 
gPerformanceDialogltemlist[gPerformanceReaiPoslist[whichAgent]).value = ":-- - "& string(itemProplist.value) & " - -- :" 
ltemUpdate(gPerformanceSettingDialog, gPerformanceReaiPoslist[whichAgent], gPerformanceDialogltemlist(gPerformanceReaiPoslist[whichAgent]]) 
if itemProplist.title = "p1 2" then 
gAgentTimerlist[whichAgent]. period=item Proplist. value 
end if 
else if itemProplist.type = #Popuplist then 
-- load performance into cast member 
if itemProplist.title = "performancel ist" then 
performanceFile =the moviepath & "performance\" & itemProplist.value 
importFilelnto(member(whichAgent, "performance"),performanceFile) 
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end if 
end if 
#itemCiicked : 
foundAt = -1 
repeat with i = 1 to gPerformanceReaiPoslist.count 
if gPerformanceReaiPoslist[i]=eventData then 
foundAt = i 
end if 
end repeat 
if foundAt = -1 then 
--put"DEBUG: sorry not found on gPerformanceReaiPoslist" 
else 
if foundAt mod gAgents = 0 then 
whichAgent = gAgents 
else 
whichAgent = foundAt mod gAgents 
end if 
-put"DEBUG: Found at: " & foundAt & "real pos is: " & gPerformanceReaiPoslist[foundAt] 
case ( itemProplist.type ) of 
#bitmap : beep 
#defaultPushButton : beep 
#pushButton : 
case itemProplist.title of 
"Save Settings": 
put "Save agent " & foundAt 
savePerformanceSettings whichAgent 
"Load Settings": 
loadPerformanceSettings whichAgent, '"' 
otherwise put "Button " & itemProplist.title & " not recognised" 
end case 
#canceiPushButton : beep 
end case 
end if 
#windowOpening: put "Window Opening" 
#windowCiosed: put "Window Closed" 
#windowZoomed : put "Window Zoomed" 
Appendix 4 - Page 7 4 
#windowResized :put "Window Resized" 
otherwise: 
end case 
else 
put "other event occured" 
end if 
end 
on loadPerformanceSettings agentNum, defaultfile 
gPerformancelist = getfiles("performances") 
tempAgentData=D 
tempAgentData = openAndReadText(defaultfile) 
-- this formating is needed to turn string into a value (list) .. don't ask me why, took me a day to find out 
tempAgentData = SearchAndReplace(tempAgentData, "<Void>", "void") 
tempAgentData = value(tempAgentData) 
whichParam = agentNum 
paramCounter = tempAgentData.count 
tempAgentData[1).value = "-AGENT "&agentNum&"-" 
--need to effect birth rate of child object 
gDurationlist.append(tempAgentData[ 12). value) 
repeat with i = 1 to paramCounter 
-- repeat with i = 1 to gPerformanceParam 
gPerformanceDialogltemlist[gPerformanceReaiPoslist[whichParam]]=tempAgentData[i] 
Item Update(gPerformanceSettingDialog, gPerformanceReaiPoslist[whichParam ], gPerformanceDialogltem Ust[gPerformanceReal Poslist[whichParam]]) 
whichParam = whichParam + gAgents 
end repeat 
end 
on savePerformanceSettings agentNum 
tempAgentData=D 
whichParam = agentNum 
repeat with i = 1 to gPerformanceParam 
case i of 
1 : gPerformanceDialogltemUst[gPerformanceReaiPoslist[whichParam ]]. value=" Agent "&agentNum 
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end case 
tempAgentData.append(gPerfonnanceDialogltemUst[gPerfonnanceRealPoslist[whichParam]]) 
whichParam = whichParam + gAgents 
end repeat 
tempAgentData=string(tempAgentData ) 
save Text tempAgentData 
end 
Appendix 4- Page 76 
Go Frame 
-- this handler causes the playback head to loop around a single frame 
on exitFrame me 
go the frame 
end 
Appendix 4 - Page 77 
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Abstract 
' 
,This paper provides a rationale for the possible de-
velopment of software interfaces, the purpose of 
which is to provide opportunities for an improvising 
musician to construct a performance which, on the 
one hand allows them to engage with sonic and 
visual material produced by generative algorithms 
and on the other challenges the conscious and sub-
conscious cognitive processes which govern their 
normal performance practice. Both cognitive psy-
chology and communication theory offer great in-
sight into the evolution of human cognisance and 
provide pointers to models with which the activity of 
musical improvisation could be interpreted. In the 
course of this paper I have tried to relate academic 
concepts and theories to material gleaned from im-
provising musicians, giving credence to their opin-
ion? and drawing inference from their experiences. 
Keywords: cognition, communication, conscious-
ness, improvisation, performance, psychology 
·, 
Introduction 
There is not a system in the material world that 
exists in isolation from all other systems, be it 
physical, biological or conceptual. Musical 
improvisation is no exception. Not only is this 
activity non-autonomous bur it continues to 
defy a consensual definition amongst those who 
engage in it and those who study it. Like so 
many culturally defined super-ordinate terms 
'improvisation' is used in reference to a range of 
human activities and even when applied to those 
that are classified as 'musical' it fails to provide a 
consistent term of reference. 
Superficially musical improvisation, as 
with the spoken word, appears to be formulated 
and delivered almost in a single process, the 
conceprualisarion of an idea being translated 
inro spoken language virtually immediately in 
many instances. As Holtzman suggests it is only 
by scrutinising the processes of music and 
language at their component level that we can 
avoid the pitfalls of unsubstantiated 
generalisation in the relationship between the 
two activitie$. 
Like natural language, music is a systtm that consists 
of a hiaarchy of systems. Each symm has its 
fondammtal componerus: the 1150, OOOth-ofa-second 
micro-sound sampk, the note or sound (!)ent, thtmlJ 
and ph raw, and ultimately the structurt of a 
compkte work. Each systtm has its ruks for 
t:kscribing its structum:.for combining andsequencing 
&mmts. And each systtm can itself be sem as the 
base ekment of another systmz at a diffirmt level in 
the himlrchy. 
Holtzman (1994 156) 
Viewing musical improvisation, which I 
will refer to only as 'improvisation', as a 
Sayer 
communication system comprising many 
subsystems will I hope clarify me areas of the 
process under examination in this study. The 
domain I have particular interest in comprises 
systems that support the preconception, 
conception and formalisation of ideas. Almough 
there seems not to be a large body of work 
providing an examination of m is domain, 
specifically in relation to the spontaneous 
creation of musical material, mere does exist a 
wealth of material within me fields of 
evolutionary studies, cognitive science and 
linguistics with which to construct plausible 
explanations of improvisational behaviour. 
This endeavour does in fact have a 
purpose, and mat purpose is to provide a 
meoretical foundation on which to construct 
computer based performance systems for use in 
conjunction with improvising musicians. The 
technical derail of which will be provided in a 
later paper. 
2 Improvisation and human behaviour 
Many aspects of human behaviour are governed 
by what we know and what we understand. If 
we know mat a particular type of behaviour is 
likely to cause us pain then we will obviously 
avoid it. If we understand and learn how pain 
works we then have me opporrun.ity to avoid as 
many pain causing situations as our 
understanding permits. This human behavioural 
characteristic is nor of course static and when 
viewed with an evolutionary perspective 
provides insight into the influence of brain 
development on human behaviour. As Gurney 
suggests the development of the thalamus and 
neocortex has led to greater control over 
behaviour rhus reducing automatic or reflex 
type responses in favour of learned responses. 
Similar rtasoningpoints to th( s(paration ofth( n(W 
planning and rtasoning ar(as ofth( brain fom th( 
olkr 'mwwmal' cmtm. It is conjmurt that h~n 
/i(S th( rtason for mans 'objectivity: He is less subjm 
to th( imm(diate tkmands of his (motions. Th( 
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reparation of th( r(asoning and emotional centres 
would ha!)( provitkd thwpportunity for man to cope 
rationalLy with most situations, since it is known that 
strong emotions tmd to disrupt organi:ad behaviour, 
including karning. 
(Gurney 1973 42) 
The consequences of a cognitive pull 
such as mis could have significant ramifications 
within the field of improvisation. Many of me 
frustrations expressed by improvising musicians 
centre around the continuous battle to generate 
o~iginal material, to evolve me music beyond 
rhat which has been played before. In his 
conversation wim Derek Bailey, Steve Lacy · 
seems to be identifying the behavioural 
tendency identified by Gurney, to organise and 
learn, as he expresses his disillusionment with 
me field of ja?-7..· 
Why should I want to karn alL thos( trite patt(mJ? 
~u know, when Bud Powlli I1UI.tk tlmn, fifom ](arr 
ear/Ur, theywerm'tpattnnr. Butwhensomebody 
analysed th(m and put thmt into a system it became a 
school and many players joined it. But by the time I 
cam( to it, [saw through it- the thrill was gone. jazz 
got so that it wa.m 't improvised any mol'(. 
(Bailey 1992 54) 
It is perhaps significant that Lacy never 
proposes a benchmark with which to measure 
successful improvisation. He describes that 
which he finds worthy of the title 
'improvisation ' with adjectives such as 'free' and 
'progressive' without opening up those 
descriptions to scrutiny. Perhaps Lacy is 
implying that true improvisation is characterised 
by a streaming of material from me performers 
psyche without influence or contamination, an 
activity not unlike the Surrealists process of 
automatic writing pioneered by Bretton, the 
premise of which is now generally accepted to 
be neurologically impossible. It is ironic that in 
this critical context the likes of Lacy fall foul of 
their own critique. Modern psychology has 
deconsrrucred the mind to the point that mere 
is no haven for his notion of creativity to exist. 
As Kenneth Gergen suggests with each and 
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every aspect of our interior space allocated to 
new ages cond.itioning o r populist psychological 
diagnosis there is no room for a generalised 
theory of being. 
In iffoct, through the various ttchnologUs ofsociaL 
saturation, th(Y( is an oplosion in the vocabu!D.ry of 
the inttrior. And this txplosion bringr to a virtuaL 
close an age ofre!D.tive homogmeity. ~slowLy lose 
our smu of assuredness in 'what there is'-for 
exampk, whether thm is in fact any mmtal disease, 
any reaL mativity. foe wilL. momLsmtirnent, supmor 
aesthetic tastt, and so on. 
(Grodin and Lindlof1996133) 
Behavioural psychology seems to reveal 
other traits in improvising musicians, traits, 
which it seems we are hard wired to exhibit and 
which appear in everyday life. There are 
numerous experiments that have revealed a 
tendency in animal behaviour to avoid negative 
experiences and be attracted to positive 
experiences. In humans, conflicts are often 
caused by artificial interjections into thjs 
scenario such as caffeine or nicotine, with the 
short-term effect satisfying the positive pull bur 
in tht long-term producing a more negative 
effect. Similarly in the production and 
consumption of music, human behaviour is 
perhaps governed by what we know rather than 
by what we undmtand. It is a cliche ro describe 
consumers of art products in these terms but 
rarely is this notion applied ro producers. 
Within the context of musical improvisation 
and particularly within the genre of jazz many 
great performances have taken place by 
performers who know what it takes to move an 
audience. Many academics and observers have 
deconstructed and analysed performances in 
order to understand what was produced by the 
performer and have succeeded in representing 
the material in accordance with a particular 
analytical method, but this does nor address why 
a performance has the effect it does. A 
performer can often deduce what has an effect 
but not why, a behavioural influence which 
Derek Bailey identifies as being detrimental to a 
performance. 
Alain Danielou, writing about the difficuLties for 
Asian musicians working within the OccidmtaL 
mttrt4inmmtsystcn describes exactly the problem 
which has also affimd West(rn performance music 
such as flamenco, jazz and, increasingly. 'fiu' music. 
'Whm the mUiicians note a positive reaction .fto m the 
public, they are t(mpted to reproduce the iffoct, which 
provoked this reaction and consequmtiy one can 
undmtand how a rapid deterioration of the rnu.sic 
performed could occur. The musician becomes littlt 
more than an actor who repeats his tricks when he 
notices that the public reacts fovoumbiy. 
(Bailey 1992 44) 
We see then that this rype of 
'gratification seeking' performance conditioning 
goes a long way to reinforce the behavioural 
changes that have been initiated by physiological 
changes in the brain . Gurney once again 
suggests that this characteristic has steadily 
developed as a feature of human evolution. 
As Lorenz pointed out, one of the themes of mans 
emergence was the loosming ofinstinctive reflex 
actions in favour oftht uamtd controL of voluntary 
behavWur. 
(Gurney 1973 40) 
Gavin Bryars, once working as a bass 
player in the field of improvisation, chooses 
now to create music through composition. The 
demise of his belief in improvisation as a valid 
art form came as a result of experiencing 
performances, which in some sense seemed to 
be fraudulent. He identified the same 
behavioural traits as Alain Danielou but in 
addition raises the question of the performers' 
objectivity. 
Ont of the main reasons I am against improvisation 
now is that in any improvisingposition the pmon 
creating the music is idmtifitd with tht mltsic. Tht two 
thing.r are stm to be synonymous. 
{Baiky 1992115) 
Bryars seems to be intimating that it is 
impossible for an improvising musician to 
remain objective during a performance and that 
this psychological scare compromises the 
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auronomy of the artwork. It is nor only within 
the field of improvisation that this psychological 
state has been idenrified. The Russian 
philosopher Peter Ouspensky in his paper The 
psychology of man's possible evolution identifted four 
general states of consciousness; sleep, waking 
sleep or relative consciousness, self-
consciousness and objective consciousness. 
These states exit on a continuum from 
subjective to objective with state number one, 
sleep, being purely subjective. Ouspensky 
suggests that people tend to spend the vast 
majoriry of their waking life in state number 2 
in which their subjecriviry is extended to include 
the perception of 'I' and 'not I'. Within this 
state he defines a number of characteristics and 
traits that people exhibit, one of which lends 
weight to Bryars' observations. 
1denti.ffing' or 'identification' is a curious statt in 
which man passes more than half of his lift. He 
'identifies' with everything: with what he says, what he 
ftels, what he believes, what he do(! not believe, what 
he wishes, what he do(! not wish, what attracts him 
and what repels him. Everything absorbs him, and he 
cannot separate himselffrom the idea, the fte/ing, of 
the object that absorbed him. This means that in the 
statt of identification man is incapable oflooking 
impartially on the object of his identi.fication.It is 
difficult to find the smallest thing with which man is 
unable to 'idmtiff: At the same time, in a state of 
identification. man has even less control over his 
mechanical reactions than at any ot~er time. 
(Ouspensky 1940 42) 
If the omnipotence of this stare, as 
Ouspensky seems to be suggesting, exists, then 
the premise that underpins many areas of 
communication theory must perhaps be re-
evaluated. That premise being that when two or 
more sentient beings communicate they are 
performing a conscious objective act. This 
argument has been employed by Karl 
Rosengren and others to distinguish the way 
human beings communicate from other animals. 
· When human beings communicatt, u:t know that we 
do so. Each one of two communicating participants is 
aware of the {sometimes potential) presence of the 
other, and ofthe fact that communication is ocrorring 
(or may occur). 
(Rosengren 2000 36) 
Another flaw in this premise that 
supports Ouspensky's theory is of course that 
much of our communication exits on channels 
that are not generally subject to intellectual 
ftl.tering, body language and vocal intonation 
being two obvious examples. This situation 
exists in an improvised music setting as much as 
anywhere else. Facial expression, speed of 
movement, body gesture, physical positioning, 
ere. are all able ro communicate information in 
which the performers' perceived inte.nt often 
plays no part. Rosengren's rypography extends 
his model of communication to include what he 
terms, unintentional and subconscious 
transm1sswn. 
While the inclusion of these aspects 
offer us insight, by way of exemplars of the rypes 
lndividusl is c on>::ious of :~etion/boh•viou: 
~ Yes No g 
· r. c •' Yes 1 co~lic&tion u :tction 2.c0fl"lr'l'D..Uiod:ion s.ssub::onv;ious tction 
.1! 0 . , 
Jj c:: 
-
ll 3 bodily beha~~ou< su:h as blu.shi.n.s, 4 un::onr.ious bod.ay behavioU< such as mull f:~eisl 
c:: 
.s No 0 
•.lJ s !:utter in&, swuting, trembli~ chtng>!s ~ 
Table 1. A communicative-orientated typology of action and behaviour. (Rosengren 1984 37) 
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of behaviour char are generally regarded as 
involuntary, rhe overall model remains problem-
atic. Ouspensky's notion of consciousness as a 
continuum on which a human activicy can be 
placed in accordance with a person's overall 
psychological or evolutionary state seems more 
plausible. 
In conntetion with this I must say at onct that I do 
not mean what is calkd in motkm psychology 'tht 
subconscious' or 'th~ subconscious mind~ That are 
simplyw?tmg~ressWns, wrrmgtmns, which mean 
nothing and do not reftr to any rea/ facts. Thm is 
nothingpm711lnmtlysubconscious in us btca~a thm 
is nothingpmruznmrly conscious; and thm is no 
'subconscious mind 'for the vt~y simple reason that 
thm is no 'conscious mind~ 
(Ouspmsky 1940 29) 
3 Improvisation and spoken language 
So we are faced with an 'improviser' whose 
evolution is closing down the intuitive and 
automatic centres in his brain, who has a 
prejudice for the learned rather than the 
invented, who succumbs to a weakness for self 
gratification, who is incapable of being objective 
about their own music and who lives under the 
illusion that they have conscious control over 
their communication. ln attempting to resolve 
this internal crisis that affiicts the improvising 
musician ir may be helpful to undertake a 
digression into the world of Linguistics. 
The term improvisation as defined 
within rhe context of this paper refers to the 
field of musical performance but as a super 
o rdinate term it can be applied to a whole range 
of human endeavours. In some ways 
improvisation is more prevalent in the field of 
spoken language than in music. Ir is more 
common for a musical transmission ro be pre-
prepared rather than spontaneous, where as 
spoken language is more likely to be 
spontaneous rather rhan pre-prepared, at least in 
derail. Although the medium of spoken lan-
guage affords rhe facilicy to ponder and hone a 
thought before it is transmitted, rhe dynamics of 
discourse often make ir scylisrically inappropri-
ate. Spoken discourse is of course regulated by 
the conrexr in which the discourse is raking 
place. When the discourse content is of a serious 
or emotionally charged nacure the level of 
consideration given before delivery is Likely to be 
higher rhan if the discourse is of Little or no 
consequence. The process of musical improvisa-
tion has many parallels with delivering spoken 
discourse but also fundamental differences. If we 
assume that spoken discourse has an important 
and fundamental human function outside the 
transmitting and receiving of information then 
the link with improvisation becomes more vivid. 
When such discourse is taking place irs objec-
tive, to connect one or more human beings 
through the spomaneous generation of sound, 
becomes very similar in method to a musical 
improvisation. indeed Kenneth Gregen's notion 
of the 'relational sublime' offers justification for 
why such a connection between spoken lan-
guage and musical improvisation should exist. 
Gregen points to deeper structures that exist 
below the encoded transmissions of spoken 
narurallanguage, structures open to more 
primal interpretation. 
Ytt, aLthough this rtaim of tht sub/imt ca11not be 
captured in languagt, ~can appreciak its dimension. 
How art sounds and markingr convernd to what~ 
takt to be languagt? For how does language acquirt its 
inttUigibiLity? Hm ~must envision primordiaL 
prowm of relationship- the pulsing coordination of 
movement and sound- that slowly turn the amorphous 
into the meanintfo/. 
(GrodinandLindLofl996J38). 
A parallel can perhaps be drawn between 
that which is 'primordial' in Gregen's 'relational 
sublime' and the 'deep structures' of Chomsky's 
'transformational grammar'. The innate 
capability of the mind to formulare grammars 
which Chomsky saw as a subsrrara of human 
communication seems to relate to Gregen's 
belief in the relationship as rhe bonding layer 
below natural language, in as much as they exisr 
99 
Sayer 
universally and are innate. The suggestion is 
therefore rhat we come into this world pre-
loaded wirh rhe facility to interface onto any 
cultural language rhat we happen to be born 
into, as Fodor acknowledges, when we are born 
our minds are not a clean sheet. 
My view is that you can 't karn a language unkss you 
already know one. !t isn't that you can't kam a 
language unkss you~ already kamed one. 
(Fodor 1978 65) 
Fodor's metaphor of the internal state 
of rhe human mind resembling that of a 
computer allows us to draw the analogy between 
machine code and rhe human internal language, 
both of which require a 
compilation process in order to 
notion of human beings rh inking in natural 
language is impossible. That would be to 
suggest rhar children in a pre-linguistic state 
could nor think and rhar non-linguistic animals 
were incapable of rhought. 
One way of describing my views is that organisms (01; 
in any event, organisms that behallf!) hallf! not only 
such natural languages as they may happen to have, 
but also a privau language in which they carry out the 
computatiom that under& their behaviour. 
(Fodor 1978 68) 
This two-phase communication model 
seems to support Chomsky's concept of deep 
and surface language structure and combined 
with Grecen's notion of the 
' relational sublime' can perhaps 
interpret external communica-
tion. In rhe case of the human, 
the external language is of 
course learnt and is translated 
at run rime rather like an 
interpreted language. 
Grecen's 
notion of the 
offer an insight into improvisa-
tion. In these terms it is clear 
rhat within rhc overall process 
of communication the encod-
ing and transmission of natural 
language is only part of rhe 
story but for an improvising 
musician to make rhis 
distinction is a non-trivial task. 
John Zorn's description of a 
personal language qeveloped 
by an improvising musician 
wirh his instrument could be 
vaguely equated to Fodor's 
'relational 
Whm you find a t:Uviu using 
a language it was not built to 
use (e.g. a language that has 
bun kamed}, assume that the 
way it does it is by tramlating 
the formulae of that language 
into formulae which corre-
sponds directly to its 
computationaliy rekvant 
sublime' can 
perhaps offer 
an insight into 
improvisation 
physical states. This would apply. in partimlar, 
to the formulae of the natural langttages that 
speakers/heare1·s learn, and the correlative 
assumption would be that the truth rules for 
predicates in the natural language Junction as 
part of the tramlation procedure. 
(Fodor 1978 67) 
What is suggested then is rhat human 
communication comprises two levels of 
interpretation, one external and one internal. 
The external level dealing with a culturally 
defined natural language and the internal dealing 
with biologically defined 'language of rhoughr', 
as Fodor describes it. Fodor argues that the 
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private language. Zorn goes on 
however, to describe this language as evolving 
rhough relationships with other musicians rhus 
blurring rhe distinction between the notions of 
public and private language. Bailey, on the orher 
hand, acknowledges that drawing an analogy 
between improvisation and language is only 
useful in terms of describing 'a vocabulary' 
shared by musicians. He seems to be alluding to 
a similar strata of communication as Chomsky's 
surface structure. 
The analogy with language, o.ftm used by improvising 
musiciam in discussing their work, has a urtain 
usefulnm in i//ustrating the development of a 
common stock of material -a vocabulary - which 
- - ... ----. ---~--
Theories: Software intervention in the process ... 
takes place when a group of musicians impro~ise 
toguher regularly 
(Bailey 1992 106) 
If Chomsky's 'transformational 
grammar' concept could be applied to 
improvisation, the process is likely to be fraught 
with difficulties. It is perhaps easier m 
conceptualise a situation .in spoken language 
where the truth rules for predicates in the 
surface structures have a correlation with 
internal sr:ires in the deep structure. It is 
impossible to conceptualise and express such a 
situation in improvised music without remrring 
m a symbolic representation using. natural 
language. In the study of the 'internal language' 
Fodor suggests that perhaps it is not necessary 
m try m determine exactly what the correlation 
is between inner and outer language but that it is 
sufficient for that correlation to be consistently 
undertaken. This relieves the improvising 
musician of the onus m define what might be 
called the 'deep structures' of his performance 
in any other terms than those in which they are 
originally manifest. 
Notia that the use of a language for computation daes 
not requirr that one should be able to daermine that 
its terms arr consinently employed; it rrquim only . 
that they should in foct be consistently employed 
(Fodar197870) 
Perhaps the reasons this correlation is 
easier m conceptualise when considering spoken 
language again relates back m our evolutionary 
heritage. 
Other fonns of rum-verbal communication include 
dAnce and music ... All of these am seem to be about 
as old as man. Actually. their elementary forms must 
buvro oltkr, since the imitative, repmentingfonction 
of gesture and mimics must have been used for tens of 
millmnia beforr human rymbolic language with fnghly 
specific articulation tkveloped Indeed, the most ancient 
musical instrument (a flute) to be discovmd to dAte is 
estimated to be botwero 40,000 and 70,000 yearr 
old, which is older than the estimated age of 
human speech. 
(Rosengren 2000 40) 
-:··-··~- ·- .---.- ··-·. ·-·-- -, 
The human evolutionary dynamic, 
moving from the reflex response to the learned, 
seems m favour the development of natural 
language rather than that of improvisation 
although it seems safe to assume that man was 
musical before.he:was linguistic. And although 
the internal operation of the brain, i.e. the way 
the mind worked, was significantly different 
then from modern man, the need to retain the 
abiliry to create spontaneous expressions of 
emotion seems to have been retained. 
The evolutionary change did not exclude motion but 
tempmd it. Man did not abandan the pleasures of 
satisfYing his needs. Instead he learned to postpone 
them in the interrstoflong-term objectives. 
(Gurney 1973 42) 
Perhaps the improvising musicians can 
be indulged in their internal dilemma between 
the learned and the invented, they arc it seems 
caught between the need to satisfy a pre-linguist 
urge for sonic self-expression and the brains 
modern day urge to suppress reflex response. 
4 Improvisation and computer software 
intervention 
There are many instances of composers and 
improvisers employing processes to circumvent 
the human ego. The most famous of which is 
possible John Cages chance operations. As Paul 
Rudy identifies in his reconstruction of Cage's 
Child ofTru, there was a need for Cage to 
resolve issues previously raised in this paper. 
Czges prior objection to improvisation was its basis in 
the confines ofa pn:fol1'1'lerr memory and taste which 
directly contradicted his dAdA in.flumas. Improvisation 
with plant material (cactus and seed pods in 'Child of 
Trre: and conch shell in 'Inlets') solved this dilemma 
through rrmoving the fomiliarity ofprrviOUJiy learned 
(and practiced) patterns, by introducing a completely 
unprrdictahle instrummt into theperformance. 
(Rudy 200 I) 
There are, [hen, precedems for an 
imervenrionist approach to constructing 
performances based on improvisation. In the 
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case of rhe cactus in Cage's performance the 
nature of the interaction was obviously 
unidirectional or simplex as iris known in 
communication terminology. The sounds 
generated by the cactus could influence rhe 
behaviour of rhe performer bur rhe performers' 
sound could nor influence the behaviour of the 
cactus. Computer software based intervention 
allows this mode of interaction to be expanded. 
Half-duplex communication describes a 
situation where bi-directional communication 
exists bur nor simultaneously. Ir is rh is mode 
that human beings employ to engage with 
spoken language, it is very difficult for humans 
to both receive and decode a communication 
while also transmitting one. When computers 
communicate with each other they often use 
full-duplex prorocols that facilitate simultaneous 
bi-directional transmission. The abstract artist 
Harold Cohen, developer of rhe AARON 
drawing system based on artificial intelligence, 
maintains rhar in computer software artists have 
for rhe first rime a tool which can monitor an 
external stimulus and change its self 
simultaneously. 
Them a fUndamental di./formce between what we 
traditionAlly calL a tool which n!quires ftedback to be 
conducted to and fom the human user for operations 
to talu p!dce, and a device that contains its own 
ft.dback paths, that can conduct its dwn invertigations 
and modifY its own behaviour on the basis of what its 
able to fted back to itselffom th~ ,;suits of what it 
has done. 
(Holtzman 1994218) 
Although humans do nor possess a full 
duplex mode when using narurallanguage there 
is brain support for the undertaking of 
simultaneous processes. The cerebellum 
regulates and adjusts borh voluntary and reflex 
actions. Ir automatically handles much of the 
processing and therefore behaviour between the 
initiation of an event and irs goal stare. Ir aces, 
as Gurney describes, as a kind of 'neural auto-
matic pilot'. When we walk across a room rhc 
cerebellum will handle our balance and foot 
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placement leaving the cortex free for other 
processing. This facility is likely ro have been 
one of rhe growth areas in human development, 
as rhe cerebellum has increased in size relative 
to the brain seem. We could here extend Fodor's 
computer metaphor with an analogy to mulri-
rasking operating systems. These achieve the 
simultaneous execution of multiple processes by 
ordering their execution according to their 
priority in interrupting and gaining the attention 
of rhe processor or in rhe brain's case voluntary 
control. 
The 'highest' brain stem centres ofr4fex control to 
develop wm the basal ganglia. Not only do thm 
nuclei form a motouquivalmt to the thalamus and its 
development on the sensory side, but they lie tll the 
base ofc=bral hemisphrres next to the thalamus. 
Thm ganglia probably do not control movmzm~ as 
they seem to be invollH!d on gmeral muscle tone and 
rhythmic behaviour. Through thm cenms we can 
carry on one activity while engaging in another, more 
sophisticated one: the ability to 'whist!£ while you 
work 'for instance. 
(Gurney 1973 40) 
Computer software based intervention in 
the process of improvisation wirh its full duplex 
capabilities allows for the creation of:an 
architecture where a human performers' reflex 
and voluntary behaviour can perhaps be 
influenced. Decomposing rhe improvisational 
activity into discrete processes where one 
process is given precedence over another could 
allow reflex behaviour to be stimulated in rhe 
subordinate process. Constructing a software 
performance sysrem where a conscious 
voluntary activity exists simultaneously with rhe 
sonic activity has a similarity ro rhe devices used 
in rhe work of John Zorn. 
My early game pieces were sports, like Lacrosse, 
Hockey, Pool Fencing and I got bored with those and 
started using war games, kind ofbookshelfgames. 
The ruks whm intenre, ro thick, you know, and if 
you write the rules out for the game Cobra they 
are impossible to &cipher. 
(Bailey 1992 76) 
Theories: Software intervention in the process ... 
So what possibilities are created when the 
'rule base' for an improvisation is divorced from 
the act of creating sound, as in the scenario 
described by John Zorn. And what happens 
when the performer is fed back information on 
his status on which he is required to act. The 
performer's voluntary faculties deal with the 
rules of engagement and the construction of 
strategies while his reflex action interprets and 
implements those strategies. Coufd rhis induce 
rhe ty~e of rare experience Bailey identifies, that 
perhaps drive musicians ro choose improvisation 
as a mode of expression. 
A lot ofimproviJers find improviJation worth-
while. I think, brcause of the possibilities. Things 
that can happen but perhaps rarely do. One of 
those things iJ that you art 'taken out of yourself: 
Somtthing happens which so diJorimtates you 
that for a timt, which might only last for a 
second or two, your reactions and responses are 
not what they normally would be. You can do 
somtthing you didn't rtaliJe you wm capable of 
Or you don't appear to be folly mponsible for 
what you are doing. 
(Bailey 1992 11.5) 
Evan Parker makes reference to this 
stare seeming ro identify contextual influences 
as a powerful force in changing a musician's 
behaviour. 
!t can make a usefol change to be dropped into a 
slighdy shocking situation that you've never been in 
before. lt can produce a diffmnt kind of mponse, a 
differmt kind of reaction. 
(Bailey 1992 128) 
The case then, for software intervention 
in the process of improvisation, is nor about 
citing rhe overall responsibility for the 
performance with either the performer or rhc 
computer; iris embodying ir in the interactivity, 
in the sublime relationship berween the rwo. I 
am nor advocating an artificial intelligence 
system learning from a performer and 
producing rule based music, bur rather an 
attempt to extend an improvisers potential by 
defining rules of engagement. The objective in 
- ......... ,,., __ -··----.--· 
artificial intelligence ro learn, srore and predict 
is not of rh is paradigm. A5 the computer 
scientist Frederick Brooks suggests, the future 
for computing is in extending and not mimick-
ing human potential. 
I believe /flt use ofcomputer systom for intelligena 
amplifoatwn iJ ·much more powerfo1 toda]l and wiU be 
at any given point in the foture, than the we of 
compurm for artijicid/ inteUigmce (AI). Tn the AI 
community. the objective iJ to d4ta base. In the AI 
community. the objective is to build systems that 
amplifi the human mind by providing it with 
computer-based auxiliaries that do the thing.r the mind 
has trouble doing. 
(Holtzman 1994 218) 
The type of sofrware intervention I am 
suggesting firs well with this Al objective. 
Performance interfaces rhar listen, feedback and 
extend the performer rather than produce a 
passive reaction provide opportunities to exploit 
synchronous channels of communication. The 
interface functioning as 'agent provocateur' can 
provide not only sonic stimuladon for the 
performer bur also visual stimulation in the 
form of an objective or challenge, with the 
performer being subjected ro the consequences 
of their performance as it unfolds. Defining the 
parameter space for rhe interface and its 
components is the major challenge for the 
software developer. The parameter space needs 
ro facilitate rules of engagement that support 
the performers artistic practice while also 
providing emancipiHion from preconceived and 
mechanical processes. The rules of engagement 
should provide a consistent and accessible 
framework for rhe performer but wirhour 
rendering the interface predictable. 
Human evolution may be changing our 
inner world in ways that allow us ro learn more 
easily, undertake more simultaneous processes 
and become less rel.iant on our reflex actions, 
bur we still have an innate desire for emotional 
expression. Symbolic language has perhaps to a 
certain extent obscured our means of direct 
expression bur in our nerworked world we are 
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redefining the means of achieving this. By using 
sof~are interfaces to intervene in the process 
of improvisation we have an opportunity to 
bear influence on the performance parameters 
hitherto embodied in the relationships between 
and within components of improvised 
performance. Perhaps Gregen's insight may 
show the way forward for the design of 
interactive performance systems. 
As we succeed in lcsing the self, the security ofsingle 
rationalities and give way to the fluid and many-
smamed fonns of relationships by which ux are 
constituted, we may approach a condition of the 
relational sublime. 
(GrodinandLindlof1996139) 
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